The world oil supply has fallen by 8%-10% because of the latest conflict in the Persian Gulf,^[i] and India has started buying oil from other sources to make up the shortfall. This has included larger purchases of crude from Russia,^[ii] Venezuela,^[iii] from which U.S. sanctions have temporarily been lifted, and other sources outside the Persian Gulf. India has substantial refining capacity and is able to quickly process the crude to produce fuels such as diesel, petrol, aviation, and LPG (household cooking gas). This has kept the economy afloat, and India will not run short on fuel.

Several countries do not have sufficient domestic refining capacity and import finished petroleum products. They are at greater risk of running short. This is the state of India’s neighbours – Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal – which are all importers of petroleum products and are facing acute shortages. Pakistan and Sri Lanka have already introduced a 4-day work week to save fuel, while Sri Lanka has additionally introduced rationing for petrol and diesel. Leaders of developed nations such as the U.K.^[iv] and Australia^[v] have also warned of fuel shortages, as they don’t have sufficient refining capacity locally.

India is the world’s third-largest importer of fuel—4 million barrels/day, which costs the exchequer over $100 billion annually. The financial constraints will increase as oil prices have run within the range of $65-$70 per barrel for the past year, giving India the ability to run its many social sector programmes. Now, however, oil prices are up by over 50% to $105–$110 per barrel. For India, the spike means an extra outflow of $5 billion/month. If the crisis and the accompanying high prices persist, India’s GDP growth is projected to slow down from 7.6% last year to 6.5% in 2026-27.^[vi]

India relies on imports to meet about 90% of its petroleum needs, and this is unlikely to change. Domestically there have been no major oil discoveries in the past two decades. In 2025, Petroleum Minister Hardeep Puri spoke of there being Guyana-sized reserves in the Andaman Sea.^[vii] There was no follow-up to the statement, and in the absence of evidence, this remains speculation at best. In March 2026, India’s upstream major, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), announced a tender, potentially worth $18-$20 billion, to hire ships internationally to explore for oil and gas in the Andaman deepwater basin. There is no guarantee ONGC will find commercial-sized hydrocarbon reserves that will make a dent in India’s massive oil imports. If a discovery is made (speculative), it will take up to a decade to reach the market. India’s dependence on imported oil, therefore, continues unchanged for the foreseeable future.

India must take seriously a plan for future shocks. Energy markets are prone to fluctuations and are impacted by geopolitical events. For instance, prices of natural gas have seen three major spikes since 2010. First, after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, after which Japan went off nuclear power and shifted to gas. Second, after the 2022 Ukraine crisis, when Europe stopped buying Russian gas and shifted to LNG. The third instance is now, after Qatar stopped LNG production due to attacks on its energy installations. The oil market too shows such fluctuations – the routine play of an ecosystem. There will be other such events in the future.

The pain point for India is price, and it needs to be addressed financially. Historically, India has invested in oil fields in Russia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Mozambique and elsewhere. However, these acquisitions have been relatively small – approximately 15 million tonnes/year – about 6%-7% of India’s total oil consumption. Managing oil fields in another country is a complex undertaking, for which India has limited bandwidth. Even those acquisitions of new acreage slowed down sharply over the past decade, possibly due to the shift in government’s emphasis towards the green transition. The current crisis shows that green transitions have restricted potential and that oil is and will be the driver for the Indian economy.

India needs a fresh approach to cover the oil price risk – and the best way is to make equity investments in proven oil and gas fields in stable-resource economies overseas. The dividends and higher return from these investments during price spikes will partly offset the burden of costlier imports.

Some of these are in new energy sources, like shale oil, which has been the biggest shift in the petroleum sector over the past 25 years and has transformed the U.S. from a declining oil producer to the world’s largest. The U.S. now accounts for nearly 20% of the global oil production – almost as much oil as Russia and Saudi Arabia combined. India can benefit by investing in American oil companies purely as a financial investor, not the operator.

It’s not difficult. The U.S. has the world’s largest and most liquid financial markets, with hundreds of oil companies ranging from the very small to global super-majors such as Exxon and Chevron. For the companies themselves, a long-term investor like India, also energy-dependent, provides stability. Like the U.S., Canada and Australia have become important exporters of oil and natural gas, respectively. These are stable democracies with transparent regulatory environments – and are immune to the geopolitical upheaval common in the natural resource sector.

All three countries – the U.S., Canada, and Australia – have, since the early 2000s – put in place tighter rules for natural resource acquisitions by foreign governments. An Indian state-owned enterprise investing in resources is likely to trigger similar scrutiny. A sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which is a passive financial investor, will be a better vehicle for such investments. The SWFs of the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait have significant investments in all three countries, including sectors such as hydrocarbons and critical minerals. India, as a part of Pax Silica, the American initiative to create secure supply chains for critical minerals, should get similar treatment as the Gulf states.

For India to benefit, its attitude to such means of energy provision needs to change. Energy security comes not just from physically owning an oil field but also from a better-supplied oil market and having the funds to pay for the oil. India doesn’t have much choice: its economy will continue to run on oil for the foreseeable future, notwithstanding the rhetoric on green energy. The Modi government has been very lucky in one respect – oil prices have been moderate since 2014, creating fiscal space for the government. The events of the past few weeks show that this happy situation cannot be taken for granted – the government must act boldly to lock in these gains. Such investments will also give India an enhanced political presence in all the three countries.

[i] International Energy Agency. Oil Market Report: March 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2026

[ii] Bloomberg. “India Has Bought 60 Million Barrels of Russian Oil for April.” March 25, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-25/india-has-bought-60-million-barrels-of-russian-oil-for-april

[iii] Bloomberg. “India Has Bought 60 Million Barrels of Russian Oil for April.” March 25, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-25/india-has-bought-60-million-barrels-of-russian-oil-for-april

[iv] Prime Minister’s Office, United Kingdom. “PM Remarks, 1 April 2026.” https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-remarks-1-april-2026

[v] ABC News (Australia). “Anthony Albanese National Address on Fuel Crisis and Iran.” April 1, 2026. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-01/anthony-albanese-national-address-fuel-crisis-iran/106522770

[vi] The Economic Times. “ICRA Expects India’s GDP Growth to Moderate to 6.5% in FY27 amid West Asia Conflict.” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/icra-expects-indias-gdp-growth-to-moderate-to-6-5-in-fy27-amid-west-asia-conflict/articleshow/129903705.cms?from=mdr

[vii] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “Press Release.” https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2143550&reg=3&lang=2

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

The post India’s options after the Persian Gulf war appeared first on Gateway House.

In the contemporary history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the university has served far more than an auxiliary role to the state. It has functioned as the central pillar of modern national identity and the primary engine for what bibliometricians call ‘knowledge impact’ (Attarzadeh & Seyfidi, 2022). Prior to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Iranian academia had attained a global standing far better than that of most developing nations. The Iranian university system, once viewed as a strategic citadel—a means of projecting soft power while simultaneously securing the hard technical requirements of self-sufficiency—has changed drastically.

Did it falter?

For the last four decades, Iran has been navigating political upheavals, violence, and fractious currents of international isolation.  The local protests and then the conflict with the U.S. and Israel has seen a near-total internet blackout in January and again this month by the government in Tehran, casting doubts on whether Iranian universities can continue to operate. These disruptions are the most severe to hit the academic sector since the 1980 “cultural revolution,” which resulted in a three-year total closure of universities. Sustained digital disenfranchisement exerts immediate and systemic pressure on the schooling and higher education sectors. It affects each sector of the economy and each element of society; this essay focuses on higher education and scientific research.

What does a continued internet blackout do to the higher education system? It halts online teaching and cuts access to scholarly literature, data, and research software, freezing academic output. This digital isolation bars participation in peer review and international collaborations. Students and faculty are pushed out of the global academic community, unable to manage applications, fellowships, visas, or submit research to international journals and conferences (Erfani 2026).  From the 1996 peak in international collaboration to recent militarisation and conflicts, the university system has changed significantly.

Two main pressures shaped this: external ‘academic boycott’ due to sanctions, and internal ‘ideological purification’ by the state.

Iran faces an unprecedented existential crisis. Currently, the conflict has no end in sight. Military wars and armed aggression may have different impacts on the parties involved; the adverse effects on scientific advancement, scholarly engagement, and the sustenance of academia are irreversible. This weakens the bedrock that is meant to preserve human values and progress.

The ongoing crisis in and around Iran is not merely a matter of destroyed laboratories or vacant classrooms. It is the collapse of a legal and social contract that once positioned the university as the engine of national development. While geopolitical headlines focus on the kinetic aspects of regional warfare, a more profound destruction has occurred in the corridors of Iran’s universities and research institutions. The loss of key academic figures—through unceasing brain drain, as direct casualties, and through the intensifying “cleansing for political expediency” (Mosheim, 2026) marks the culmination of a slow and unfortunate decline.

The Pre-Sanction Era of Growth and Integration

Prior to the tightening of international sanctions in 2006 and the deep political fissures that followed the 2009 presidential election, Iranian higher education operated under a mandate of rapid expansion and modernisation. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the legal framework for education was defined by a five-year development plan, which sought to transition Iran into a knowledge-based economy. This growth was driven by a state-centric utilitarianism designed to modernise the workforce, yet it produced a significant socio-cultural tension. The state’s drive was often hyper-religious and mostly pharisaical. It was geared toward industrial needs, without accounting for shifting demographic realities.

STEM fields became the top national priority. Iran’s education spending was often higher than that of other countries in the region (Kokabisaghi et al. 2019). The government saw science as a source of international prestige beyond ideology. Universities acted as bridges for Iranian thinkers to connect with Western researchers. This was before politics became completely radicalised. The period pushed for ‘scientific meritocracy.’ Government departments had some technocratic freedom, and the university helped middle-class mobility. A favourable socio-legal climate enabled Iranian scholars to attend international conferences, fostering openness. Despite the Islamic Republic’s ideology, academics focused on rigour rather than politics (Habibi 2015; Beidollahkhani 2025). The early expansion of the Iranian university system was a paradox of state-driven utilitarianism and what seemed to be a genuine global ambition.

While the growth was engineered by the state to serve its own ends, the system enabled a level of international scientific exchange that, in retrospect, appears to be a lost era of integration. This period proved that Iranian intellectual talent was capable of global leadership when the doors of collaboration remained even partially ajar. The chart below has a non-exhaustive list of academic and research partnerships between universities in Iran and nations other than Russia and China. The current tragedy is not just the loss of funding, but the loss of that integrationist spirit. This foundation was severely tested as the geopolitical climate soured and international economic sanctions were imposed.

A Stanford University project called Stanford Iran 2040 Project provides a useful study (Azadi et al. 2020), employing a longitudinal analysis of Iran’s scientific trajectory and drawing on extensive datasets. In summary it reveals that Iran’s annual publication output increased from approximately 1,000 in 1997 to over 50,000 in 2018. Consequently, Iran’s proportional contribution to global scientific literature rose from 0.1% to 2.6% during this period. The disciplinary distribution of this output is characterised by a predominance in the fundamental sciences (41%), followed by medicine and health (22%), engineering (22%), agricultural and environmental sciences (10%), and social sciences (5%). The quality of output, however, presents a more complex picture. While the qualitative standing of these publications—as benchmarked by journal impact and rankings—demonstrates considerable disciplinary variance, engineering consistently performs best. Notably, this longitudinal data suggests that research quality has remained largely stable across most sectors. Nevertheless, a persistent discrepancy remains.

There are three contradictions and discrepancies: the restrictions on STEM research following sanctions, the brain drain from Iran, purges and institutional decline:

1. The STEM paradox of productivity vs quality

The performance of Iranian universities in the first decade of this century shows stark discordance. Science-metric providers noted that between 1996 and 2010, Iran’s scientific output rose 18-fold, from 736 to 13,238 published papers, and that it grew 11 times faster in Iran than the world average (MacKenzie, 2010; Coghlan, 2011). The paradox is that Iran produced more papers than ever before, yet the science behind them was increasingly ignored by the global community.  This discord is the direct result of the  crippling international sanctions (beginning in earnest in 2012 and re-imposed with enhanced pressure in 2018) imposed on Iran. It fundamentally altered productivity and criminalised knowledge transfer.

The Code of Federal Regulations under U.S. law treats research, teaching, or peer review with Iran as the export of services to a sanctioned country. The list includes Cuba, North Korea, and Syria.

The U.S. government’s Office of Foreign Assets Control approves academic collaboration with entities in sanctioned nations. The web of legal codes covers original research, meta-analyses, reviews, and case reports performed with designated entities.

Opinion pieces and translation services may be partially exempt under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but they still require OFAC review (Miller and Ziad-Miller, 2019). Breaking these rules carries a fine of up to $1 million and 20 years in jail per violation under Title 31 C.F.R. 500-599. Because of these sanctions and statutory restrictions, Iranian researchers struggled to import vital equipment—spectrometers, reagents, and engineering software—from around the world, including the U.S.

According to UN estimates based on country-level data without extrapolation (UNESCO, 2021), Iran’s investment in R&D as a share of GDP in 2018 was 0.83, much higher than India (0.65), Indonesia (0.23), Egypt (0.72), Argentina (0.54), and Mexico (0.31). Moreover, the number of full-time researchers per million inhabitants in 2018 was significantly higher in Iran (1,475) than in India (253), Indonesia (216), Egypt (687), and Argentina (1,192), and was more than double the average for all Arab states combined. Currency collapse, scientific isolation, and psychological strain hindered every aspect of Iranian researchers’ work and crippled science in Iran (Butler, 2019). Many shifted to theoretical modelling and simulation in materials science and nanotechnology. This kept the propensity of churning out publications high, but may have separated scientific and academic research from practical reality and industrial use.

Iranian universities experienced a more rapid transformation in the aftermath of the 2009 domestic protests. Research grants and faculty appointments were increasingly scrutinised by security agencies. Suspicion stifled international collaboration as scholars feared contact with foreign peers would be seen as espionage. The university was no longer viewed as a space for inquiry but as a potential site of soft war against the state. This led to a series of renewed nationwide anti-government protests, followed by the killing of thousands of protestors and activists.

When a nation’s scientific and academic elite are siloed into only local conversations and domestic journals, the iterative process of peer correction stops. The lack of intellectual visibility means that Iranian innovations in medicine or engineering, new ideas in social sciences, and critical reflections rooted in the humanities remain unvetted and unintegrated (Tarikhi, 2020). This isolation does not just hurt academia; it poses a terminal threat to the state’s own goals of civilian self-sufficiency, as it severs links to global R&D cycles and international academia, which are necessary conditions for modern socio-economic progress.

2. The great exodus of brainpower

The most quantifiable tragedy of the last two decades is the flight of human capital, or brain drain. Iran consistently ranks among the top countries for the emigration of its highly educated elite (Azadi et al., 2020). According to the International Monetary Fund estimates (IMF 2024), the annual loss of human capital from Iran is equivalent to an economic loss of over $50 billion—nearly matching the nation’s peak oil revenues in some years.

This must not be viewed as a choice made by individuals, but as an inevitable reaction to the deterioration of the “transnational social space” (Cooke and Wood 2026). Several factors were at play – an excessive inflation rate, a severely devalued currency, a disconnect from the economic benefits of globalisation, and a large population starved of the socio-cultural benefits of liberalisation. More importantly, the institutionalised ideological purge led to severe restrictions on the academic environment and the dilution of institutional autonomy in the garb of purifying scientific thought and inquiry. The classification of students (a legal mechanism to ban politically active students from education) and the 2022 protests (‘Woman, Life, Freedom’) led to a massive crackdown on university campuses.

For a PhD scholar in Engineering, for instance, the choice became clear: stay in an economy with 40% inflation, governed by a hyperbole-infused political system with limited freedom of research, or emigrate to another country as soon as possible. This led to a profound sense of “psychosocial despair” among the educated Iranian thought leaders.

This exodus of talent has created a missing middle class in the Iranian economy. Iran awards several doctorates and trains many scientists every year. However, the lack of an internationally benchmarked legal framework to protect intellectual property and the dominance of quasi-state foundations over the private sector resulted in a fractured innovation ecosystem incapable of absorbing them. Iran’s investment in education effectively serves as a major subsidy to other nations where these scholars eventually settle, create new knowledge, publish their academic research, and file patents for foreign organisations.

3. Purges and institutional decline

The institutional decline of the Iranian university reached a tipping point during the 2021–2023 purge. This “Second Cultural Revolution” was framed as a strategy to “purify” universities in the wake of protests. In a punitive shake-up designed to eliminate dissent, the state expelled and, in some cases, imprisoned thousands of school principals and professors. These academicians were not merely removed; they were replaced by loyal propagandists.

The substitution of expertise for ideology has been described as “a coup by the security apparatus against science” (Stevenson 2024). This hollowing out of the faculty directly correlates with the plummeting qualitative rankings of Iranian institutions, as the replacement cohort lacks the international standing and research history of their predecessors.

Over the last 20 years, the performance of Iranian universities in global rankings has presented a deceptive picture. On the surface, institutions such as the University of Tehran and Sharif University maintained, or even improved, their positions through the mid-2010s. Quantitatively, these two Iranian universities ranked among the top 500 in the Times Higher Education (THE) rankings across parameters. However, a deeper analysis reveals a different story. While citation counts are high—sometimes bolstered by internal citation networks—scores for “International Outlook” and “Industry Income” have stagnated (THE, 2025). While Iran once outpaced regional rivals such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia in STEM fields, the last decade has seen a reversal. While top Saudi Arabian universities aggressively invested in global talent, Iranian labs have struggled with basic equipment, leading to a plateau in scientific breakthroughs.

To improve its standing in global university rankings, the government implemented a legal mandate requiring PhD students to publish in journals used by ranking agencies such as QS in their methodologies to graduate. This led to a culture of a “publication factory”, often marred by self-citation and, in some cases, the proliferation of predatory publishing to meet state-imposed quotas, leading to “modernity without development” (Sadeh et al. 2019). In the Times Higher Education rankings, Iranian universities consistently score in the bottom decile on the ‘International Outlook’ parameter. The lack of foreign faculty, the declining number of international collaborators and co-authors in scholarly work, and the isolation of domestic researchers—exacerbated by developments that began in 2025—have further damaged these institutions (Hashjin et al., 2025).

Repression mechanisms also led to the gradual demise of leading Iranian institutions. Reports of nationwide internet shutdowns and communications blackouts in early 2026, prior to the attack by the U.S. and Israeli forces, indicate a state strategy to conceal human rights violations and suppress the documentation of the crackdown on students and faculty (Amnesty International 2026; Associated Press 2026). These shutdowns represent a deliberate attempt to isolate Iranian academia from global oversight and commentary.

Innovation in Isolation

Despite the hollowing out of academic institutions, Iran maintained a high Innovation Efficiency Ratio, ranking 11th globally (Kokabisaghi et al. 2019). The most damning evidence of the decline in scientific temperament lies in the disconnect between scientific papers and industrial reality, such that Iran’s rank on international innovation indicators remains unnoticeable (Akhondzadeh, 2017). While scientific papers grew by nearly 500% between 2005 and 2018, Iranian filings with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or the European Patent Office – two of the largest patent offices in the world – remained negligible.

This is not surprising. According to the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), most Iranian patents are utility models filed domestically, which lack the global novelty required for international competitiveness (WIPO 2025). Further, there is a near-total absence of knowledge spillover from the university to the manufacturing sector. The Iranian automotive industry, for instance, continues to rely on decades-old foreign platforms despite having thousands of domestic papers in advanced automotive engineering (Mazdeh et al., 2016). The focus of Iranian innovation, despite being limited in rigour and application, has shifted from civil advancement to military reconstitution (Spruk, 2026). Having suffered irreversible losses to military and civilian infrastructure during the 2024 Israeli campaign, the 12-Day War of June 2025, and the conflict with the U.S., which began early March 2026, Tehran has pivoted its remaining scientific talent in what can only be termed an existential fight for survival.

The Future of the Iranian Academia

The transformation of higher education and research in Iran over the last twenty years is a cautionary tale in cultural sociology and a warning in political economy. Iran has transitioned from a global colleague with high rates of international collaboration to an isolated, ideologically purged state that has pivoted its innovation engine toward survival. The outward migration of talented Iranians continues to pose a terminal threat to the nation’s long-term prosperity.

Protection for free exchange of ideas without any censorship or repression, and irrespective of creed, is the raison d’être for a modern egalitarian society. It is the necessary condition for shared prosperity. The sufficient condition, though, is the preservation of scientific temperament, which is the common but differentiated responsibility of all citizens and the state. But when a state tries to replace its professors with propagandists, students with sycophants, scholarship with sanctimonious rhetoric, intellectuals with influencers, it begins a painful journey towards imminent stagnation. History is replete with instances when men in power placed primacy on narcissistic rage for absolute dominance over building trust-based social cohesion. Everything else becomes secondary – the precision of the most advanced missiles, rich civilisational history, and even the capitalist might of the economy.

It was, after all, a philosopher and not a historian who said that “we learn from history that we do not learn from history” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel). Surely a vital lesson for Iran, but several nation-states and their leaders will do well to recognise this, for their own societies and humanity.

Ashish Bharadwaj is the Distinguished Fellow for Law and Education, Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

Endnotes:

*Note: This is a non-exhaustive list based on an online search. Several webpages were either blocked or had broken links. The fields of cooperation are indicative and may not include all the areas of cooperation. Some signed MoUs are currently active, while others may have lapsed. Partnerships/collaborations vary in scope (student mobility, summer schools, joint research) and in who the host institution is for visiting students & scholars. Depending on available information, the year could indicate the year of commencement, the year of termination, or the year the MoU was signed.

1. Amnesty International. 2026. What happened at the protests in Iran?. Online News Article.
2. Associated Press. 2026. Iran supreme leader signals upcoming crackdown on protesters ‘ruining their own streets’ for Trump. Online Article.
3. Attarzadeh, B., & Seyfodini, H.S. 2022. National identity, transnational ideology, and cultural policy in Iran. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 29, 807 – 827.
4. Azadi, P., Mirramezani, M., Mesgaran, M. Migration and Brain Drain from Iran, Working Paper 9, Stanford Iran 2040 Project, Stanford University, April 2020.
5. Akhondzadeh, S. 2017. Innovation and Technology in Iran. Avicenna Journal of Medical Biotechnology 9(3), pp. 113-114.
6. Beidollahkhani, A. 2025. Policy-Mediated Epistemic Control: How Authoritarian Regimes Repurpose Graduate Political Science Research Agenda–The Case of Islamic Republic of Iran. Higher Education Policy
7. Butler, D. 2019. How US sanctions are crippling science in Iran, Nature, 13-14: September
8. Coghlan A. 2011. Iran is top of the world in science growth. New Scientist (Science in Society)
9. Cooke, F. L. and Wood, G. 2026. “International Sanctions, Transnational Social Space Dynamics, and Human Resource Implications for Multinational Enterprises”, in Reinterpreting Multinational Enterprises through a Revitalized Transnational Social Space Perspective, Eds. Mike Geppert, Ödül Bozkurt, Christoph Dörrenbächer, Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 101
10. Erfani, E. 2026. “Internet Blackout: Iran’s Academic Shutdown.” Nature, Volume 650: 516
11. Habibi, N. 2015. “Iran’s overeducation crisis”, Middle East Brief 85(89), Brandeis University
12. Hashjin, A. A., Shabani, E., Tahmasebi, A., Farrokhi, P. & Akgün, H. S. 2025. International accreditation in Iranian universities of medical sciences: a qualitative analysis of challenges and solutions. BMC Medical Education 25:1447.
13. 2024. Staff Report for the 2024 Article IV Consultation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
14. Kokabisaghi, F., Miller, A.C., B.R. Farshid, Mahmood, A.S., Zarchi, A.K., et al. 2019. “Impact of United States political sanctions on international collaborations and research in Iran.” BMJ Global Health Vol 4, No. 5.
15. MacKenzie D. 2010. Iran showing fastest scientific growth of any country. New Scientist (Science in Society).
16. Mazdeh, M. M., Jafari, M., Akhavan, P. & Mousavi, S. J. 2016. Improving Product Development Performance Through Knowledge Outsourcing: A Study of the Iranian Automotive Industry. The South African Journal of Industrial Engineering 27(2), pp. 1-12.
17. Miller, A. C. and Ziad-Miller, A. 2019. “United States Federal Government Regulation of International Research Collaborations: What Every Physician-Scientist Should Know.” International Journal of Critical Illness and Injury Science, Vol 9, No. 1: 5.
18. Mosheim, T. 2026. Iran’s universities battered but not beyond repair. Times Higher Education.
19. Sadeh, S., Mirramezani, M. B. Mesgaran, A. Feizpour, P. Azadi. The Scientific Output of Iran: Quantity, Quality, and Corruption, Working Paper 7, Stanford Iran 2040 Project, Stanford University, February.
20. Spruk, R. 2026. Confrontation with the West and Long-Run Economic and Institutional Outcomes: Evidence from Iran. Preprint: arXiv and Cornell Tech
21. Stevenson, Struan. 2024. “Punitive Purge of Teachers and University Professors in Iran.” Former Scottish Representative to the European Parliament, Personal Blog
22. Times Higher Education. 2025. World University Rankings 2025: Iran Analysis
23. Times Higher Education. 2026. Arab University Rankings 2026
24. 2021. Science Report: The Race Against Time for Smarter Development. Paris
25. World Intellectual Property Organization. 2025. Global Innovation Index 2025: Iran. Geneva

The post The siege of Iranian higher education appeared first on Gateway House.

As the war between Iran, Israel and the U.S. rages on, an important visit that preceded the start of the conflict has been overshadowed. It was the state visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel on February 25-26, 2026. In the holy city of Jerusalem, home to the world’s three major religions, a new script of win-win partnership between India and Israel, the two like-minded democracies and strategic partners, was written on February 26, opening new gateways for closer collaboration in areas of defence, critical technologies and cyber security.

Unfortunately, and tragically, two days later, the U.S.-Israel joint strike on Iran hijacked the headlines and global attention, and the newly minted Delhi-Jerusalem script was written, opening new gateways for closer collaboration in areas of defence, critical technologies and cybersecurity. Some sections of the public in India mostly focused on the timing of the visit, reinforcing the impression that India has tilted towards the U.S.-Israel camp.

These debates will go on endlessly – about the timing of the visit and whether Israel shared intelligence with India during the imminent war. In the world of realpolitik, the country’s core national interests come first, and seen thus, advancing security and strategic partnership with Israel has its own logic and rationale. So it is important to take an objective review of PM Modi’s visit to Jerusalem and its implications for India’s security and the overarching goal of Viksit Bharat. The talks between Modi and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu upgraded India-Israel ties to the level of “Special Strategic Partnership”, a category reserved for very few countries, viz., the U.S., Russia, France and South Korea.

There are five major takeaways.

First, the visit was a compelling demonstration of India’s strategic autonomy and not an erosion of neutrality, as made out by some critics. PM Modi visited Israel with the full knowledge that it would be negatively viewed by left-liberal ideologues back home, who see any attempt at forging closer relations with Israel as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. India has not abandoned the Palestinian cause; for a reality check, India hosted the Palestinian Foreign Minister Varsen Aghabekian Shahin^[1] in New Delhi on January 30, 2026, and hosted the India-Arab Ministers’ Forum^[2] on January 31, 2026, just days before Modi visited Israel.

Secondly, it was payback time for New Delhi. Israel was the only country that did not mince words and supported India’s right of self-defence during “Operation Sindoor.” Israel-supplied weapons helped India counter Pakistan’s offence. Many countries India considered close strategic partners preferred to remain ambivalent and played their own games. Against this backdrop, India’s core agenda with Israel during Modi’s visit was to bolster the defence and security partnership with Israel, the bedrock of bilateral ties. The outcomes were substantive and transformational. The two sides decided to accelerate joint development, joint production, and transfer of technology, with the overarching goal of bolstering Aatmanirbhar Bharat, India’s ongoing quest for self-reliance in indigenous defence technology.

Thirdly, as the fellow sufferers of terrorism, the two leaders took a strong stand against it. In a compelling address to the Knesset on February 25, PM Modi reaffirmed India’s solidarity with Israel in the wake of the Hamas attacks on Israelis over two years ago, saying, “With a heavy heart, we share your grief.”^[3] “India stands with Israel – firmly, with full conviction – in this moment and beyond.” A day later, with Netanyahu at his side, PM Modi told journalists at a joint press conference: Israel and India agree there is “no place for terrorism in the world, in any form.” These statements are important for a critical reason: as Pakistan continues with its persiflage and double-talk on cross-border terror, India can count on Israel as its steadfast partner against the neighbouring country’s efforts to derail India’s growth story.

Fourth, the talks positioned technology as the key driver of this new elevated phase in the India-Israel partnership. The two sides unveiled a Critical and Emerging Technologies Partnership, which will impart fresh momentum to cooperation in emerging frontiers such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and critical minerals.

Fifth, the focus on a deeper economic and development partnership. A clutch of pacts, covering diverse sectors including agricultural innovation and technologies, the use of civilian drones, satellite data, irrigation and fertilisation management and the transfer of knowledge in advanced agricultural technologies, was signed. This builds on the India-Israel Bilateral Investment Agreement signed in September 2025 and will accelerate negotiations for a Free Trade Area agreement.

Tel Aviv is now in the category of New Delhi’s top trusted partners which includes the U.S., Russia and the European Union. In terms of optics and concrete outcomes, Modi’s visit succeeded in changing the narrative of the India-Israel partnership and bringing to a decisive end the equivocation on the part of New Delhi to embrace Israel as a key partner in “Viksit Bharat” and “Surakshit Bharat.”

The commencement of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war means that India will have to deftly practise and demonstrate its strategic autonomy by managing heterogeneous and often contrapuntal relationships and strike a balance in its ties with the U.S. and Israel on the one hand and Iran and the Arab world on the other hand. India has centuries-old civilisational ties with Iran, but it has also ancient ties with Israel. The Book of Esther refers to India as ‘Hodu’, and the Talmud records trade with India in ancient times, as PM Modi reminded the Israeli parliament. In this multiplex and fracturing world, this is no time for binaries or zero-sum games. India needs all countries, big and small, to help fructify its vision of a humane, compassionate and balanced world order.^[4]

Manish Chand is CEO, Centre for Global India Insights, New Delhi

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

[1] News on Air. “EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar Meets with Foreign Affairs Minister of Palestine Varsen Aghabekian Shahin in New Delhi.” https://www.newsonair.gov.in/eam-dr-s-jaishankar-meets-with-foreign-affairs-minister-of-palestine-varsen-aghabekian-shahin-in-new-delhi/

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “2nd India–Arab Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.” https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F40622%2F2nd_IndiaArab_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting

[3] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Prime Minister’s Address to the Knesset, February 25, 2026.” https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/40821/Prime_Ministers_Address_to_the_Knesset_February_25_2026

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s Opening Remarks at the Inaugural Leaders’ Session of the Voice of Global South Summit 2023.”  https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/36109/Prime_Minister_Shri_Narendra_Modis_Opening_Remarks_at_the_Inaugural_Leaders_Session_of_Voice_of_Global_South_Summit_2023 

The post Modi’s Israel visit brings defence and tech appeared first on Gateway House.

With Iran in the news, the Parsi community in India is finding that their peripheral connection to the country evokes interest. Iran is the land of their very distant ancestry. Parsis are the followers of the prophet Zarathustra, who preached the ancient Persian faith, considered the world’s oldest monotheistic religion. It exercised a profound influence on later religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam on issues such as heaven, hell and the Day of Judgement.

Parsis see themselves as inheritors of the glorious traditions of two great Persian empires, the Achaemenid (550-330 BCE) and the Sassanid (224-651 CE). The ruins of Persepolis, standing majestically atop a hill, an architectural marvel of the ancient world, are a reminder of the legacy of the mighty Persian empire founded by Cyrus the Great was fortified by Darius the First. A replica of the `Cylinder of Cyrus’ from 539 BC is preserved in the United Nations building in New York and is acknowledged as the world’s first bill of human rights. The Old Testament refers to Cyrus, King of Persia, who conquered Babylon and set free the Jews who had lived in captivity for 70 years, allowing them to return to Jerusalem. The Book of Ezra refers to Cyrus as “Anointed of “The Lord”, a term normally reserved for Jewish prophets. 

The Parsis fled Persia for India about a century after the Sassanid empire collapsed and Persia came under Arab control following the Battle of Nahavand in 642 CE. India and Persia were two ancient civilisations with a deep connection and similar roots. Their early dialects, Vedic Sanskrit and Avestan, are sister languages with many common words, sometimes with opposite meanings. Their religions have several common concepts, including the deification of fire. The commonalities between the two countries continue. The most obvious is an extensive vocabulary of familiar words: khush, jabardast, hafta, sal, pyar mohbat, muskeelian, meherbani, tehzeeb, etc.

Persian was the official language for the Indian courts, administration and literature under the Mughal emperors and even early British rule. The fabled mosques and palaces of Persia, with their brilliant colours and delicate workmanship, was the inspiration for India’s Mughal monuments. Great Persian poets like Firdosi, Omar Khayam, Hafez, Rumi and Sa’di had a huge impact on Indian literature. Despite their theocratic state, the Iranians have remained proud of their pre-Islamic heritage, whether it is Persepolis or the Tomb of Cyrus. The winged Farohar, symbol of the Zoroastrian deity Ahura Mazda, can be seen on some Islamic houses and across tourist shops in the country. 

Anjuman Atash Bahram, Mumbai, with the winged Farohar symbol at the top.                             Image credits: Heritage India

Iranians constantly emphasised that they were Persian Aryans as opposed to being of Arabic origins like most of West Asia. Many Iranians steadfastly continue to celebrate the ancient spring festival of Navroze with flowers and fruit decorations despite the disapproval of hardline Muslim clerics.

The Persian civilisational journey is a contrast with that of Pakistan, which inherited the famous cradle of civilisation, Mohenjo Daro, in Sindh. Few Pakistanis visit this glorious site; the locals feel little ancestral connection to the site, preferring to trace their roots to West Asia and not to Mohenjo Daro, despite being of sub-continental ethnicity.

Persia and India’s impact on each other go back to antiquity. But the extent of the Persian influence on the Parsi identity is more difficult to quantify. Till the 19th century, and even today for formal occasions, the Parsis have elements of Persian style in their dress code, including covering their heads. Men still wear long, stiff, lacquered black pagris or black prayer caps to the fire temple. Parsi women took to the sari early, but Persian elegance with bold colours and refined design is seen in their Chinese-style embroidered gharas. Their success in cultivating fruit orchards, usually chikoos or mangoes. is often attributed to their Persian heritage.

Wedding photograph of a Parsi couple in traditional attire from the 1900’s. Image credits: Chitravali

Rock icon Freddie Mercury, though a Parsi who consciously tried to hide his identity, in an unguarded moment admitted that his flamboyant persona was because he was a “Persian Popinjay”. 

Farrokh Bulsara, aka Freddie Mercury (centre), with his father, Bomi, and mother, Jer Bulsara, who were a part of the Parsi community from Bulsar (present-day Valsad), Gujarat. Image credits: Mid-Day

Persian influence is also glimpsed in Parsi food, where fruit and nuts are common embellishments in savoury dishes. The later Zoroastrian immigrants, the Iranis, who arrived in India in the 19th and 20th centuries looking for better opportunities, set up several bakeries and cafes in Mumbai in the style of those back in Iran. Most familiar Parsi names, such as Meher, Feroze, Hormaz, Darius, Jamshed, Dinshaw, Rustom, Sorab, Niloufer, Roxana et al., continue to be popular not just in Iran but all over West Asia. The names are from Avestan times and appear in Zoroastrian folklore and history.

Yazdani Bakery, 73 years old, is one of Mumbai’s iconic Iranian bakeries. Much loved by locals, it has been cherished through paintings and artworks, as seen on the left.

Despite this deep cultural connect, however, Parsis do not identify with Iran as the mother country. They left for India in the eighth century after more than a 100 years of religious persecution following the Arab invasion of Persia and assimilated completely with India, even while rigidly maintaining their own identity and religion. The local people named the new arrivals Parsis since they came from the Pars region in Iran. Zoroastrians who left Iran, however, retained ties with their co-religionists back home over the centuries through messages known as Rivayats. But while initially it was the Indian side which deferred to the spiritual advice from their fellow believers in Iran, gradually the tables turned as the Parsis became more prosperous and influential and the Iranian Zoroastrians more marginalised. 

For instance, when the Iranian Zoroastrians pointed out the inaccuracies in the Parsi calendar, with spring falling in August, many Parsi scholars declined to own their mistake in calculation. While back in Iran and much of Central Asia, modern-day Navroze and spring are ushered in on the basis of the vernal equinox and not calendars. Orthodox Parsis stick dogmatically to their own calendar. They did eventually reach a compromise – but only to dub the new equinox festival as Jamshedji Navroz.

In the mid-nineteenth century, prominent Parsis, enlisting the help of the British government, sought to alleviate the lot of their Zoroastrian brethren in Iran by getting the jizya tax – levied for centuries by the Muslim rulers on all non-Muslim communities such as Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians was abolished by 1882, encouraging them to settle in India with their assistance.

The 20th century’s self-anointed Iranian monarchs, Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son Mohammed Reza Shah II, impressed with the achievements of the progressive Parsis in India, attempted to persuade them to return to Iran. Though Parsis often referred approvingly to II as “apro Shah” (Our Shah) since his family has assumed the title Pahlavi from pre-Islamic Persia and he celebrated the 2,500-year anniversary of Cyrus’s dynasty with jaw-dropping extravagance, he could not be enticed to leave India. The Shah, by playing up Persia’s ancient glory, only further alienated the Muslim theocracy and may have contributed to the Islamic revolution.^[1]

In 19th-century British Raj India, Christian missionaries who converted a Parsi boy taunted the Parsis, suggesting that they recited their prayers by rote without understanding them. This motivated the Parsis to take renewed interest in learning the dead languages of Persia, in which their scriptures are written. The generations of Parsi boys were made to study the language of their liturgical texts in Avestan, the extinct Persian language dating back to 1500 BCE.

It has similarities to Vedic Sanskrit and Pahlavi spoken from the 3rd to the 7th century CE. Today, Zoroastrianism and the early Persian language are taught in a few educational institutions in India, such as the K.R. Cama Oriental Institute in Mumbai and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, and some centres in the West, such as SOAS in London, are funded by Parsi trusts. But in present-day Iran, there seems to be little interest in learning this ancient language.

Coomi Kapoor is the author of The Tatas, Freddie Mercury and Other Bawas: An Intimate History of the Parsis.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

© Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Avesta.org. “The Persian Rivayats.” Edited by Ervad Bamanji Nusserwanji Dhabhar.
https://www.avesta.org/rivayats/rivayats.htm

The post The Persian-Parsi identity appeared first on Gateway House.

Five years after the February 2021 military coup and eight weeks after the general elections were held, Myanmar is getting ready, once again, to transition from military rule to a ‘hybrid democracy’ stipulated in the 2008 Constitution. A civilian government, which shares powers with the Tatmadaw or the Armed Forces, will be formed in April, with a new president and a vice president elected in the coming days. The new Parliament has already been convened.

This is a re-enactment of the political landscape of March 2011, following the 2010 elections, except that hope prevailed then, whereas scepticism and despair now rule in many quarters. Myanmar analysts view it as less of a transition to democracy and more of a transition from “a military-clad dictatorship to a civilian-clothed one.”[i]

The new leadership is facing multiple crises. First, the West Asia conflict has risked dramatically deepening Myanmar’s problems and obscuring it from the international view. The UN special rapporteur on human rights points out that humanitarian aid for over 3.5 million people displaced due to the Myanmar civil war is likely to dwindle further as international organisations shift their focus and resources to West Asia.[ii]

Second, even after the elections, armed clashes between the military and the resistance have not ceased. They continue with varying intensity and frequency across several parts of the country, including the Kachin, Shan, Chin, Karen, and Rakhine states. Aerial strikes by the Tatmadaw and attacks by select Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) on government troops, with civilian casualties being a regular feature, have continued unabated.

Yet, there is little doubt that the military situation has turned in favour of the government. The Tatmadaw has come a long way since October 2023, when the Operation 1027 of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of Ta’ang, Kokang, and Rakhine EAOs, inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on government troops in the northern Shan State. Through a mix of retreat, reinforcement, and securing China’s crucial support, Naypyidaw eventually gained ground to the extent that two years later, it succeeded in holding elections in 80% of the country’s townships in a peaceful environment.

Now, military strategists are busy re-arranging the political chessboard. Speakers for the two houses of Parliament have been selected from among the top army or police personnel. The trusted colleagues of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing staff the senior-most positions of the Tatmadaw. The only uncertainty is about him. The option of his retirement, which was touted before the elections, is off the table. He aspires to be the next president, while retaining effective control of the Tatmadaw. Moves are afoot to get him elected president and to enable him to serve as chair of the newly created Union Consultative Council, which will oversee all state functions. With him at the apex of the new power architecture, political opposition and many EAOs are unlikely to participate in any national dialogue the government may try to convene. Thus, Myanmar may well have to live with a continued and costly stalemate.

The international situation, too, favours the military government. Apart from China, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Indo-China region (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), and Thailand are all inclined toward this status. ASEAN, saddled with its failed Five Point Consensus formula, may still take more time to craft a fresh basis for dealing with the new military-civilian government. The UN, the U.S., and the EU remain opposed to the emerging political configuration, but they are far too distracted elsewhere to pay much attention to Myanmar. Yet, some in Washington have begun advocating a ‘calibrated engagement’ with the military to counter China’s mounting influence. The lifting of long-standing sanctions on Myanmar will help establish goodwill.

India’s traditional ‘two-track’ policy of cultivating cooperation with the military government and extending political and moral support for the cause of democracy has delivered largely satisfactory results. However, now in the fast-changing context, the time has come to factor in recent developments that necessitate a more nuanced policy. For instance, New Delhi should engage with the new civilian government as early as possible.

Three key challenges are relevant here.

One, China’s footprint has expanded considerably since the coup. Beijing’s triple role – as a reliable partner of several EAOs, a friend of the military, and a mediator between the two sides – has been markedly successful. In contrast, India wisely avoids getting involved in internal conflicts. But it is constrained by indefinite delays in completing its mega projects, such as the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan multi-modal transport projects, due to the unstable security situation. Bilateral trade has increased, but few new development projects have been announced. The completion of some projects will demonstrate good intent and ease the lives of ordinary people.

Two, the military’s loss of control over large parts of the western region bordering India has motivated New Delhi to adopt a policy of ‘benign engagement’ with the EAOs that control this region. However, there is a vast gap between the expectations of one side and the capabilities of the other. Hence, the effectiveness of this policy needs to be re-examined if India is to see visible benefits and see some of its initiatives move ahead.

Three, new challenges have appeared in the Northeast. These are a significant increase in drug trafficking; expansion of cybercrimes along the Myanmar-Thailand border with the involvement of a large number of Indian IT professionals; illegal inflow of arms into India; and, as the recent case of a U.S. citizen and six Ukrainians apprehended by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) shows, the growing involvement of external forces that help Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) operating from Myanmar. Speaking recently in Delhi at a conference at the United Service Institution of India (USI), a senior Army official asserted that India’s handling of insurgencies in its own border areas, its work on healing ethnic tensions, and its efforts to reduce external influences have improved the situation today. But other experts point out that it grows ever murkier with shades of grey dominating the entire security and strategic landscape in the Northeast.

Another dimension is the government’s attempt to improve border management through ‘hybrid fencing’ along the entire 1,643-kilometer-long border with Myanmar and by suspending the Free Movement Regime. The Indian establishment is fully committed to them, whereas at the people’s level in a few Northeastern states, discontent prevails. A delegation of experts from the Ministry of External Affairs visited the area in mid-March 2026 to gather perceptions of government policy and returned with valuable inputs about ground realities.

Indian policymakers must closely monitor how Myanmar’s second shot at limited democracy evolves, given the wide gap between the government and the opposition. They should also ensure that India-Myanmar border management promotes better relations with Myanmar and a more effective security and social environment in the Northeast.

In the end, however, the Southeast Asian nation’s political transition will be shaped by its own leaders, elites, and the people themselves. Their internal dynamics will determine the exact blend of hope and despair for Myanmar’s future.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[i] ‘Myanmar Parliament says to start process to select new president on March 30’, The Straits Times, 20 March 2026, The quotation is attributed to independent analyst Htin Kyaw Aye.  https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-parliament-says-to-start-process-to-select-new-president-on-march-30

[ii] ‘Mideast war risks dramatically deepening Myanmar crisis: UN expert’, Mizzima, 13 March 2026, The quotation is attributed to Tom Andrews. https://eng.mizzima.com/2026/03/13/32130

The post Myanmar’s second shot at limited democracy appeared first on Gateway House.

The Arctic as a region sits at the crossroads of a shifting world order, exemplified recently by the Trump Administration’s audacious rhetoric about control of Greenland. The politics in the region certainly reflect the logic of both cooperation and competition: Transboundary processes and interconnections necessitate regional coordination across the Arctic. At the same time, national security concerns – such as military positioning across the NATO-Russia divide – necessitate the logic of competition. Rapid environmental alterations, driven by global climate change and likely to precipitate the first ice-free summer day in the Central Arctic Ocean before 2030,^[1] continue to reshape both Arctic governance and security.

Much of what is understood as the Arctic lies under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the eight Arctic states – Canada, Denmark (via Greenland/Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. – and overlaps with the interconnected homelands of Arctic Indigenous peoples. Parts of the Central Arctic Ocean, at the top of the world, are designated as ‘high seas’ under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—the ‘ocean constitution’ that grants coastal states their exclusive economic zones while also safeguarding the rights of other users.

The Arctic Council has, for three decades, brought together the Arctic states, the Indigenous peoples of the region, and leading scientific expertise to address cross-border environmental and social challenges. India has served as an accredited observer to the Arctic Council since 2013 and is therefore positioned to make regular contributions to Council working group projects. Building on the assessments and outcomes produced by the Arctic Council, several key regional and bilateral binding agreements have been negotiated in recent decades. They address search and rescue, oil spill preparedness and response, and marine traffic management (for example, in the Bering Strait) and establish a precautionary approach to potential future fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.

The Arctic Council’s cooperation was impacted by Russia’s  invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the other Arctic states suspending cooperation with Russia while the country held the rotating chairmanship role.^[2] Today, under the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), the Arctic Council continues its work on social and environmental issues at a ‘low politics’ level primarily in working groups, with high-level political cooperation still largely on ice as a continuing response to Russia’s war in Ukraine.^[3]

Pressing security concerns and abruptly changing economic patterns stress-test these cooperative arrangements. The Arctic has long held strategic significance for all Arctic states.^[4] The accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the Russia-Ukraine war means that seven of eight Arctic states are NATO members. This has given new impetus to security coordination in the Arctic among the NATO states. Statements by the U.S. administration about its “need for Greenland” for strategic purposes, combined with U.S. President Donald Trump’s refusal to rule out the use of military force, certainly have had a chilling effect across the broader transatlantic security community—even as military-level cooperation and coordination within NATO continued uninterrupted.

While the need to stand firmly by the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark continues to be an important foreign policy position for the Nordic countries and Canada, this period of tension has also resulted in a NATO-wide consolidation of Arctic-related military measures in the newly launched Arctic Sentry, which coordinates and synchronises Arctic initiatives carried out by NATO member states.^[5]

Growing interest in minerals essential to the green transition and to modern defence systems has also brought heightened attention to the Arctic, as states seek to counterbalance China’s dominance in mining and refining these critical minerals and to “friendshore” key supply chains.^[6] Critical minerals were, for example, initially cited as one justification for increased U.S. interest in Greenland. While reserves of important minerals can indeed be found across the Arctic region, with 23 of 34 critical raw materials as defined by the EU to be found in Greenland,^[7] the lack of infrastructure to support extraction makes mining a logistically daunting and expensive undertaking, and interest often turns to reserves in more accessible climes. Even as Arctic sea ice patterns continue to change and retreat seasonally in the coming decades, physical distance, prolonged darkness, uneven and shifting ice conditions, and the continued absence of supporting infrastructure will all remain major factors shaping the scope and feasibility of human activity in the region.^[8]

The Arctic region is embedded within a global political landscape that is increasingly unpredictable. In such a fragmented world, the ability to stitch together networks across multiple scales and to make effective use of the governance tools already available is essential. One such could be for  all states wishing to support a safe, sustainable and governed Arctic to work with private sector actors to increase adherence to international shipping regulations, such as the Polar Code.^[9]

The Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen wrote that one should never wear one’s best trousers when setting out to address important political challenges. His words are a reminder that the work ahead in Arctic governance, and relatedly in global governance for oceans, ecosystems, and broader planetary challenges, may be incremental and frustrating yet remains indispensable.

Elana Wilson Rowe is an Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Professor of Global Governance at the Norwegian University of the Life Sciences.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1] Heuzé, C. & Jahn, A. 2024. The first ice free day in the Arctic Ocean could occur before 2030, Nat Commun 15, 10101, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024 54508-3

[2] Spence, Jennifer, Hannah Chenok, Elana Wilson Rowe, Malgorzata Smieszek-Rice, Margaret Williams and Fran Ulmer. “Arctic Climate Science: A Way Forward for Cooperation through the Arctic Council and Beyond.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and UiT The Arctic University of Norway, March 18, 2024

[3] Balton, David and Stirling Haig. “Revitalizing the Arctic Council.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 24, 2026

[4] Friis, Karsten and Elana Wilson Rowe. Keeping Your Cool: Arctic Security Challenges across Time and Space, an Input Memo to the Arctic Security Roundtable at the Munich Security Conference. NUPI. https://www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/cristin-pub/keeping-your-cool-arctic-security-challenges-across-time-and-space, February 2026.

[5]Boulègue, Mathieu.  “NATO Awakens in the High North“. CEPA, March 19, 2026
https://cepa.org/article/nato-awakens-in-the-high-north/

[6] IEA (2025), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025, Licence: CC BY 4.0; Leonard Schütte, “Economics: Trade Off,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, 79-85, https://doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457.

[7] Government of Greenland, EU and Greenland sign strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials value chains, https://govmin.gl/2023/11/eu-and-greenland-sign-strategic-partnership-on-sustainable-raw-materials-value-chains/

[8] Friis, K, Mike Sfraga & Elana Wilson Rowe. 2025. Memo to the Arctic Security Roundtable: The geopolitics of Arctic economic activities. NUPI Research Paper, 1/2025. https://www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/ cristin-pub/memo-to-the-arctic-security roundtable-the-geopolitics-of-arctic economic-activities

[9] https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/polar-default.aspx

The post Arctic politics: between competition and cooperation appeared first on Gateway House.

As the war in the Persian Gulf completes its third week, India’s South Asian neighbours – Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal – are facing its economic impact. All these countries have witnessed severe economic and political unrest in the recent past, and the economic turmoil arising from the Gulf will complicate the journey to stability.

While most of the economic focus of the conflict has been on oil prices, natural gas has seen a much larger disruption. Qatar, which is the world’s third-largest producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), declared force majeure and paused gas deliveries on 4^th March.^[i] Bangladesh, which relies on natural gas for over half of its energy needs, felt the impact almost immediately. It had to acquire LNG cargoes at prices of $23-28/mmbtu (Metric Million British Thermal Unit, used to measure gas), versus the $10/mmbtu that it had paid in 3 months before the crisis.^[ii] Bangladesh has now stopped power generation from its gas-fired power plants, and two of its critical sectors, agriculture and textiles, will take a hit. Dhaka has already shut down five of its six urea-making plants due to the shortage of natural gas – natural gas is the raw material for fertiliser manufacture.

The shortage will likely hit Bangladesh’s important textile sector, which accounts for over 85% of the country’s exports and is the largest employer outside of agriculture. Apart from the gas shortage, Bangladesh is facing stress on liquid fuels (diesel and petrol) and had introduced fuel rationing on 6^th March, which was withdrawn on the 15^th ahead of Eid.^[iii]

Sri Lanka too depends on imports for its energy needs and has introduced fuel quotas for vehicles, with limits to how much fuel each vehicle type-2-wheelers, 3-wheelers, private cars, buses etc – can purchase.^[iv] The government is relying on QR codes to enforce the rationing. The country has moved to a four-day work week effective from 18^th March.^[v] For Sri Lanka, the disruptions in West Asian airports such as Dubai and Qatar have started to hit tourist arrivals. For the first two weeks of March 2026, Sri Lanka welcomed 85,811 tourists – about 20% less than the same period for March 2025. Tourism is one of the key forex earners for the island nation, and an extended disruption will hurt the economy.

Landlocked Nepal, which imports its fuel from India, has raised petrol prices by 15 Nepali rupees/litre to reflect the higher international price of petrol.^[vi] Nepal Oil Corporation has started distributing half-filled cylinders which have 7.1 kg of cooking gas, instead of the usual 14.2 kg, to cope with the shortage of cooking gas.^[vii] Tourism is an important sector for Nepal as well, which had 1.16 million tourists in 2025. While India accounts for the bulk, the high spenders tend to come from the U.S. and Europe, and Western tourist and trekker arrivals may see a fall if the conflict persists.

Apart from the fuel shortages and declining tourism, these countries will be hit if there is a fall in remittances – Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal rely significantly on remittances from their overseas citizens, many of whom work in the Gulf. Bangladesh received $30.2 billion in remittances during 2024-25 from its expatriate population ^[viii] mostly from the Gulf region. For Sri Lanka, the six GCC members account for 40% of total inward remittances – $3.2 billion out of the $8 billion it received during 2025.

Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal are all under an IMF programme to stabilise their external sectors. The hit from higher oil and gas imports, the textile/tourism sectors, and reduced remittances will cause economic instability – and easily snowball into a political crisis.

This is of grave concern to India, which itself has begun to ration cooking gas in the wake of the war. Petrol and diesel prices will follow in the next weeks, and become increasingly unaffordable.

Since the conflict began, crude oil has jumped over 50% to over $110/barrel, while LNG has doubled to over $20/mmbtu. By keeping prices high, Iran can pressure the U.S. to come to the negotiating table but without other countries going against it. This objective seems to be driving Iran’s stance on ship movement through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran has officially declared that the straits are open to vessels from countries that have not participated in attacks on Iran.^[ix] However, in practical terms, very few ships have transited the straits due to risk perception, and traffic is down by 95%.^[x]

The Iranian stance is dictated by pragmatism – denying innocent passage to a merchant vessel through an international waterway can be viewed as an act of war. By declaring the straits open, Iran has complicated U.S. attempts to broaden its coalition and involve other major powers to ‘open the straits’^[xi] – a stance America’s NATO alliance partners are not willing to take. The U.S. Navy is the world’s largest, followed by China, Russia, and India. None of the big three of BRICS are likely to participate in a U.S.-led war. The next two navies in terms of size are Japan and South Korea, neither of whom have heeded the U.S. call

However, since the straits are practically closed, oil and gas prices continue to be high, working in Iran’s favour in the longer term. Unfortunately for South Asia, waiting for the straits to reopen is also a wait for its next crisis.

Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[i] https://www.qatarenergy.qa/en/MediaCenter/Pages/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=3894

[ii] https://www.thedailystar.net/business/economy/news/three-more-lng-cargoes-be-bought-double-dec-prices-4126706

[iii] https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/energy/fuel-rationing-officially-withdrawn-supply-improves-1387156?amp

[iv] newsfirst.lk/2026/03/15/sri-lanka-reintroduces-qr-based-national-fuel-pass-system#:~:text=Colombo%20(News1st)%3A%20The%20Ministry,rise%20in%20domestic%20fuel%20demand.

[v] https://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=119849#:~:text=Public%20transport%20services%2C%20including%20trains,17%2C%202026%2002%3A50%20pm

[vi] https://en.himalpress.com/noc-raises-fuel-prices-petrol-dearer-by-rs-15-per-liter/#:~:text=With%20the%20fresh%20revision%2Cpetrol,at%20Rs%20152%20per%20liter.

[vii] https://english.ratopati.com/story/54155/consumers-say-we-felt-relief-even-after-half-a-cylinder-of-gas-was-distributed

[viii] https://www.bb.org.bd/en/index.php/econdata/wageremitance

[ix] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603168217

[x] https://unctad.org/publication/strait-hormuz-disruptions-implications-global-trade-and-development

[xi] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-says-hes-demanded-countries-help-protect-their-own-territory-police-irans-strait-of-hormuz

The post Gulf War pinches South Asia appeared first on Gateway House.

The visit of Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, to India (March 4-7) was rated as significant for several reasons. It was a state visit laden with elaborate protocol. He was also the chief guest at the Raisina Dialogue, the foreign ministry’s flagship platform for global interaction. His visit overlapped with the visit of his country’s Prime Minister Petteri Orpo to India – a rare instance of both the highest levels of Finnish leadership visiting India within a brief period.

Despite its small population of 5 million and limited geographic size (65th in the world), Finland is an advanced industrial economy with a per capita income of over $54,000. It stands among the front-ranking nations in technology, particularly AI and telecommunications. Its delegation, led by PM Orpo, was active at the AI Impact Summit hosted by India. Finland is having its moment in the sun: International awareness of Finland’s importance increased tremendously after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war when in April 2023 Helsinki abandoned its traditional neutrality and consciously chose to join NATO as a full member.

The Indian establishment as well as national and international media, had an opportunity to gain a first-hand glimpse of Finland’s worldview as President Stubb delivered the inaugural address at the Raisina Dialogue on March 5, in the presence of PM Narendra Modi. He rejected the notion that the liberal world order was dead. “The fact that the rules are broken,” he insisted, “does not make all the system null and void any more than someone getting caught for speeding makes speeding limits irrelevant.” He conceded, however, that the world order was changing; the global balance of power had shifted; and the Western-dominated world may be replaced by one shaped by the Global South and a country such as India. He generously depicted India “as a major power.”

Stubb strongly articulated his refusal to believe that “the future will only belong to two great powers.” Asserting that this should not be allowed, he called for a multipolar order and for reform in the UN, WTO, and Bretton Woods institutions. An advocate of a dignified foreign policy, he underlined the need to create an atmosphere of dialogue and engagement with one another on an equal footing and with respect.

The two governments readily agreed to elevate bilateral relations to the level of  Strategic Partnership in Digitalisation and Sustainability. A cross-sectoral working group on digitalisation will be set up, and it is expected to produce concrete, substantial actions. AI-related domains and space tech will be accorded priority. On sustainability, the focus on cooperation will be in areas such as ocean energy solutions, biofuels, smart grids, and green hydrogen with a joint working group given the task to drive future dialogue and the crafting of cooperation schemes. Finland  has globally recognised expertise in clean technology and renewable energy, which are priorities for India.

Finland’s clear support for upholding a rules-based international order and for India’s permanent membership of the reformed UN Security Council was welcomed by India. In line with the EU policy approach, Finland aligned itself with India in promoting “a free, open, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific” with a brief reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – a joint coded signal sent to China. India  welcomed Finland’s decision to join the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is still awaiting a real take-off. An agreement on strengthening cooperation in Arctic-related areas was signed.

But there were differences too, such as the West Asian conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. Both issues were discussed, but divergences in their perspectives were evident in the joint statement’s limited mention of them.

Three MOUs were signed, including one on migration and mobility. Among the eight announcements made at the conclusion of the presidential visit were the resolve to double bilateral trade (currently at $3 billion) by 2030, in line with the conclusion of the historic India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA); creation of a joint task force on 6G; and greater connectivity of the startup ecosystems through the India-Finland Startup Corridor. About 33,000 Indians are in Finland, most of them young professionals working in the IT sector. These agreements will create new opportunities  for them. The two sides agreed to co-host a World Circular Economy Forum in India in 2026 and to establish a consular dialogue between the two foreign ministries to focus on citizen-centric issues like visa facilitation and extraditions. After completing his programme in Delhi, the president visited Mumbai, met the chief minister of Maharashtra, and addressed a business event and students at Mumbai University.

As the MEA stated, the official visit, with its focus on the three Ts – Trade, Technology, and Talent – was “very substantive and productive.”

The real significance of Stubb’s visit lies in the confirmation that India and Europe are on the same page geopolitically, despite certain differences in their global outlooks.

Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies and a former ambassador.

This article was first published in Hindustan Times.

The post A significant Finnish visit appeared first on Gateway House.

During this high point of Jewish glamour in Hindi films, all contributed by Indian Baghdadi Jewish women, were two German-speaking European Jewish men, refugees in Bombay’s Hindi film industry. They were among a small group of German refugees in the industry, like cinematographer Josef Wirsching and director Franz Osten of Bombay Talkies. They introduced a new sensibility and modern techniques into the early talkie era of Hindi cinema. Unlike Wirsching and Osten, music composer-conductor-musician and ethnomusicologist, Walter Kaufmann, and his friend, script and scenario writer Willy Haas, worked with Mohan Bhavnani of Bhavnani Productions.^[1]

Walter Kaufmann lived in Bombay from 1934 to 1946

Source: Wikipedia

Willy Haas lived in Bombay only from 1939 to 1941. He left India in 1947

Source: Wikipedia

Bhavnani the first big name from India’s Sindhi community in Hindi films, drew these two well-known names from Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft (UFA) Studios in the then state-of-the-art New Babelsberg Studio Complex in Berlin. He urged Kaufmann first, in 1934, to seek refuge in Bombay, by offering him work in his production company. Haas’ job offer from Bhavani in 1939, to join as script and scenario writer at Bhavnani Productions, his new banner, was mediated by Kaufmann.^{[2] [3]} Rather than going west to Hollywood, as most European Jews did, Kaufmann and Haas were tempted by Bhavnani’s offer, which made it easy for them to procure a British India visa. Both also had some exposure to India’s history and culture, which made it easier for them to make this decision. ^{[4] [5]} The solid offer of work by Bhavnani, who befriended Kaufmann at UFA Studios during a stint there, sealed the deal.

Producer-director Mohan Bhavnani with his actress wife Enakshi Rama Rau

Source: The Scroll

The British Indian government did not encourage European refugees to disembark at Indian ports, although Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was in favour of hosting the skilled and highly educated European Jews being persecuted under Hitler’s regime in Germany. He felt they could contribute to India’s betterment in agriculture, industry, and medicine. The British Indian government prevailed: it did not permit European refugees to disembark in Bombay unless they had a job offer in writing and were guaranteed by a British Indian resident. Most refugee ships were redirected to Shanghai during the inter-war and Second World War years, with very few refugees disembarking in Bombay.^[6] Sources state that European refugees (Jewish and non-Jewish) in India were just 1051 before the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.^[7]

The guarantor for European Jews in India was arranged by the Jewish Relief Association (JRA, est. 1934), whose board was composed of prominent expat German and local Baghdadi Jews.^[8] The JRA raised money for their housing and upkeep till they could support themselves. Script writer Willy Haas, who arrived on the Conte Rosso liner in 1939, was quickly cleared by immigration, in the presence of a JRA representative, and soon whisked off by his friend Kaufmann to his home, while his luggage was sent to the JRA lodgings in Lesser’s Guest House on the second floor of Soona Mahal building on Marine Drive.

Haas lived in Max Lesser’s guest house, which was located on the second floor of Soona Mahal building, Marine Drive

Image credits: A.Savin, Wikimedia Commons

According to a translation of Haas’ 1958 article in Die Literarische Welt (The Literary World) – the two friends had dinner that same evening with their benefactor, Bhavnani, and his actress wife, the beauteous Enakshi Rama Rau, at Kaufmann’s home on the ground floor of Rewa House in Mahalaxmi.^[9] Haas, 12 years older than Kaufmann, had a formidable reputation as a scriptwriter, literary critic and journalist in Berlin and Prague. He was the editor of the renowned Die Literarische Welt from 1925 to 1932, a widely respected literary journal in Germany and Europe, and had written the scripts for 20 films for UFA Studios, Berlin, before fleeing to India. Despite this, he was racked by doubts because of his inability to speak English, let alone Hindustani, the lingua franca of the Hindi film industry.

It was Bhavnani’s fluent German and his promise to have Haas’ scripts translated into Hindi that offered some consolation. What did come as a culture shock, though, was Haas’ first exposure to the non-linear storyline and the disruptions of ‘impromptu’ song-and-dance sequences in Hindi films. Actor David Abraham, a Bene Israel Jew who began his career with Bhavnani Productions and later became a good friend of Haas, took him for his first Hindi movie. He instructed Haas to meet him at a cinema in Fort, thirty minutes after the start of the film at 9 pm, chuckling that they wouldn’t miss much. They finally stumbled out of the theatre, along with an audience made up of families with infants and food baskets, at 1.30 am. This film had five intervals, numerous narrative disruptions, and ended only with Lord Krishna appearing to offer hope to the widowed heroine.^[10]

Poster of Prem Nagar

Haas’ first script, Jhooti Sharm (1940), for Bhavnani Productions, was based on Henrik Ibsen’s Ghosts.^[11] A ‘social’ film with a message about the malaise of sexually transmitted diseases, it was a deliberate choice, not just because of Haas’s familiarity with Ibsen’s works, but also Bhavnani’s decision to stay away from mythological films and politically controversial themes.^[12] This film was a hit, but Haas could not recognise his own script when he visited the sets, as Bhavnani irretrievably altered it during filming to suit what the audience wanted.

While he was struggling to understand Indian sensibilities, traditions, mythologies, and ‘village life’ (as he described it), which were so diametrically different to the Weimar Republic’s minimalism and Expressionism in filmmaking, his friend Kaufmann was on a creative high.^[13]

By 1938, Kaufmann, who had been joined by his wife, Gerti, was living on the ground floor of the Maharaja of Rewa’s bungalow.^[14] The Maharaja, Martand Singh, was an aficionado of Western classical music. Along with Mehli Mehta, Zubin Mehta’s father, and one or two expats, Kaufmann established the Bombay Chamber Music Society (BCMS) in 1936. By the time he left India in 1946, the Society had given 600 concerts, either as a trio or a quartet. By this year, too, he was head of European music at Bombay’s All India Radio & Studio, then located at Marine Lines.

Walter Kaufmann (center) on the piano with Mehli Mehta on the violin performing at a Bombay Chamber Music Society concert

Source: Wikipedia

Despite his rigorous training in Western classical music since childhood, Kaufmann still had to make a concerted effort to understand the sounds and tonal variations of Indian musical instruments such as the veena, sarangi, sitar, and tabla, as well as Indian musical notations and classical singing. He travelled across the Subcontinent studying the music of the mountains (Nepali and Kashmiri), hills and plains, and the ragas of Hindustani and Carnatic music.

Kaufmann’s greatest contribution was the introduction of orchestral music, using Indian instruments, in Hindi films and documentaries produced by Information Films of India. He also combined the sounds of Indian musical instruments with Western ones into his own compositions. The most well-known of these is All India Radio’s (today’s Akashwani) signature morning tune, based on the raga Shivaranjini, played on the violin (believed to have been played by Mehli Mehta), tanpura and viola.^{[15] [16]} Kaufmann also evoked India in many of his compositions written during his time in India. His Indian Piano Concerto was performed for Prague Radio in 1937.

Kaufmann’s musical universe was not confined to his routine work at AIR and performances with the BCMS. He partnered with Willy Haas on the radio opera The King Calls (1940) and, before this, wrote and performed India’s first radio opera, Anasuya (1938). He also composed music for Bhavnani’s films and Information Films of India (the precursor to Films Division of India), thus making his years in India from 1934 to 1946 his most creative.

Willy Haas, in the meantime, in his quest to understand India and its people, convinced Bhavnani that he needed to immerse himself in the real India. He travelled to the native Kingdom of Limbdi (Saurashtra), and experienced life in a village there, returning to Bombay full of ideas for his next script. The outcome was Prem Nagar (The City of Love), a formulaic but charming love story of good and evil, fate and destiny, plus the spiritual enlightenment as the happy ending.^[17] This movie which opened at Novelty cinema in Bombay’s Grant Road in April 1941, was an instant hit.^[18]

Haas left Bhavnani Productions a few months before this film’s premiere, going full-time into freelance journalism. He wrote for the Bombay Chronicle and The Illustrated Weekly and wrote plays for the radio.^[19] He left Bombay soon after for Dehradun to work in the British Indian Army as a translator-interpreter at the Central Internment Camp there. According to Uma Anand, producer Chetan Anand’s wife, and daughter of Haas’ close ‘Doon’ friend, Haas was “our intellectual lifesaver in Dehradun ”.^[20] She credits the many ideas that Haas discussed with her film producer husband and her, as finding their way into India’s first Cannes Grand Prix (now Palme d’Or) win, Chetan Anand’s Neecha Nagar (1946).

Kaufmann and Haas left India soon after the Second World War ended, but the precious few years these two European Jewish refugees lived in India and interacted with its intellectual and cultural life have left a lasting imprint on Mumbai’s Hindi film industry, just as the contributions of yesteryear’s beautiful, pioneering Jewish actresses had in overcoming the taboo for respectable women acting in Hindi films.

Sifra Lentin is Bombay History Fellow at Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.

References:

[1]Instead of using the German Wilhelm for his screen credits, Haas used the Czech variation Vilém.

[2] Bhavnani’s first film production company, Ajanta Cinetone, was short-lived. (1933-1939). It closed because of an extended and expensive tussle with the colonial censors over The Mill (1934).

[3] See: Lentin, Sifra, Mercantile Bombay: A Journey of Trade, Finance and Enterprise (New Delhi, Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2022), pp.116-118, on the Weimar Republic’s cultural influence on films, art, literary criticism, in Bombay, during the inter-war years.

[4] According to Anil Bhatti, in his chapter “Willy Haas and Exile in India”, Haas in his autobiography questions why he chose India. He writes, “One of the reasons, he subsequently realised while in exile, was Kipling’s Kim, which he had read as a boy…. It seemed to him that subconsciously he had retraced the path of the narrative action of the book as an exile in India.” Other reasons Haas cites are Gandhi, Indology lectures at the University of Prague, and Paul Deussen’s translations of Indological texts. Likewise, Kaufmann too had taken Indology classes.

See: Bhatti, Anil, ‘Willy Haas and Exile in India’, in Bhatti, Anil, and Voigt, Johannes H. edited, Jewish Exile In India 1933-1945 (Delhi, Manohar/Max Mueller Bhavan Delhi, 2005), p.115.

[5] Two biographies on Kaufmann, one by Gangar, Amrit, The Music that Still Rings at Dawn, Every Dawn: Walter Kaufmann in India 1934-1946 (Mumbai, Goethe Institute/Max Mueller Bhavan, 2013), and Agatha Schindler’s chapter ‘Walter Kaufmann: A Forgotten Genius’ in Bhatti, Anil, and Voigt, Johannes H., Jewish Exile In India 1933-1945 (Delhi, Manohar/Max Mueller Bhavan Delhi, 2005) both point to Kaufmann’s keen interest in understanding and learning the music from the Subcontinent. He subsequently wrote two authoritative works: one on the music of South India and the other on the music of North India. His most creative years were spent in India, interacting with the best exponents of various Indian musical instruments and classical singers at All India Radio, and travelling the length and breadth of the country to collect ragas, instruments, and record sounds.

[6]Shanghai once had a substantial European Jewish community due to this British India policy.

[7] Bhatti, Anil, and Voigt, Johannes H. edited, Jewish Exile In India 1933-1945 (Delhi, Manohar/Max Mueller Bhavan Delhi, 2005), p. 28.

[8] The Jewish Relief Association (JRA) office in Bombay was given material and political support by the Council of German Jewry in London. Funding for the destitute refugees was later raised largely from amongst the European refugees who had begun working and were financially able to contribute; the rest was raised from among the well-to-do Baghdadi Jewish businessmen in Bombay and Calcutta. In terms of political support, by March 1939, the Council had reached an agreement with the India Office that the ultimate discretion to permit refugees to disembark at Indian ports vested with the colonial Government of India, combined with a guarantee of support for five years from the JRA in Bombay.

See: Siddiqi, Majid Hayat, “Jews and Central European Nationals in Exile in Colonial India between Two World Wars”, in Bhatti, Anil, and Voigt, Johannes H., Jewish Exile In India 1933-1945 (Delhi, Manohar/Max Mueller Bhavan Delhi, 2005), p.48.

[9] The translation is by Xan Holt and reproduced in parts in Mukherjee, Debashree, and Xan Holt, ‘Willy Haas in Bombay’ ( Sage Journals: Bioscope: South Asian Screen Studies, 5 June 2024)

[10] Ibid, 9

[11] The original title of this 1881 play Ghosts by Henrik Ibsen is Gengangere. Written in Dano-Norwegian, this term literally translates as “those who walk again” or “revenants,” rather than simply meaning spirits or spectres. The title refers to past inherited sins and old ideas that refuse to stay buried and continue to haunt the living.

[12] Bhavnani’s last two film for his first production company, Ajanta Cinetone’s “Mazdoor” or “The Mill” (1934), script written by Munshi Premchand, the legendary Hindi litterateur, and “Jagran” or “The Awakening” (1935). Both films encountered issues with the censors, and he was forced to close this company.

[13] Film Noir was a cinematic genre that took root in the 1940s-50s in American crime dramas, which was a direct outcome of the number of European refugees who worked in Hollywood. It was characterized by cynical, fatalistic themes, moral ambiguity, and a dark, shadowy, black-n-white visual style. It was an outcome of the influence of German Expression on film-making.

[14] Gerti Hermann was the philosopher Franz Kafka’s niece and became a French teacher in Bombay.

[15] Walter Langhammer was no stranger to the radio. Even before joining AIR in 1937, his compositions written in India were played on Prague Radio, conducted by Heinrich Swoboda.

See Gangar, Amrit, The Music that Still Rings at Dawn, Every Dawn: Walter Kaufmann in India 1934-1946 (Mumbai, Goethe Institute/Max Mueller Bhavan, 2013), p.37.

[16] The AIR signature tune was adopted to be played by all AIR studios across India in 1939. This fact is known to us from an article in The Listener Magazine, volume 4, dated 7 February 1939. The article describes a visit to the AIR studio by the Viceroy of India, who is entertained by the AIR orchestra conducted by Kaufmann. The Viceroy later congratulates him on his tune being chosen as the signature tune for all AIR radio stations.

[17] According to Haas’s autobiography, he was upset with the ending of this film being changed from spiritual enlightenment to the last scene showing a happy couple rocking their baby in a crib.

[18] See Christoph von Ungern-Sternberg. “Willy Hass.” METROMOD Archive, 2021, https://archive.metromod.net/viewer.p/69/2912032691 (Last modified on 15.09.2021)

[19] Haas during his short time in Bombay from 1939 to 1941, was involved substantially in four movies, aside from Jhooti Sharm and Prem Nagar the other two were Kanchan (1941) and Asir of Asirgarh (1949), the latter was Bhavnani’s last movie and was released under the titles Ajit or Raangeela Zameen. He left Bombay in 1941 for Dehradun to begin work as a translator/interpreter in the British Indian Army’s Central Internment Camp for enemy aliens, located just outside Dehradun.

[20] Ibid 11.

The post European Jews in Bombay’s film industry appeared first on Gateway House.

India is preparing to host the BRICS[1] summit in 2026, and in the run-up to the meeting, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has put out a proposal to link the digital currencies of the BRICS nations. This will cover the expanded BRICS, now comprising the original Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa along with newcomers Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

The timing of the RBI proposal is intriguing. It is clearly a move towards autonomy for the emerging and developing BRICS member states – and certainly not a knee-jerk reaction to the turbulent trade talks with the U.S.

What does the proposal mean, and what does it intend to do?

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a country’s sovereign currency in digital form. It is not cryptocurrency and not prone to volatility risks. The CBDC is issued by the central bank of the country, like the RBI in India, and considered legal tender money.  It only differs from fiat currency in that this is digital and not printed, offering the convenience of digital payments with the stability of cash.

The move to link digital currencies is a bold step towards removing a third currency, typically the U.S. dollar (USD), from the payment settlement system for international trade between BRICS nations. For instance, when importing crude oil from Russia, instead of first converting Indian rupees (INR) to USD and then into Russian rubles or Chinese yuan, trade can be settled directly through the linked CBDCs. Similarly, the export of petroleum products by India to Brazil would be settled through the linked CBDCs instead of USD.

Currently, the proposal has only been mentioned as a part of the agenda for the BRICS summit, and the details of the plan have not been made available. However, it is likely to draw inspiration from similar projects that have been initiated in the past. In 2021, Thailand, the UAE, China and Hong Kong collaborated to launch Project mBridge, with Saudi Arabia joining in later as a full member. It aimed to explore a shared multi-CBDC platform to enable cross-border payments and settlements to move with speed, efficiency and at lower cost. It reached the minimum viability product stage in 2024 and continues to expand.[2]

Similarly, Project Aber explored the possibility of a single dual-issued digital currency between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[3] Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa developed prototypes for a shared platform for international settlement using CBDCs under Project Dunbar.[4] There have also been other negotiations and trials for digital currency-based cross-border settlement.[5] However, these initiatives are not yet operational at the required scale to produce enough evidence in favour of, or against, RBI’s proposal, which aims to be much larger in scope and membership.

Given that BRICS member states have been toying with the idea of an alternate unified digital currency for payment and settlement, this proposal could serve as a call for unification, collaboration and execution.

A CBDC-linked system of payment settlement will promote trade between BRICS nations via a common mechanism without having a separate BRICS currency.[6] With BRICS members contributing $5.61 trillion to exports and $4 trillion[7] to imports and accounting for 40% of the global economy in 2024,[8] it is reasonable that they develop payment systems beneficial to them collectively yet allows member nations to operate independently. Geopolitically it reduces risk by skirting the SWIFT payment settlement systems and specifically, domestic. MSMEs will benefit from low banking and conversion costs.

In 2024, India’s BRICS imports were over 40% of its total imports, with crude oil imports from Russia being a major contributor. Exports to BRICS nations accounted for about 22% of total exports.[9] If this proposal can reduce foreign exchange fluctuation risks and costs for these large trade volumes, it will be beneficial for Indian traders who can use this working capital elsewhere. Additionally, it may open up new markets and opportunities among BRICS nations owing to the ease of doing business.

Some might view the proposal as anti-American and a move towards proximity to Eastern powers (specifically Russia and China), but this is a narrow perspective. India is not yet equipped to operate without having the U.S. as a significant trading partner. U.S. sanctions and recent diplomatic developments between the two countries have seen instability, but in February, the trade deal with the U.S. was finally negotiated and will be ratified.  This is not in opposition with India’s continuing endeavours on currency and economic resilience.

For some time now, India has been working on the wider acceptance of the Rupee as an international currency of trade. In 2022, India introduced the special Rupee-Vostro account, which allowed settlement of international trade in INR. This was an additional, complementary arrangement to the existing system that uses freely convertible currencies aimed at reducing exchange rate risk for Indian exporters and importers. India’s allowance of international trade in INR is also a step towards reducing dependence on the USD.

At present, the majority of the trade between India and Russia takes place in local currencies.[10] Even administrative steps like cutting approval time for foreign banks to open Rupee accounts being reduced to 24 hours – strategic moves towards making INR a favourable currency for settling international trade.

Thus, the RBI’s proposal seems to be a sequenced step that allows not only India but all other BRICS members to operate on an ‘in-house’ settlement system that saves costs and boosts trade. As a bonus, the members that have already attempted such initiatives can bring their learnings to create synergy and positive outcomes.

Is achieving this is mission impossible? No. Will this be a smooth ride to its destination? Definitely not.

To begin with, not all BRICS nations have an operational digital currency. China, Russia and India do and are expanding its use; Brazil, South Africa and the UAE are testing and preparing to launch their own CBDCs, while other member states are at various stages of this journey.[11]

Secomd, a linked system will have interoperability issues. Each country has its own regulations and will want to maintain financial sovereignty. An initiative of this nature will have to navigate a fragmented regulatory environment while ensuring financial stability on the domestic front. It is necessary to put in place stringent laws related to data-sharing and strong cybersecurity measure due to lack of technological standardisation. A strong dispute resolution mechanism and anti-money laundering regulations are critical components to ensure that the system is not misused. The stability of political regimes too will play a part in defining the viability of the proposal.

Finally, a functional mechanism to manage trade imbalances is crucial to avoid unnecessary accumulation of reserves.

The West may view the proposal to link the digital currencies of the BRICS as a skirt-around to sanctions and other global financial restrictions. For the rest of the world, it is a step towards the gradual streamlining of the foreign exchange market. If successfully implemented, this will be a significant geo-economic shift and an ambitious step towards autonomous international trade, at least for trade between BRICS. It will also position India and the BRICS as global digital finance leaders. It won’t replace current systems in the near future but can gradually gain traction and bear fruit. Thereby, BRICS is not just asking for a seat at the table – its creating its own table.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here. 

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in. 

Support our work here.

©Copyright 2026 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited

References:

[1] The BRICS is a group formed by eleven countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran. The acronym BRIC was conceived in 2001 based on the four founding members Brazil, Russia, India, China and the letter ‘S’ was added when South Africa joined the 2011. The rest of the six members were added in 2023.

[2] Bank for International Settlements. “mCBDC Bridge.” https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/mcbdc_bridge.htm

[3] Saudi Central Bank (SAMA). Project Aber Report. https://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/News/Documents/Project_Aber_report-EN.pdf

[4] Bank for International Settlements. “Project Dunbar.” https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/dunbar.htm

[5] BRICS International Council. “Development of Central Bank Digital Currencies in BRICS Countries in 2024.” https://bricscouncil.ru/en/analytics/razvitie-ts-vts-b-v-stranakh-prisoedinivshikhsya-k-briks-v-2024-g

[6] BRICS. “About BRICS.” https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics

[7] Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). “BRICS.” https://oec.world/en/profile/international_organization/brics

[8] International Monetary Fund. “World Economic Outlook Database.” https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD  https://brics.br/en/news/brics-gdp-outperforms-global-average-accounts-for-40-of-world-economy

[9] BusinessWorld. “India’s Trade with BRICS Nations Nears $400 Billion Amid Rising Deficits.” https://www.businessworld.in/article/indias-trade-with-brics-nations-nears-400-bn-amid-rising-deficits-562402#:~:text=Rising%20Dependence%20On%20Brics%20Imports&text=The%20share%20of%20Brics%20in,of%20refined%20petroleum%20products%20globally.

[10] The Financial Express. “90 Per Cent of India–Russia Trade in Local Currency Now.” https://www.financialexpress.com/business/industry-90-per-cent-of-india-russia-trade-in-local-currency-now-3663287/

[11] BRICS Brasil. “CBDCs from BRICS: A New Chapter in Global Financial Modernization.” https://bricsbrasil.com.br/en/cbdcs-from-brics-a-new-chapter-in-global-financial-modernization/

The post BRICS CBDCs can lead to financial multipolarity appeared first on Gateway House.