26/11: Seriously not ready

Mumbai is the world’s fourth largest urban agglomeration, with an estimated population of 19 million and an area of 603.4 sq km. The population density is about 22,000 persons per square kilometer; 89 police stations contain a police force of approximately 40,000, all ranks included. Within this intense mass of humanity is a hive of commercial activity, making Mumbai a dream target for terrorists. The huge movement of people in and out of the city each day makes it difficult to identify terrorist ingress.

Much has been said about the resilience of Mumbaikars in the face of terror attacks. But is this resilience or a fatalistic approach to the inevitable? After each attack, we get up, dust ourselves off, berate the failure of security and intelligence agencies and get back to business, the trauma a distant memory.

26/11 was the first time a terror attack largely affected the well-heeled of Mumbai. Hence it appeared more traumatic due to the stridency of their influential outcry. Much was made about the really serious measures to be instituted. Budgets were apportioned, knee jerk purchases were made and now… we are back to business as usual.

So what then were the major lessons of 26/11 and where are we today?

The Threat

In the foreseeable future India will continue to face a serious terrorist threat from various quarters.

Some of these are:

Pakistan based jihadi terrorist groups
Extremist movements in the East and North East which under pressure will move westwards
Home-grown criminal elements fostered by the above external forces.

Neither India’s nor any other country’s policy is likely to be able to reduce these threats in the short or medium term. The actions of these groups will inspire and instruct other extremist factions in India; this indicates that the threat will most likely continue to grow. We have to develop a serious and coherent response to such threats, particularly in the country’s growing number of metropolises.

Good governance and equitable wealth distribution will alleviate some of the dissatisfaction which creates fertile recruiting grounds for internal factions. The Maoist threat is one such case.

Aim of the Terrorist

In our context, the aim of the terrorist is likely to be to:

Create disharmony between different elements of the society.
Force the government to curb civil liberties, thereby creating public resentment
Make security forces appear harsh and repressive.
Attract public attention to the cause through media exposure.
By succeeding i.e. discrediting government capability, humiliating Indian security services, causing large scale death and destruction and garnering credible media coverage, terrorists hope to attract both international and Indian recruits to their cause.

The security fallout of 26/11

Government Sensitivity: Overt and harsh security measures continue, forces have become callous and the public is tired of often routine and meaningless security checks. Very few mature countries have the overt security that we have. The CISF at airports is a case in point: armoured bunkers, helmets, automatic assault rifles (when did the soldier last fire it in practice?). These are the trappings usually found in banana republics. Such an attitude only enhances the terrorist cause. Countries who have been hit the hardest and longest by terrorism realize that restrictive preventive measures instituted by security forces alienate them from the common man.

Security must be there but be invisible; one good example of this is the advanced screening and profiling processes at Tel Aviv airport.

Intelligence: In the wake of almost every incident, the public outcry is about “lack of intelligence.” In fact intelligence is available in plenty; it is the organization and process of correct analysis, dissemination and feedback that is left wanting. Enough has been written and said about this but little to nothing has been done. Turf wars between agencies will ensure that we are unlikely to go forward on this.

Fighting the Last War: Both security forces and society are invariably caught up in fighting the previous war, thereby disregarding the important fact that the next war will undoubtedly be different. Incidents are unique in terms of location, method and weapons of attack. A telling case in point was the 26/11 attack. Most previous terrorist incidents were bomb attacks and both public and private security forces had instituted measures to check for bombs. In a radical departure from the bombings of the past, 26/11 was a fire assault using automatic weapons. Public or private security agencies were simply not geared to meet these attacks.

Attempts at creating special forces have been made, for example the raising of Force One and the relocation of the NSG to metros. However these measures have since been mired in bureaucratic wrangling, voiding the efficacy of such actions.

Since it is not possible for security forces to have a dedicated arm to address each kind of threat, it becomes important to have a multi-disciplinary organization with a brick system. This will ensure that appropriate skills are available in the central pool and can be swiftly deployed to meet each unique situation. In developed societies, SWAT teams and other specialist forces operate on this concept.

Public Response: Since attacks against the public, a soft target, are relatively easy and cheap to mount, this group will continue to remain vulnerable. It is important to generate fundamental security consciousness through constant public awareness programmes which will address:

Type of threats
Level of awareness expected from the public
Suitable response drills when attacked

Remember that terrorists are like fish swimming in the tide of society. Without adequate local support, he is unlikely to be able to function effectively. The government should work hard to win over the common man in support against terrorism.

Information Security Protocols: In times of crisis, we tend to take our democracy too seriously. Why must the press and public have unfettered access to a site while operations are in progress, particularly when such real time airing of the situation jeopardises the lives of security forces and hostages? There is an opinion that during 26/11, the Pakistani handlers of the attackers were getting real time feedback on the actions of the security forces through the constant and detailed coverage of the event by the Indian media.

Clear cordons and police lines must be established to allow all agencies involved in a situation to function without hindrance. There needs to be a clear media policy that addresses the concerns of both government agencies and the media. We must not allow such incidents to become electronic Roman Circuses. In doing so, we only play into the hands of the terrorists, creating the oxygen of publicity that the terrorist craves.

Police Reforms: Various commissions have been ordered after each attack, they have recommended extensive police reforms, but there seems to be a convenient amnesia on part of the government when it comes to their implementation. As soon as the trauma wears off, budgets cannot be found and archaic acquisition policies undermine progress. Some of our police are still equipped with weapons of Second World War vintage. Witness the RPF at CST during the attacks, trying to use .303 Lee Enfield rifles that jammed. In a mistaken attempt to modernize, AK-47 assault rifles are being distributed
indiscriminately to various police forces. The AK-47 fires at 600 rounds per minute; if used by untrained police personnel, it does not require much imagination to visualize the mayhem it could cause amongst innocent bystanders.

Private Security Agencies: As police and paramilitary forces are being stretched ever thinner in the discharge of their duties, there is an increasing tendency to move towards private agencies to handle security functions. Most companies and individuals have some form of private security at office and at home. The only statutory provision governing them is labour-related; there is very little regulation on their legal empowerment to fulfill their duties.

This requires urgent attention. Clear-cut government policy must be drafted to enable such agencies to function effectively.

The threat is here to stay in the foreseeable future. 26/11 was not the first attack on Mumbai, nor will it be the last. How and where will the next strike be? Our resilience seems to lie in only one aspect: our unwillingness – and inability to be seriously ready.

Xerxes Adrianwalla is a retired Brigadier of the Indian Army and a regular contributor to Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

This article is part of the series “26/11: Reflections”. You can find a compilation of all the articles that are part of the series here.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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