A new U.S.-Middle East diplomatic landscape

The rise of countries in the Middle East can be attributed, in part, to the strategic value of hydrocarbon production and, more lately, ventures in unconventional areas, from diplomacy to innovation, investments and connectivity projects. Examples include Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the NEOM project, initiatives in connectivity such as the new Istanbul International Airport and the global reach of flagship airlines like Fly Emirates, Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways, which have secured international presence and prestige. Financial and business hubs such as Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi have consolidated their regional powerhouse roles. Additionally, universities such as the King Abdulaziz University, Khalifa University and Qatar University have sharped the prestige of research in the region, while the Museum of The Future in the heart of Dubai and The Louvre Museum in Abu Dhabi have become symbols that blend culture and innovation in the Gulf countries.

These developments are not isolated efforts but a broader transformation marked by significant milestones. Notable examples include ambitious geopolitical initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, the North-South Transport Corridor, the Global Gateway, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, among others, which are redefining the region’s connectivity, energy security frame and regional impact on the global agenda. Simultaneously, non-dollar-based cross-border payment systems are gaining traction, signalling a move toward diversified financial ways.

From January the first of this year, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran — among others, have acquired full membership of BRICS; on March 2023, the Iranian-Saudi détente got a new beginning; and Syria’s re-entry into the Arab League on May of 2023 are some of the compositions that have reshaped the region’s geopolitical landscape. Adding to the complexity are the conflicts and humanitarian crises which have reached a critical status in Palestine, Yemen and Lebanon[1] — and maybe even again, Syria. Within this context, the next U.S. government represents a pivotal factor which can significantly influence the recalibration of geopolitical trends.

The incoming U.S. administration will adopt a policy framework driven by pragmatic decision-making, where transactional diplomacy defines international engagements. French President Emmanuel Macron read the tea leaves when he stated in April this year that the “European issue is not a geopolitical priority”,[2] emphasizing the need for Europe and other regions to recalibrate their own approaches. Nevertheless, fostering mutual understanding of priorities will remain critical to maintaining global stability and cooperation. This evolving dynamic reflects the interplay between national imperatives and broader global challenges, requiring tailored responses from different actors.

In the Middle East, the shift needs agility to navigate emerging partnerships, security dilemmas, and economic prospects so that regional ambitions can be aligned with the realities of an international order in flux. So does North America, especially as the USMCA Agreement between the United States of America, Mexico, and Canada — the second biggest economic bloc with a shared population of more than 510 million people and an economy nearly 17% of the world —[3] is heading for a review in 2026. Some world issues, such as migration, energy security, and supply chains, will be present in these developments, and they will have international implications.

Regarding the Middle East, the principal challenge for Donald Trump as the 47^th President of the United States will be to establish a clear foreign policy strategy that lines up with national interests and the long-term perspective. Within this framework, a pentagon of critical issues demands attention:

Advancing normalization efforts between Saudi Arabia and Israel while strengthening and possibly expanding the Abraham Accords;
Policy recalibration on Iran, addressing its influence through non-state actors and regional allies, and managing concerns over its nuclear programme being carefully balanced between deterrence and diplomacy;
Reassessing U.S. interactions with both state and non-state actors in the Middle East, essential to maintaining leverage and influence in a landscape of shifting loyalties and alliances;
Establishing a comprehensive framework to address ongoing conflicts, including the future of the Palestinian question, a new chapter of turmoil inside Syrian borders, the stability over the Red Sea and Aden´s Gulf, and the U.S. military presence in Syria and Iraq, will test the equipoise between strategic interests with humanitarian and security concerns; and,
Formulating a response to the growing influence of external powers such as China in the Middle East will be crucial for preserving U.S. strategic relevance in the region. Military, diplomatic, and diplomatic balance will be sought in every step taken.

Uncharted challenges will be obstacles to the development of diplomacy. While the Abraham Accords established diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in 2018, the current geopolitical landscape complicates its further progress. A primary hurdle is the ongoing war in Gaza, the humanitarian crises, the political and social stability of Israel and persistent tensions along the Lebanese border. Advancing normalization efforts becomes increasingly tricky without a ceasefire and de-escalation in these areas. For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the political calculus and prospective backlash surrounding the Accords has now grown more complex. The announcement of a fragile truce between Israel and Lebanon —mediated by the U.S. and France[4] — appears to be the first step toward de-escalation, but a peace process is far from being completed.

Donald Trump’s unpredictable approach to policymaking in the past makes it challenging to prophesise his exact strategy toward the region. However, it also presents an opportunity to advance the development of a new collective security framework or at least a stable consolidation of pragmatic accords that do not feed internal rivalries leading to scalations of controversies.

Such an architecture, grounded in shared interests and regional stability, will help manage security challenges more cohesively. The Abraham Accords and the I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, U.S.) are frameworks that do not camouflage the existing conceptions of the whole Middle East but have defined a narrative of pragmatism aligned with shared interests. The BRICS, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are also examples of fusions with multipolarity.

The assistance of the U.S. would likely be intertwined with broader military and economic agreements, intelligence and logistical aid, and trade partnerships. For states such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE, leveraging this alignment could reinforce regional security while advancing strategic economic collaborations, especially regarding the growing ties with China, which has demonstrated diplomatic assertiveness.[5] Many moves have been made on the regional chessboard, and there is no going back. The clearest policy therefore is one which understands there are limits to Pax-Americana, and it is a transactional understanding of multipolarity that can overcome differences and close diplomatic gaps.

Some of these scenarios are mirrored in Latin America and the Caribe, where political divisions have interrupted a regional cooperation dialogue. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit 2021,[6] hosted by the former President of Mexico Andres Manuel López Obrador, in Mexico City, was the last international summit with the capacity of gathering all the countries of the region and released a joint declaration[7]. Returning to this kind of milestone is arduous. The U.S.’s new foreign policy will have to manage these inner labyrinths that did not exist eight years ago.

To navigate the ever-shifting desert sands, of a new chapter of U.S. foreign policy, it is vital to recognize early partners and rivals, opportunities and risks, and mainly to distinguish actual needs – ending the humanitarian crisis, backing a conflict resolution agenda keeping all the nations and actors involved, energy security and economic cooperation from the futile concerns – inactive scenarios which belong to the past.

Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting, a Mexican Council on Foreign Relations member, and an analyst on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.

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References

[1] UNICEF, “UNICEF in the State of Palestine Escalation Humanitarian Situation Report No.31”, UNICEF, October 18, 2024. (https://www.unicef.org/sop/reports/unicef-state-palestine-escalation-humanitarian-situation-report-no31); OCHA, “Humanitarian Situation Update #239 | Gaza Strip”, OCHA, November 19, 2024. (https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-239-gaza-strip?_gl=1*puka4l*_ga*NTUxMzk3NzY2LjE3MzAwNTYwMTI.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTczMjI0NTM4Mi43LjEuMTczMjI0NTQwNy4zNS4wLjA.); International Committe of the Red Cross, “The humanitarian crisis in Lebanon and the ICRC’s response”, ICRC, November, 15, 2024. (https://www.icrc.org/en/article/humanitarian-crisis-lebanon-icrc-response)

[2] Élysée, “Discourse sur L’Europe- President of the Republic”, Élysée, April 26, 2024. (https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/europe-speech)

[3] World Economic Forum, “These are the world’s biggest trading blocs”, World Economic Forum, April 28, 2023. (https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/04/growth-summit-2023-world-biggest-trading-blocs/)

[4] The White House, “Joint Statement from President Biden of the United States and President Macron of France Announcing a Cessation of Hostilities”, The White House, Briefing Room/Statements and Releases, November 26, 2024. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/11/26/joint-statement-from-president-biden-of-the-united-states-and-president-macron-of-france-announcing-a-cessation-of-hostilities/

[5] Mauricio D. Aceves, “China’s expanding role in the Middle East”, Gateway House – Indian Council on Global Relations, October 28, 2024. (https://www.gatewayhouse.in/chinas-expanding-role-in-the-middle-east/)

[6] Gobierno de México – Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, “Under Celac’s leadership, cooperation and consolidation advance in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Gobierno de México – Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Press Release 334, jULY 24, 2021. (https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/under-celac-s-leadership-cooperation-and-consolidation-advance-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean)

[7] Along with the participation of Xi Jing Ping, President of China, Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General, and Charles Michael, President of the European Council