As the Modi government’s third term began, India participated in two important international conferences: the BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, on 10 June and the Outreach Session of G7 in Apulia, Italy, on 14 June. At the first conference, India was represented by Dammu Ravi, Secretary (Economic Relations) in the Ministry of External Affairs, as the External Affairs Minister was yet to be sworn in. At the second conference, India – as one of the 12 guest nations of the G7 Chair, Italy – was represented by the Prime Minister.
Naturally, the latter meeting received much greater attention in India and abroad, given the heft of G7 – an exclusive club of rich and powerful nations – and the fact that it was PM Modi’s first outing for summit diplomacy in his third term. Taken together, India’s participation demonstrated that New Delhi’s preoccupation with major powers and the challenge to pilot its diplomacy through great power divisions would be a vital feature of external relations in the coming years.
Though not a member of G7, India gets invited regularly to its annual summits, in a clear indication that the West sees value in having India as an interlocutor and partner when global challenges are under discussion. This was India’s 11th participation and PM Modi’s 5th consecutive participation in G7 deliberations. Besides India, the other guest nations were Algeria, Argentina, Brazil (G20 President), Egypt, Kenya, Mauritania (AU President), Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tunisia, Türkiye and UAE. The significant absentees were China and Russia, apart from two other members of BRICS – Iran and Ethiopia.
Clearly, G7 symbolizes the West and the North, whereas Beijing and Moscow lead the East and seek to dominate the South. India is also a part of the East and is certainly a credible claimant of the leadership of the South, but it does not share the anti-Western inclinations and instincts of Russia and China. India views itself as a natural bridge between the North and the South as well as a possible interlocutor between the East and the West. This mindset guided New Delhi’s interventions in the two conferences of G7 and BRICS.
On specific discussions in Italy on 14 June, which covered issues such as energy, AI, Africa, and the Mediterranean, PM Modi tweeted that he had “a very productive day” with world leaders. “Together,” he added, “we aim to create impactful solutions that benefit the global community and create a better world for future generations.” The Indian side presented its views in consonance with the collective decisions taken by G20 just nine months back in New Delhi. Mr Modi stressed that developing countries were bearing “the brunt of global uncertainty and tensions.” He reiterated India’s commitment to achieving the target Net Zero by 2070 and highlighted the nation’s proactive role in converting “monopoly in technology into mass usage” and promoting cooperation to make Artificial Intelligence (AI) “transparent, fair, secure, accessible and responsible.” He also underlined the importance of the recent elections as “the biggest festival of democracy,” pointing out that the entire electoral process was made “fair and transparent by the ubiquitous use of technology.”
A major utility of G7 for the Indian leadership lies in the opportunities it offers for both formal and informal interactions with world leaders. Bilateral meetings of several kinds – formal and informal – were held between the Indian PM and the leaders of the U.S, UK, Italy, France, Canada, Japan, and others. These meetings revealed two trends: one, summit diplomacy has become an essential and impactful part of 21st-century diplomacy; and two, the Indian PM loves it and excels at it. His personal rapport with a slew of participants is a national asset. However, it seems that by the time the G7 summit takes place next year, some of this year’s participants may be replaced by new leaders. Therefore, more – and not less – attention to summit-level interactions will become necessary in the future.
In contrast to G7, BRICS offers a non-Western and even anti-Western perspective on several international issues. The latter seeks a more responsive and representative multilateral system that ensures more meaningful participation of developing and least developed countries. It advocates a comprehensive reform of the UN, and expansion of the Security Council to include developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America. BRICS swears by the role of G20 as “the premium forum for international economic cooperation,” and the contribution of consecutive presidencies of India, Brazil and South Africa during 2022–25 in addressing “inequalities, imbalances and shortcomings of the world economy.” This grouping is also committed to promoting the enhanced use of local currencies in trade and financial transactions among its members, thus moving towards de-dollarization.
In a direct attack on Western sanctions against Russia, BRICS expressed concern over “the use of unilateral coercive measures” and termed them “incompatible” with the UN Charter. While seeking speedy reform of the existing Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the grouping re-committed itself to strengthening the New Development Bank (also known as the ‘BRICS Bank’) into “a new type” of MDB for the 21st century.
The joint statement was particularly harsh on Israel, blaming it for “mass civilian displacement, death and casualties, and destruction of civilian infrastructure.” It reflected the grouping’s “unwavering commitment” to the two-state solution. On Ukraine, it revealed an ambivalent position, hiding behind divergent national positions and appreciating various mediation proposals. Against this backdrop, India participated in the peace summit on Ukraine hosted by Switzerland on 15–16 June, while China stayed away. Russia was not invited. But in a brilliant display of diplomatic calibration, New Delhi declined to sign the summit’s communique, maintaining that options acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine alone can lead to abiding peace.
It is worth underlining that India is a full signatory to the BRICS ministerial statement. On the other hand, not being a member of G7, it is not committed to any of the provisions of the nearly 18,000-word ‘Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué’. A careful comparison of the two documents reveals a vast spectrum of differences between G7 member states’ common positions and the consensus view of the 10 member states of BRICS. India thus has the complex task of deepening its ties with the West, while still shaping the perceptions and decisions of the expanded BRICS.
The multilateral groupings of the East and the South such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are of considerable value to India. They enable it to exercise its strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. Besides, they help New Delhi to try enhancing its convergence with Moscow, despite the latter’s growing proximity with Beijing.
On the other hand, G7 is a platform that takes up issues and subjects having immense relevance in the global context. As Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra aptly put it, “Sharing India’s perspectives on these issues not only within the G7 but also through the G7 summit to the entire world is very important.”
Hence, India plans to work – creatively and actively – both with the Western and non-Western camps. The forthcoming summits of SCO (July), BRICS (October), and G20 (November) will provide the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of India’s calibrated diplomacy and the complex, nuanced role it plays in tackling global challenges and advancing the national interest.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House, and a former ambassador.
This article was published in WION News.