China's expanding role in the Middle East

Extensive discourse is taking place regarding the power vacuum in the Middle East following the waning presence of the U.S. In this frame, regional actors have increased their influence over the specific issue of stability. Hence, it is crucial for all countries to diversify their ties when seeking a new balance, beyond their familiar stakes of economic interest and energy security. In this scenario, China offers an alternative, furthering its early strategic engagement around investments, bilateral and multilateral cooperation and geopolitical calibrations, to fit smoothly alongside a new, multipolar order narrative. The echoes of this strategy are also heard in other latitudes. In parallel, China has also increased its presence in Latin America, primarily through investments in communications, technology, and infrastructure for connectivity.

The role of China in the Middle East can be categorized into a troika of domains—the economic and geopolitical scope includes the supply chain, financial systems, investments, technology and technical knowledge transfers, trade and energy security. The second refers to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, including the convergence inside organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the many displays of diplomacy, from the cultural to the military. The third reflects the political approach with non-state actors and the open communications channels through the political labyrinth of the region. China does not aim to control regional dynamics or guarantee security. China’s policy is the master of economic dialogue and the use of incentives while avoiding direct involvement in conflicts and creating adversaries. Economic development is the sword, and pragmatism the road.

The Middle East has historically stood at the crossroads of geopolitics, even for China’s vision. The Persian Gulf provides China with over a third of the oil it imports;[1] Qatar is China’s most significant source of imported gas, and Turkmenistan is the second.[2] Nowadays, China is the largest trade partner of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia.[3] The region became an essential destination for Chinese exports and services linked with infrastructure, communications and information technologies. More than 60% of maritime trade between Europe and China[4] crosses the many seas of the region: the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Oman, the Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz Straits.

Beijing has invested in Oman’s Duqm Port and has built oil pipelines to the Port of Fujairah and facilities at Khalifa Port in the UAE. It holds stakes in at least 20 port projects in the Middle East and North Africa. Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen remain potential sites for further Chinese port development. This intensifying web of possibilities and realities is the first step of a growing China presence in the Middle Eastern supply chain and mirrors the world’s geopolitical priorities.

However, conflicts compromise the transit through these chokepoints between the Indo-Pacific and the Mediterranean waters. The Houthis’ reactivity in the Gulf of Aden, the instability in the Horn of Africa or even the chapter of the stuck Evergreen container ship in the Suez, show how vulnerable these areas are.

Avoiding exposure has been China’s central policy, but in the foreign domain, China has certainly been active and visible. The Chinese military base in Djibouti at the entrance of the Red Sea and the naval presence close to Hormuz, ostensibly aims to deter piracy and more easily participate in joint military exercises. So far, these cards have not been used to interfere in ongoing conflicts, but only to protect Chinese assets and guard commercial routes. Military engagement is for Beijing, the last option when threats to overseas national interests are imminent. Nor does China perceive military non-state actors or ongoing regional conflicts as direct threats. This fact conditioned its approach to relying on diplomacy rather than military engagement.

But this strategy has limits. Scalations and the spread of conflict might involve different approaches. Providing technology and components for dual purposes, civil and military, or supporting the development of the military industry[5] [6] have been small but significant steps toward military involvement through business means.

The SCO, BRICS, the Digital Silk Road and the Global Security Initiative show that China’s presence deep inside the arteries of the Middle East have entered a new stage of engagement. The comprehensive strategic partnerships with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE demonstrate the accurate calibration of diplomacy, navigating the political differences. Even considering the long-lasting support to Palestine and the condemnations of military actions of Israel in Palestine and Lebanon, China has developed economic ties with Israel and simultaneously reinforced relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. China is the top trading partner for Iran and Israel.[7] China’s 25-year cooperation agreement with Iran signed in 2021, and the mediatory role played by Beijing in the Joint Trilateral Statement with Iran and Saudi Arabia, gives China legitimacy and reduces the perception of China as a rival.

Earlier this year, Chinese envoys met Hamas’ political leaders in Doha; concurrently, China attended talks with top Israeli diplomats and the Palestinian Authority, and later in July, China hosted a summit with representatives of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in Beijing. These interactions seek to maintain communication with all actors, even when political and warfare conditions make mediation efforts an unviable task. However, diplomatic inertia over the Middle East appears to be taking root, especially with the devastating situation in Palestine and the multiple fronts opened by this Pandora’s box. Other actions could be analyzed if the conflict spreads and harms global stability.

China’s ties with the Middle East are traversing into uncharted seas. The weight of China has grown in the Middle East. Nowadays, it’s easy to find banks with China’s flag in the region’s leading cities. China’s embassies in Riyadh, Cairo, and Tehran are more influential than ever. China’s ability to understand partners’ motivations has resulted in a foreign policy that is a mix of incentives and defined consequences; it is aware of the importance of establishing a transparent set of geopolitical priorities in a long-term frame. A new version of the “Great Game”[8] has started in the Middle East, and its inner powers are in the leading roles, but China will be that player always on the chessboard with more pieces and moves in hand, than ever.

Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting, a Mexican Council on Foreign Relations member, and an analyst on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

Support our work here.

For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in

References

[1] Keith Bradsher, “China’s Economic Stake in the Middle East: Its Thirst for Oil”, The New York Times, Beijing, China, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-oil-saudi-arabia-iran.html

[2] Chas W. Freeman, “The Middle East and China”, The Middle East Policy Council, Washington, D.C. USA. https://mepc.org/speeches/middle-east-and-china/

[3] The State Council, People´s Republic of China, “Sino trade volumes soar with Middle East, Africa”, The State Council, People´s Republic of China, Beijing, China, 2023. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202307/17/content_WS64b49b48c6d0868f4e8ddd72.html

[4] Amr Salah Mohamed, “China’s growing maritime presence in Egypt’s ports and the Suez Canal”, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., USA, 2023. https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-growing-maritime-presence-egypts-ports-and-suez-canal

[5] Hiddai Segev and Ofek Riemer, “Not a Flood but a Rising Current: Chinese Weapons Sales to the Middle East”, INSS, 2023. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Hiddai.pdf

[6] Dan Darling, Derek Bisaccio and Aja Melville, “China Seizes Arms Exporting Opportunity in the Middle East”, Defense and Security Monitor, Insights from Forecast International, 2023. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2023/06/01/china-seizes-arms-exporting-opportunity-in-the-middle-east/

[7] Jonathan Fulton and Michael Schuman, “China’s Middle East policy shift from “hedging” to “wedging”, Atlantic Council, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/

[8] Peter Hopkirk, “The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia”, Kodansha America, Inc, 1994. https://www.amazon.com/Great-Game-Struggle-Central-Kodansha/dp/1568360223