Africa figures prominently in China’s worldview and in the conduct of its foreign policy in the 21st century. This was evident in the 9th China-Africa Summit held in Beijing Sept 4-6, under the aegis of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has led the engagement for the last 24 years. The Forum has emerged as an all-encompassing and effective platform for dialogue, interaction and planning between the two sides. African countries, despite their reservations and grievances, have found it useful to enhance their proximity to China. Unlike the previous decade, African governments and institutions of multiple hues are more comfortable dealing with their Chinese counterparts.
In the latter half of the 20th century, especially in its last decade, China has laid the foundations of a strong partnership with Africa. This has blossomed since the first FOCAC summit took place in Beijing in 2000. Since then, a total of four conferences have taken place in Beijing and one each in Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, and Senegal. The Beijing summit of last week confirms China’s consistency and steadfastness in pursuing its goals which are economic, political and strategic in nature, reflecting China’s long-held view that Africa is vital to the world’s future, and therefore it should be motivated to stand alongside China.
A 30-para-long Beijing Declaration of the latest summit reflects this. The jointly negotiated document bears, predominantly, the stamp of Chinese draftsmanship. It has six sections, mostly outlining the high-level ‘China Africa Community with a Shared Future’; fostering ‘synergy’ between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), AU’s Agenda 2063 and the 2030 UN Agenda for sustainable development; the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI).
Both sides have re-committed to expanding exchanges on governance, modernisation and poverty reduction so that modernisation based on ‘the characteristics of their own civilisations’ is promoted. This means ‘inclusive economic globalization’ that focuses on the concerns of African countries. China supports Africa in increasing the latter’s influence and role in global governance, and the declaration specifically refers to Africa’s appreciation of China as the first country to support the AU in joining the G20.
There is little new in the goal to promote synergy involving Chinese, African and UN plans for development as this has been often articulated in the past. However, China has now hailed progress in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and expressed readiness to sign a framework agreement for economic partnership with Africa. However, on the issue of financing projects and businesses in Africa, the Chinese astutely shifted responsibility by calling on international financial institutions and commercial creditors to participate in debt treatment for African countries.
For itself, China’s three flagship plans – GDI, GSI, and GCI – have been firmly embedded into the purportedly “joint strategy” to create a common path to all-round security and development. The declaration, for example, voices China’s support for increased UN funding for Africa’s independent peace operations, counterterrorism activities and maritime security challenges. It also adds in China’s newest outward engagement: a dialogue among cultures and civilisations.
Africa’s FOCAC co-chairmanship will now pass from Senegal to the Republic of the Congo and the tenth conference is due to be held in 2027 in the latter country.
President Xi Jinping stuck to a familiar template for such occasions for his keynote address at the inauguration of the Beijing Summit. He did offer fresh financing amounting to nearly $51 billion in soft loans, grants and investment promotion to African nations. Within these were the usual offers for partnership in trade connectivity, green development, industrial chain cooperation, and health. He offered impressive opportunities, such as training for 60,000 women and youth across sectors, hosting 1,000 members of African political parties in China for visits, and training 7,000 military and police personnel from Africa. Nice to hear, but doubtless it will be as opaque about the actual extent of such promises being fulfilled in the future as it was in the past. What will be real will be China’s decision to give all 33 African LDCs zero-tariff treatment for 100% of certain products – an offer that India made in 2008. When implemented, it may boost African exports to China, currently in deficit.
A sober African view of this growing multi-dimensional cooperation between China and Africa recognises the benefits and risks of a close partnership with Beijing. But as pointed out by Paul Nantulya of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, the FOCAC-centred process is still largely shaped by ‘a donor-recipient dynamic where African countries mostly take a back seat while China initiates most of the agenda.’
The U.S. reaction to these deepening ties is much the same: that China’s interest in the developing world is shaped by Xi Jinping’s anti-Americanism. Michael Shuman of the Atlantic Council says the aim of Xi’s strategy is to build a coalition of states within the Global South to act as ‘a counterweight’ to the U.S.’ global alliance. The Europeans are more sophisticated. They caution against interpreting the Chinese role in Africa ‘in black and white terms.’ While China is doing some good in health and education, it expands its power and influence on the continent.
What should India make of the latest FOCAC summit? There are many lessons – most of which have to do with consistency and political will.
First, consistently cultivating Africa at the highest political levels is necessary in both optics and substance, if India is to be taken seriously. After holding three India-Africa Forum Summits, India paused them in 2015. Almost a decade has elapsed since then. Second, strong historical bonds, ideational contributions and stirring rhetoric are useful, but they must be backed by financial generosity. This demands substantial additional resources for fuelling India-Africa cooperation. Without them, all diplomatic and business initiatives will be handicapped. Third, if India is to develop into a China+1 hub, it will do well to think about ways to include Africa into the supply chains of its own hinterland.
Scholar George Yu wrote in Asian Survey in 1968 that “studying China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the bush. The dragon is imposing, but the bush is dense.” China has found a presence in the density of the bush; India must too but needs the same strong political will that the Middle Kingdom displays.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House, former Indian high commissioner to South Africa Kenya and Lesotho, and the author of India-Africa Relations: Changing Horizons (Routledge 2022).
A version of this article appeared in The Hindu.