The two most crucial areas of Indian foreign policy are the nation’s relations with major powers and its ties with its immediate neighbours. Experts agree that India’s policy towards great powers and immediate neighbours has been deeply interconnected and neither can be assessed in isolation from the other.
South Asia, stretching from Afghanistan to Myanmar and from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean, is known for its complex geopolitics, development deficit, and low regional integration.
History, power asymmetry, and psychological factors influence changing dynamics. The involvement of external powers has been a reality. In the past decade, China has been the non-resident power that matters most.
While visiting Russia last week, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar portrayed India as “a major power”. To many eyes, it is so; to others, it is getting there.
The more India enjoys cooperative relations with its neighbours, the more influence it can exert in the world.
Likewise, neighbours looking at India with a reasonable mindset may internalise that cooperating with the world’s fifth largest economy is clearly in their interest. Against this backdrop, an objective review of the present and future is offered below.
Of the eight neighbours, Pakistan – given its size and history – presents the most formidable challenge. It is a nation consumed in dealing with a debt-ridden economy, serious internal security situation including rising tensions with Afghanistan, and continuing political uncertainty where the only constant is the Army’s hold on power. The National Assembly elections on 8 February will throw up indicators for the new year. Will they result in a ‘hung’ house or lead to the emergence of Nawaz Sharif as the next prime minister?
Some Pakistan watchers believe that his premiership is “not a done deal” but most experts interpret his return from exile, dropping of cases against him, and his growing proximity to the Army leadership as evidence that he will wear the crown of thorns once again.
Assuming this scenario comes through, the likely equation between Pakistan and India through 2024 will be of wider interest. Perceptions differ.
A former Indian high commissioner believes that Sharif’s return to power and Narendra Modi’s expected victory in elections in India may open the doors for a limited rapprochement. Others are skeptical, citing divergences on the Kashmir issue, the hawkish attitude of the Army Chief, and New Delhi’s firm policy against Pakistan’s continued adherence to cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy.
Afghanistan, having defied predictions by many international affairs pandits, has fallen off the radar. The expectation that international solidarity may compel the Taliban government to accept some inclusiveness in governance and give assurances about eschewing terrorism has not been fulfilled.
Hence, the neighbours’ preference for minimum transactional relations with the regime may continue in 2024.
Nepal, known for its fractured polity and frequent change of governments, will continue to engage in a balancing game between India and China. It cannot ignore the compulsions of geographical proximity and logic of cultural and historical ties with India. Yet, it is committed to profiting from China’s largesse and remains prone to Beijing’s strategy to sow seeds of dissension in Nepal-India ties.
Bhutan, enjoying unique and close relations with India, has triggered new concerns, of late. These emanate from reports about progress in border delimitation discussions between Bhutan and China, and China’s keen interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Bhutan.
Doklam, situated at the trijunction boundary of India, Bhutan, and China remains a big question mark, given the absence of dialogue among the three concerned parties. However, a major positive development was the visit of King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck to India in November 2023. New Delhi conveyed “full support to the socio-economic development in Bhutan,” including the plan for a smart city at Gelephu and its road connectivity with Kokrajhar (Assam). Further developments will be worth watching.
Sri Lanka showed signs of a slow but steady recovery from the economic crisis it has faced since May 2022. The nearly $4 billion assistance from India made a significant difference.
“If we are stable today,” President Ranil Wickremesinghe told the visiting Indian finance minister last November, “it is because of the assistance.” New Delhi’s collaboration with Colombo on debt management continues unabated. So do its endeavours to enhance cooperation in connectivity, infrastructure development, energy, trade, and investment.
Yet, Sri Lanka also needs considerable assistance from China. India understands this reality, although discontent continues over Colombo’s inability to show adequate consideration for the former’s security interests. If implemented, Sri Lanka’s latest decision to place a year-long moratorium on visits of Chinese research vessels to its ports will be considered a positive development.
Maldives hogged much attention following the election of Mohamed Muizzu as the president in September 2023. His election showed a swing from his predecessor’s pro-India policy orientation to the ‘India Out’ campaign. Three measures taken by the new government – request to India to withdraw its military personnel, refusal to renew the MoU on the joint hydrographic survey, and Maldives’ absence from the latest Colombo Security Conclave meeting in Mauritius – caused much disquiet in New Delhi. But the meeting between PM Modi and President Muizzu on the sidelines of COP28 seemed a good beginning. The early months of 2024 will witness a calibrated Indian response. A series of high-level discussions may be on the cards.
Bangladesh, facing parliamentary elections on 7 January presents a potentially promising picture as most experts agree about the near-certain victory of the incumbent Awami League. The other two parties – the BNP and JEI – are not in the running. The presence of many independent candidates gives the electorate a semblance of choice. The likely return of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will demonstrate the success of Dhaka’s India policy. The past 15 years bear a testimony to an all-round enhancement in bilateral cooperation.
Myanmar today demonstrates the abject failure of its leaders and elites. The country is riven by violent conflict, sharp polarisation, widespread chaos, and a shrinking economy. Neither the military regime nor the resistance has the capability to prevail over the other. Nor will they agree to take the path of dialogue and reconciliation. Given the possibility of further deterioration of the domestic political situation and China’s rising influence, India needs to consider some adjustments to its dual-track policy of maintaining normal relations with the government and supporting the cause of democracy.
Among the region’s multilateral institutions, SAARC has clearly been on the ventilator. Its last summit was held in 2014. BIMSTEC showed promise as some success has been achieved since 2018, but it is not enough. Many hopes ride on the next summit likely to be held in the second half of 2024. How the new (Indian) Secretary General and member governments prepare for it will merit a close watch.
India’s experts often advance their individual ideas to improve the South Asia policy and address ‘the China factor’ in the region. These are unlikely to work in isolation. Perhaps the nation’s top think tanks and leading scholars, together with experts from the ruling and opposition parties, should hold a closed-door Conclave and formulate a practical action plan for the government’s consideration. This can work well and should be encouraged.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House and a former ambassador.
This article was first published by WION.