Today, foreign policy is a hot issue in India’s media, academia, and civil society. The frequency of op-eds on international affairs in national dailies, the proliferation of think tanks, and the domination of diplomatic discourse on social media indicate that the appetite for foreign policy-related developments has greatly increased. This is mainly due to two factors. The nation’s economy is growing along with its international profile, and its leadership is proactive in projecting its ambition to be a leading power on the world stage.
As always, India’s foreign policy is a mixture of change and continuity in consonance with changes within the country and the outside world. Hence, looking ahead, we need to pose the critical question: what does the immediate future hold for India’s foreign policy and diplomacy?
But first, let us pinpoint some of the defining characteristics of the international situation as it emerged at the end of 2024. Five key features must be highlighted.
First, the 2020s are the period of a polycrisis in the world. Covid-19 was a rare phenomenon that affected much of the world, causing havoc to peoples’ lives, livelihoods, health, and the global economy. The war in Ukraine and multiple conflicts in West Asia – Gaza, Red Sea, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria – have created a humanitarian catastrophe. Superimposed on all this is the persisting United States-China rivalry. Second, a clear rebalancing of power has been underway since 2008, with power – economic, military, and strategic – shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the rise of Asian powers, such as China, India, and others.
Third, as a result, multipolarity has replaced America’s ‘unipolar moment’ during the 1990s and the bipolarity of the Cold War era, although huge asymmetries exist among the various poles of power. Fourth, India’s foreign policy agenda has become more complex and varied, with the economy and technology as the new powerful engines. The present external affairs minister of India cannot talk about foreign policy without referring to de-globalisation, supply chain resilience, critical minerals, digital transformation, and Artificial Intelligence (AI). These issues never figured in the foreign policy discourse during the time of the first foreign minister of India. Finally, the fifth characteristic of the world situation may aptly be described as ‘the Trump factor.’ Never before has a single country and a single leader dominated the debate on international affairs as the U.S. president-elect does today.
External affairs minister S Jaishankar made two interesting points recently. One, with India now working towards its goal of becoming ‘Viksit Bharat’ (Developed India) by 2047, it needs a foreign policy that matches this ambition. Two, the government has been running ahead of Track-II, i.e., media, think tanks, and academia, in terms of presenting innovative ideas and grand strategies for the nation’s role in the world. Both observations represent an enticing challenge for foreign policy scholars.
Given India’s geographic location and geopolitical situation, South Block will spend the lion’s share of its time and resources on nurturing cooperative relations with the great powers and immediate neighbours in a complex environment where these two domains are interrelated.
The U.S., China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) are certain to command huge attention among the big players. One detects much self-confidence in the capital about its ability to cope with the Trump factor, but behind it lies a degree of rising concern because of the measures planned by the incoming U.S. administration on tariffs, trade, tax cuts, and immigration. These could have negative implications for India too. The trajectory of U.S.-China relations in the coming months will be of special interest to India. Should they come under stress, Washington and Delhi could embrace each other closely, consolidate the Quad further, and prepare for President Trump’s visit to India in 2025. Further development of the India-China reset, the fruit of persistent diplomacy and flexibility shown by the two sides will be of public interest. Recent parleys between the special representatives and the forthcoming foreign secretary-level meeting may pave the way for more normal exchanges. Whether the process moves smoothly enough to warrant a bilateral summit between the top leaders will need to be watched. As to India-Russia relations, they have been progressing very well while shifting the focus from legacy issues (read defence supplies) to new domains like energy, manufacturing, and technology. They will receive fresh momentum from the Putin-Modi summit in Delhi in early 2025.
A significant question mark for the new year: will it end the Ukraine and West Asia wars? President Trump’s credibility will be tested, as he had grandly declared that he would bring peace to the Ukraine war in “one day.” It is in the West’s hands to negotiate a settlement without abandoning Ukraine altogether. The Trump transition team has plans. Much depends on the new equation that develops between Trump and Putin. Optimists think chances are that the duo could devise an acceptable formula. However, West Asia is more complicated, although a clear outcome is already visible. Israel’s military domination of the region is now indisputable. This could result in ending the ongoing conflicts, but it may start new ones depending on the combined security perceptions of the U.S. and Israel.
Among the neighbours, Bangladesh – our closest and friendliest big neighbour until July – promises to be a major headache unless civil society gives enough room to the governments to restore some normalcy. A well-conceived visit to Dhaka by foreign secretary Vikram Misri was a wise initiative. The unfolding power dynamics in Dhaka will determine how the interim government addresses India’s key concerns about attacks on minorities, including the Hindus, border security issues, and the continuation of development partnership in mutual interest. New Delhi, too, will be expected to respect some of Bangladesh’s sensitivities, including the Hasina factor. Relations with Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bhutan are likely to see further expansion, but they may follow a zigzag course with Nepal. Pakistan and Afghanistan will stay on the radar but are unlikely to receive major attention. Is a breakthrough in ties with Pakistan conceivable? Only if it chooses to give firm guarantees about ensuring the end of cross-border terrorism against India. Will the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) be resuscitated? Unlikely. Will BIMSTEC be given a fresh wind? Possibly, if Delhi-Dhaka ties show some improvement and Thailand displays dynamism and creativity in its leadership.
Several other issues will capture South Block’s attention in the new year, such as pursuing the agenda and leadership of the Global South, making a fresh attempt to convene the fourth India-Africa Forum Summit, refining the Indo-Pacific strategy, and focusing on plurilateral organisations like BRICS, G7, and SCO. New Delhi will be happy to work closely with South Africa, the present president of G20. The countries likely to receive special attention are Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, France, Italy, Argentina, Mexico, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Iran. India’s record of foreign policy management in the past 24 years has been remarkably good. The past decade witnessed notable strides toward an assertive foreign policy and creative summit diplomacy. The diplomatic machine has performed well. By interweaving national security, economic, and diplomatic considerations into a coherent policy, India is set to be a principal player.
Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published in The Hindustan Times.