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19 May 2016, Gateway House

India, Iran, and greater West Asia

A month after visiting Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Modi will visit Iran on 22 May. India's careful balancing of relations with competing parties in West Asia has let it remain a friend to all. But to play a role commensurate with its global vision, India must work on becoming more than a friend and instead be an indispensable partner to countries in the region.

Editor-in-Chief, Radio France International

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When he visited Saudi Arabia last month, Prime Minister Modi received a warm welcome from his Saudi hosts. And as he prepares to go to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arch-enemy in the Persian Gulf region, he can be confident of receiving an equally friendly reception from the Iranians.

It is a comforting feeling for India, whose diplomacy revels in being friends with everybody. Contrary to the actions of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, both of whom chose to visit Saudi Arabia and Iran on one trip, Modi has carefully elected to pay separate visits to both countries. It is possibly due to differing agendas, but more probably to emphasize that one relationship cannot—and should not—be impacted by the other.

Certainly, India and Iran have specific issues to discuss apart from, and regardless of the prevalent situation in West Asia. Essential to India’s growth programme is the supply of energy.  According to the International Energy Agency (IEA),[1] whereas India’s domestic oil production is limited to 700,000 barrels/day, its electricity consumption will grow at an annual rate of 4.9% until 2040. Its dependence on imported oil will then reach 90% of the total, increasing the country’s strategic vulnerability.  India is a major customer for Arab oil producers, but it is naturally eager to diversify its supplies of oil and gas. The importance of Iran, which has the largest natural gas reserves after Russia, cannot be overstated. Currently, 80% of India’s oil is imported, and two-thirds of it, from West Asia. Hence, the insistence in India’s naval doctrine on securing sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean which, according to its doctrine, is an “area of interest”.

The prospect of sanctions on trading with Iran being lifted—-due to the nuclear agreement reached with Iran in Vienna on July 14 last year—is a huge relief for India, which had steadfastly resisted pressure from the United States to curtail its ties with Iran when it was under international sanctions. Iran is also crucial to India as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia via the Arabian Sea harbour of Chabahar, the modernisation of which has been supported by substantial Indian investment. The Indian cabinet gave the green light last February to a $150 million credit facility to support the port’s development. According to the MoU signed in May 2015, India will supply equipment for two berths of Chabahar port and operate these for a decade before transferring operations back to Iran. India also intends to build a rail track from the port to the Iranian city of Zahedan, 650 km from Chabahar, to access the entire Iranian railway network.

Indeed, Iran offers the only viable alternate routes to crossing Pakistan. The Modi government’s wariness of jihadi terrorism is shared by the Iranian government, which is directly involved in fighting Sunni extremists on the ground in Syria and Iraq, and, at home, in the Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Having secured support for fighting terrorism from the United Arab Emirates in August 2015, and from Saudi Arabia last month, Narendra Modi is likely to get the same kind of support from their rival—-Iran—which, if confirmed, will be quite an achievement.

Thereafter, Prime Minister Modi is expected to embark on his long-delayed and much anticipated visit to Israel and Palestine. As an admirer of Israel and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Modi’s words and deeds will be the subject of much attention. Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj was careful not to deviate from her ministry’s traditional position—of how being friends with Israel does not automatically equate to diminished support for the Palestinian cause—while visiting the area last January to prepare the ground for this trip. The Palestinians, however, are no longer under any illusions as they know, from experience, that these good words are not matched with deeds. On the contrary, despite the efforts made to project the relationship between India and Israel as being low key, the depth of cooperation between the two can no longer be hidden, especially in the fields of defence and intelligence sharing. India has long been fearful of alienating the Arab world by getting too close to Israel, but no longer. It is now far more open about it as it does not require that much boldness since the strategic convergence between Israel and the Sunni Gulf monarchies against Iran has become obvious in the past few years.

From the start of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, Delhi has been wary of the consequences the demonstrations and uprisings could have on its interests in the region, including but not restricted to the effects on Indian expatriates there. This is clearly highlighted in the testimony of the then Indian ambassador to Damascus, V. P. Haran, who ex post justifies his support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime, citing the involvement of jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda in the early stages of the Arab Spring demonstrations.[3]

Being friends with everyone—carefully avoiding taking sides and getting involved in disputes between Middle East countries—has been the hallmark of Delhi’s diplomacy in the region. Several prominent diplomats and observers have lauded this policy, pointing out it has worked well so far.[4] Ambassador Ranjit Gupta lays out what is presented as a well thought-out policy:

“Reticence or so called policy passivity in a particularly unpredictably changing and volatile environment in war zones does not reflect an absence of decision making, an abdication of ‘leadership’, or of being a ‘freeloader’. It is simply being sensibly prudent. India’s non-intrusive, non-interventionist, non-judgmental, non-prescriptive, not taking sides in regional disputes, low key, low profile pragmatic approach based on mutual benefit and advantage has yielded very satisfying results and there is absolutely no need whatsoever to change the broad contours of this policy. This is the best way to preserve India’s excellent relationships and protect its interests in the Gulf region in particular and West Asia in general.”[5]

It is true that countries with a more proactive foreign policy in West Asia (the United States, Russia or France) cannot claim to have achieved much success so far. However, if friendship with all is obviously better than an absence of friendship or enmity, it is clearly not enough as it has hardly yielded any influence in the region. For India to be relevant and, above all, not be taken for granted by its many “friends”, it needs to be more than a friend for the countries in West Asia. It needs to become a partner of interest, with a unique selling point. For instance, it must present its partners a huge market, qualified expertise in many fields – chiefly high technology and a joint fight against terrorism.

What  more India should present its partners with remains to be defined, but Indian diplomats, politicians, and analysts would be well advised to spend some time concentrating on  what more India can provide. In the not-so -distant future, it will be the contributory factor to making India not only convenient or useful, but indispensable as a partner. Only then will India enjoy a position commensurate with the role it intends to play on the world stage in the twenty-first century.

Olivier Da Lage is editor in chief at Radio France International. He contributes to Gateway House in his personal capacity.

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References

[1] IAE, India Energy Outlook, 2015, <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2015/IndiaEnergyOutlook_WEO2015.pdf>

[2] Indian Navy Strategic Publication (NSP) 1.2, Ensuring secure seas: Indian maritime security strategy, October 2015, <http://indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf>

[3] Fountain Ink Series, Gulf countries played a role in the Syrian uprising, <http://series.fountainink.in/gulf-countries-role-uprising/>

[4] Gateway House, Balancing Israel and Palestine, 27 April 2016, <https://www.gatewayhouse.in/the-best-of-both-worlds/>

[5] National Institute of Advanced Studies, India and the Middle East Crises, NIAS Strategic Forecast n° 2, February 2016.