The 22nd summit of the leaders of India and Russia–Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin–during the former’s visit to Moscow on 8 and 9 July 2024 should be best assessed through the prism of multipolarity.
Today’s geopolitics is a series of continuing and complex interactions among several poles of power such as the U.S., EU, China, Russia, Japan, India, and the other important nations of the Global South. In this age of conflicts and competition, tensions and turbulence, the player that enjoys positive relations with most, if not all other players, has the chance to perform well in securing its national interest. This driving motivation keeps the India-Russian partnership strong and ticking, despite new challenges. Ironically, it is this aspect that many in the West fail to appreciate while hoping for and predicting (wrongly) a rift in this relationship.
Hence, the real significance of the Putin-Modi summit is that it took place. The last summit was held in New Delhi in December 2021, before the Ukraine conflict began. The last visit by PM Modi to Russia was in September 2019 for an economic forum meeting in Vladivostok. The last meeting between the two leaders took place in September 2022 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
It was India’s turn to be the guest at the annual summit with Russia, which could have been held in 2022 or 2023, but somehow the scheduling of dates and perhaps some diplomatic factors came in the way. Now, the first bilateral visit in Modi’s third term to Moscow has assumed its own momentum. More importantly, both governments ensured that the summit was projected as more than just a mere routine meeting; it was organized creatively and was perceived as a vital summit of two friendly nations that have safeguarded their mutually beneficial partnership for over seven decades.
The build-up to the summit was marked by extensive commentary, analysis and media coverage focusing on what the two leaders – Modi and Putin – planned to discuss and achieve through their deliberations. The Russian side, rejoicing that the long-delayed summit was taking place after all, was first on the mark in disclosing the dates of the Modi visit. It reported a sense of concern and jealousy in American and European circles that Modi was set to re-visit Russia. As this summit coincided with the NATO summit hosted by the U.S. in Washington on the same day, several Western experts opined that either India should shun meeting Putin or persuade him to seek a peace settlement with Ukraine immediately. Chinese scholars expressed the view that only the West, not China, felt insecure over the likely outcome of the Modi-Putin talks.
In this light, New Delhi insisted that the bilateral context of the Moscow summit was of utmost importance. India looks at its “relationship with Russia purely from a framework of reference of bilateral relationships,” observed Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra at his media briefing on 5 July. But he went on to stress that the visit would be an occasion to discuss “various areas of importance in bilateral engagement as also issues of regional and global importance of mutual interest and help broaden the scope of our partnership.” A discussion on the two nations’ membership of several multilateral groupings such as BRICS and SCO was also on the agenda.
The results of informal discussions preceding the 22nd summit and the extensive dialogue at the summit itself have been reflected in three documents: the joint statement, the leaders’ statement on the development of strategic areas of economic cooperation for the period up to 2030, and the list of nine MoUs/agreements signed. A close study of these documents presents five key takeaways, as below.
One, the overarching reality is one of an enduring and expanding relationship between India and Russia, both of whom remain committed to the further development of the “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” The two nations have been engaged in multi-faceted cooperation “in all possible areas of cooperation” and have been exploring “new avenues for cooperation while strengthening cooperation in traditional areas.” For this purpose, institutional links and mechanisms for dialogue will be reinforced in the future. An agreement was reached to convene the next annual summit in India in 2025.
Two, trade and economic partnership will receive more focused attention in the future. A $100 billion target for bilateral trade has been set up. An FTA on goods between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as well as on services and investments will be pushed. A separate document – ‘Programme-2030’ – contains a broad action plan. Other objectives include continued discussion on a migration and mobility partnership agreement between India and Russia, and improved transport connectivity through the Chennai-Vladivostok (Eastern Maritime) Corridor, the International North-South Corridor, and using the potential of the Northern Sea Route.
Three, other important areas for higher cooperation in the coming years are energy partnership, civil nuclear and space cooperation, military and military-technical cooperation, and cooperation in education, and science and technology.
Four, cultural cooperation, tourism and people-to-people exchanges will be further promoted proactively through multiple means. A shared motivation is “to promote a more contemporary understanding of both countries.”
Five, the two nations accept “the importance of reinvigorating multilateralism” and enhancing cooperation relating to the UN and numerous other multilateral organizations and groupings of which they are members. Notably, Russia reiterated its “steadfast support” for India’s permanent membership of a reformed and expanded Security Council. India’s expression of support for Russia’s ongoing presidency of BRICS implies that the two sides should be able to narrow/eliminate their differences on the expansion issue. The leaders stressed that as “major powers” India and Russia will continue “to strive for global peace in a multipolar world.”
As was expected, Ukraine cast a shadow on the discussions in Moscow. The missile attack on a hospital in Kyiv and the killing of Ukrainian children on the day the summit began, created an awkward situation for the Indian side. Referring to the Modi-Putin meeting, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy observed, “It is a huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts to see the leader of the world’s largest democracy hug the world’s most bloody criminal in Moscow on such a day.” Despite this, India clearly conveyed its considered view to Russia that solutions to conflicts could not be found on the battlefield and that the only pathway was through dialogue and diplomacy.
The agreed goal to re-double efforts to expand and deepen bilateral economic cooperation makes much sense. An increase in trade rather than mere balancing is the desired way forward. However, governments will need to motivate and encourage business and industry to subscribe to this goal optimally.
Finally, on the strategic and diplomatic side, Russia has been somewhat wary about the deepening cooperation between India and the U.S., just as India has shown concern about the growing proximity between Russia and China. The Moscow summit indicates that the response by India and Russia to this complex phenomenon is to impart more substance and new momentum to their bilateral relations. From New Delhi’s perspective, the Moscow summit reflected India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ in full play.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House, and a former ambassador.
This article was published in WION News.