For India’s foreign and security policy, which of the two areas is more important: The Indian Ocean stretching from the East African shores to the Indian subcontinent – or the vast region called the Indo-Pacific? Until the first decade of the present century, the most acceptable answer was: The former. However, this changed in the second decade as experts and media were fascinated by the Indo-Pacific as a new geopolitical construct.
The Indo-Pacific region extending from Kilimanjaro to Hollywood became the buzzword. It remained so until the combined effect of the wars in Ukraine (since February 2022) and West Asia (since October 2023) diverted global attention to European and West Asian theatres, thus reducing the salience of the Indo-Pacific vision.
In this light, where do we stand today? Scholars, diplomats, and naval officers agree that, for India, the Indian Ocean is the area of primary interest, whereas its Indo-Pacific strategy is designed to serve this fundamental outlook. The Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean, but it is vital to its security and economic development. Stakes continue to be high because of the escalation of traditional and non-traditional threats. The key feature is the sharpening geopolitical competition and increasing arms race involving the United States (U.S.), China, the European Union (EU), Russia, and others such as Iran, Türkiye, and, of course, India.
In recent weeks, several significant developments impacted India’s position favourably. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s successful visit to Mauritius (March 11-12) highlighted the strategic importance of this bilateral relationship. It resulted in deepening cooperation in the core areas of diplomacy, maritime security, and development partnership. It also enabled New Delhi to upgrade its 10-year-old SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision to the MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) doctrine.
Earlier, the high-powered College of Commissioners led by EU President Ms. Ursula von der Leyen visited India (February 27-28) to inaugurate a new stage in the India-EU relationship. Notably, the EU decided to join India’s still-evolving diplomatic initiative, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI).
The pull of the Indo-Pacific remains strong, as illustrated by two other developments. One, New Zealand PM Christopher Luzon visited India (March 16-20). A productive trip, it resulted in the decision to launch negotiations for a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, an MOU on defence cooperation, and a public recognition by New Zealand that India plays “a significant role in the Indo-Pacific region.” Two, media reports suggested that the Philippines, under intense pressure due to China’s grey zone activities, wants India and South Korea to join the Squad comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines.
The imperatives within the broader Indo-Pacific context lend weight to the argument that India must concentrate its strategic resources on the region closer home, which is the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). How is this to be done? Clearly, through (i) an astute development of several key bilateral relationships such as with Mauritius, Kenya, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Australia, and (ii) appropriate investment in strengthening various plurilateral groupings such as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Quad, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
While bilateral relations have been mostly moving in positive directions, there is a need to invest more in plurilateral institutions and raise public awareness about the stakes and challenges they face in the fast-changing environment of the Trumpian era.
Of the four groupings listed above, CSC comprising India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Bangladesh (absent, of late), with Seychelles as an observer, continues to register progress, especially after the conclusion in August 2024 of the charter to establish its secretariat. Quad, perhaps the most written-about grouping in the past decade, seems like a car standing in front of an amber light. It received fresh energy as its foreign ministers held their latest meeting on January 21 in Washington, i. e., the day after President Trump’s inauguration. Its further consolidation is likely, albeit after the trajectory of the U.S.-China equation, presently shrouded in ambiguity, becomes more apparent.
This leaves two other groupings. BIMSTEC will hold its next summit and related meetings in Bangkok on April 2-4. It must exert itself energetically to move beyond the confines of a routine summit. On its agenda are issues such as expanding connectivity, strengthening regional cooperation to address the shared developmental and security challenges, deepening cooperation in the digital domain, revisiting the need to expedite negotiations for an FTA, and securing the broader vision of ‘the Bay of Bengal Community.’
Thailand’s low-key approach as the chair, persisting tensions in India-Bangladesh relations, and the protracted political and security crisis in Myanmar are noted, but who knows: BIMSTEC leaders may surprise us by crafting a decisive advance towards achieving “a prosperous, resilient and developed BIMSTEC region.”
Finally, the IORA, spanning three continents Africa, Asia, and Australia – stands as a truly comprehensive platform with 23 member States and 12 dialogue partners. (France is the latest member, and the EU is the latest dialogue partner).
New Delhi has several reasons to be especially interested in the future of IORA: the grouping was born out of India-South Africa parleys during President Nelson Mandela‘s visit to India in 1995; its two-year chairship will come again to India in November 2025, and now it has an Indian diplomat as its secretary general. IORA faces a painful paradox: It has been given a vast mandate, but its personnel and financial resources are meagre. How can it handle the resultant challenges?
IORA handles six priority areas: Maritime security, trade and investment cooperation, fisheries, disaster risk reduction, academic and scientific cooperation, and tourism and cultural exchanges. In addition, it is expected to focus on two cross-cutting areas: The Blue Economy and women’s economic development. It needs to craft a formula that helps it develop practical projects funded by more affluent members and dialogue partners to benefit smaller and poorer member States. Then, it will move away from the public perception that it is largely a talk shop. It must proactively publicise the projects it has already completed.
Above all, IORA planners need to remember that plurilateralism has become highly competitive. Only those groupings that meet annually at the leaders’ level manage to grab the attention of bureaucracies, media, think tanks, and the public. Therefore, as the next chair, India needs to take a leaf from Indonesia’s book and consider convening the second IORA Summit during its tenure. New Delhi could easily re-create a bit of its logistical and policy magic, which resulted in its highly impactful presidency of G20.
The remaining years of the present decade will reveal how, through creative and purposeful pro-activism, Indian diplomacy manages the vortex of challenges emerging in the Indian Ocean.
Rajiv Bhatia is the Distinguished Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published in Hindustan Times.