Two years of the Russia-Ukraine war and six months of the Israel-Hamas conflict are now followed ominously by Iran’s unprecedented airborne attack on Israel. With West Asia facing the prospect of a major regional conflagration, these developments seemingly robbed the Indo-Pacific region of some of its salience.
But despite the ongoing armed confrontations in Europe and West Asia, international attention remains pivoted to the complex power dynamics in East Asia.
This is so partly due to China’s frequent and coercive water canon attacks on the Philippine vessels, and partly because the Biden administration remains anxious to leave behind a rich legacy of strong alliances and partnerships.
Deterring China from actions that threaten U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific has been Washington’s key goal. Lines are thus being drawn in the Pacific Ocean that may define the future trajectory of the U.S.-China strategic contestation.
Several important and interrelated developments, in this context, need to be analyzed to get the macro picture right.
Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s official visit to Washington including its key components – a rare state dinner at the White House and a joint address to Congress – opened “a new era of U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation”, with an added emphasis that the two nations would work as “global partners for the future”. Strengthening defense and security cooperation formed an essential element of the novel approach.
President Joe Biden spoke of America’s “unwavering commitment” to Japan’s defense. The U.S. welcomed Japan’s decision to enhance its defense capability by raising its defense budget to 2 per cent of GDP in the fiscal year 2027.
The Washington visit resulted in the announcement of new strategic initiatives to strengthen the alliance.
First, the two nations would “upgrade” their respective command and control frameworks to secure “greater interoperability and planning” between the U.S. and Japanese forces.
Second, the goal to deepen “intelligence, surveillance and Reconnaissance cooperation” would be prioritized.
Third, efforts would be made “to strengthen the Alliance force posture, build high-end base capabilities and increase preparations to enhance deterrence.”
Fourth, defense and foreign ministers have been tasked to develop “this new relationship” through their future meetings in the ‘2+2′ format. The joint statement is thus both candid and specific about the future of defence cooperation.
In his well-received address to Congress, PM Kishida built a compelling case for a closer partnership with the U.S.
“The post-Cold War era is already behind us,” he said, “and we are now at an inflection point that will define the next stage of human history.”
He stressed that the U.S. leadership was “indispensable” but “the U.S. should not be expected to do it all, unaided and on your own.”
The closest friend of the U.S. – the people of Japan – are “with you,” he emphasised, “to assure the survival of liberty.”
During the working visit of Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., President of the Philippines, to Washington, a historic trilateral summit was hosted by President Biden on 11 April, with PM Kishida as the other eminent participant.
Their joint vision statement highlighted the summit’s important outcomes.
The common goal, they affirmed, was to advance the security and prosperity of “our nations, the Indo-Pacific, and the world.” Biden clearly stated that the U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and the Philippines remained “ironclad.”
Perhaps the most telling portion of the vision statement relates to the three nations’ partnership on peace and security. It contains a severe and frank criticism of China. The three nations expressed serious concern over the PRC’s “dangerous and aggressive behaviour” in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, the militarization of reclaimed features, coercive use of the Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, and China’s “repeated obstruction” of Philippine vessels’ exercise of high seas freedom of navigation.
They also underlined the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable for global security.
Viewing China as a common and serious threat, the three nations – the U.S., Japan and the Philippines – are set to deepen maritime cooperation, conduct at-sea trilateral exercises, and improve interoperability.
Separately, Japan and the Philippines have also been engaged in strengthening their bilateral cooperation. A reciprocal access agreement is being negotiated by them, which will allow them to send military forces to each other’s territory.
Moreover, the U.S. and Japan welcomed growing defense cooperation between the Philippines and South Korea on the one hand, and the Philippines and Australia on the other. Clearly, China’s hostile actions have provided much ballast for deepening naval partnerships in East Asia.
China’s reaction appeared along the expected lines. The foreign ministry spokesperson said Beijing “firmly opposes the relevant countries’ manipulating bloc politics” and “any behaviour that provokes or lays plans for opposition and hurts other countries’ strategic security and interests.”
She criticised the trilateral summit participants for “engaging in close cliques that exclude others in the region.”
She dismissed criticism of China as “wanton smears and attacks.”
Since its launch in September 2021, the strategic partnership of alliance members – Australia, the UK, and the U.S. – has been moving forward with its specific goal of providing Australia the conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine capability.
A meeting of top officials of the three countries, held in December 2023, assessed the progress as “exceptional”. Of late, policy thinking favours creating linkages with other appropriate nations. Japan is the prime candidate. In a statement on 8 April, the three governments confirmed that plans were afoot to engage Japan in specific technological areas under the Pillar II of AUKUS.
Other hopefuls are Canada and New Zealand. Questions about what the former could bring to the table have been raised. As to New Zealand, these are still early days, Wellington seems interested in exploring the possibilities. Foreign Minister Winston Peters observed, “Our job is to find out all the facts, all the aspects of what we are talking about and then as a country make a decision.”
New Delhi has been watching these developments with deep interest. As a member of the Quad, India is amply aware that the strategic engagement of fellow members – the US, Japan and Australia – with each other and with other countries will impact this nation in many ways.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent visit to the Philippines has provided much clarity about the changing dynamics in the region. The continuing dialogue with the U.S. during the visit of Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra to Washington last week and the forthcoming visit of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to Delhi would also help.
The Indian side is likely to work for hosting the next Quad summit during the period between the end of the Indian elections and the commencement of the U.S. presidential elections. But, as of now, it seems an uncertain prospect.
Given the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region and the increasing complexity of U.S.-China ties, this region is certain to command much policy attention in the coming months.
With its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, India can afford to neglect neither West Asia nor East Asia.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House, and a former ambassador.
This article was first published by WION.
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