Is India's Africa policy working?

“…Africa will be at the top of our priorities,”[1] Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his address in the Ugandan parliament on 25 July 2018. Four years into the present government’s five-year term, New Delhi is adopting a laudably determined approach to deepening the partnership.

India’s engagement with Africa, especially at a time when the partner region’s geopolitical and geoeconomic situation is changing, deserves serious consideration. Africa is increasingly being viewed as a land of opportunity and promise, not a region of conflict and poverty as before.

Every major player – China, Japan, the United States, Russia, the Association of South East Asian Nations, besides the former colonial nations – is enhancing cooperation with it. As the second most important Asian power and the world’s fastest growing economy, India naturally has significant stakes in Africa’s stability, security and development. But separately, this country’s track record as a successful democracy and development model are relevant to African nations. They, in turn, are well-positioned to offer India their markets and resources, while also building up food and energy security for both sides.

The China factor

Africa has welcomed India’s overtures in enriching cooperation, oblivious to the element of India-China competition in the region that is keeping agog sections of the western and Indian media and experts. Africa needs multiple partners and is understandably disinclined to pick one country over another.

New Delhi has always held that India’s relations with Africa – rooted in history and, therefore, unique – stand on their own: competition with other countries has no part in it though public perception may run to the contrary.[2]

Those given to such comparisons need to remind themselves that China’s economy is about five times bigger than that of India’s today — a critical fact, bearing on the size of the two countries’ respective footprints on the African continent. (This explains why India, while moving on its own steam, has also striven to craft trilateral partnerships with the U.S., Japan and others to leverage available opportunities.)

Key elements

Some more key facts, objectively evaluated, will help us assess the impact and effectiveness of India’s Africa policy. For example:

Government-to-government ties have been strengthened since the first India-Africa Forum Summit was held in 2008; this process gained special momentum after the third summit in 2015. (All 54 African countries attended the third summit; 40 of them were represented by heads of state or government)
India’s president, vice president and prime minister have made more than 25 visits to African capitals during the past four years. Reciprocal political-level visits contributed significantly to mutual understanding and cooperation.
Peacekeeping has been a vital element of the India-Africa partnership since 1960. Over 6,000 Indians currently serve in peacekeeping operations in African countries. About 70% of 163 Indians, who lost their lives while on duty, did so in Africa.
New Delhi’s decision to open 18 new diplomatic missions in Africa in the next few years, which will take the total number to 47, reflects its new Afro-centric approach.
The economic and trade pillar, however, presents a mixed picture. Bilateral trade, which peaked at $72 billion in 2014-15, declined to $52 billion in 2016-17. It showed a 21% increase, touching $62 billion in 2017-18. But, the goal of hitting $100 billion is still distant.[3]
Investment does not seem to progress well. Average annual Indian investment in Africa declined from $6 billion during 2010-13 to $1 billion during 2014-17. Africa’s cumulative investment in India stands at about $2 billion for the period 2013-18.
Project partnership, fuelled by the government’s Lines of Credit (LOCs) and managed by Exim Bank, needs to show improvement. A total of 166 projects are officially listed for the period 2002-17, involving concessional credit of $9.31 billion. The difficulty is that of this amount, contracts of the value of only $4.83 billion (i.e. 51%) have been signed, and an amount of only $3.95 billion (i.e. 42%) has been disbursed. Limited absorption capacity of recipients, procedural delays, and lack of interest among established Indian corporates are the main constraints.
Development cooperation, funded largely by a grant of $600 million announced at the 2015 summit, has been moving ahead well, with India committed to provide 50,000 scholarships during 2016-20 and setting up a variety of skill development institutions at bilateral and regional levels. More information on the actual utilisation needs to be placed in the public domain.
Among projects under the International Solar Alliance, a sizeable share of India’s concessional credit has been earmarked to African nations.
Finally, people-to-people links continue to develop – but in a sub-optimal way. Inadequate growth in tourism, lack of direct flights by Indian carriers, underutilisation of public diplomacy as a tool, particularly by the African side, and below-par engagement with civil society, strategic and academic communities, constrain the growth of dynamism and substance in exchanges between Indian and African Third Spaces (i.e. beyond the government and business sectors.)

The way forward

The Indian prime minister spelt out recently the “10 Principles” that will continue to guide India’s engagement with Africa.[4] Mutual benefit should sustain these efforts. The main facets of India’s Africa strategy should be to: a) motivate and enable India Inc to step up its trade and investment exchanges; b) impress upon stakeholders the need to make project management speedier and more effective; and c) develop an ambitious plan to strengthen the people-to-people connect.

Only then will the India-Africa partnership start moving towards harnessing its full potential.

Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House and a former High Commissioner to South Africa, Lesotho and Kenya. He writes regularly on African developments and India-Africa relations.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

For interview requests with the author, or for permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.

References

[1] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Prime Minister’s address at Parliament of Uganda during his State Visit to Uganda July 25, 2018, < http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30152/Prime_Ministers_address_at_Parliament_of_Uganda_during_his_State_Visit_to_Uganda>

[2] This position was aptly articulated by T.S. Tirumurti, Secretary (Economic Relations) in the Ministry of External Affairs, who in course of a media briefing on 20 July 2018, stated: “As regards China, I don’t think we see ourselves in a competition with China in Africa at all. Our relations with African countries go back very, very long way, goes back to history, goes back to Mahatma Gandhi, goes back to Apartheid and now it is on a very solid foundation of development cooperation and security and other cooperation, which is enlarging. So, I don’t think we look at relations with African countries through the perspective of relations with another country.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Media Briefing by Secretary (ER) on Prime Minister’s upcoming visit to Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa (July 20, 2018), < http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/30140/Media_Briefing_by_Secretary_ER_on_Prime_Ministers_upcoming_visit_to_Rwanda_Uganda_and_South_Africa_July_20_2018>

[3] Sources of data are Expo-Import Databank, Dept. of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India as well as Export-Import Bank of India.

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Prime Minister’s address at Parliament of Uganda during his State Visit to Uganda July 25, 2018, < https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30152/Prime_Ministers_address_at_Parliament_of_Uganda_during_his_State_Visit_to_Uganda >