Since October 8, Hezbollah has been continuously launching rockets at Israel, in support of Hamas. With this act, Hezbollah broke away from the UN-mediated ceasefire agreement of 2006, which it was signatory to. This is not surprising.
After Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, it was clear there was no immediate national interest or territory occupied in Lebanon. Yet Hezbollah, backed by Iran, did not drop its hostility against Israel. The group’s ideological-religious goal has now dragged the people of Lebanon into a war of attrition, in which they have nothing to gain.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah caters to the needs and wants of the Shia community, which is 31% of the population, to the detriment of others. Its armed militia threatens the official Lebanese national army which, since the ceasefire agreement of 2006, has been trained by the U.S. and the West as a professional and modern armed force for Lebanon. Heba Saleh, the Cairo-based correspondent for the Financial Times, reports how the Lebanon army stays on the sidelines in the current Israel-Hezbollah war, wishing sotto voce that Hezbollah will be destroyed and unable to recover as an armed group after this round of fighting with Israel.
Whether Israel feels it is fighting a legitimate war against Hezbollah and Iran, the real question remains: what after the military strikes? How long will Israel fight in Lebanon? Will it reoccupy southern Lebanon as it once did against Yasser Arafat and his guerilla war in 1982?
Israel’s first war in Lebanon has some lessons for Israel today. Then, the Israeli army, under the command of Ariel Sharon, went to Beirut to evict Yasser Arafat and the militants of the Palestinian Liberation Organization so they wouldn’t attack the northern communities of Israel in 1982. Then defence minister Ariel Sharon launched a massive attack on the city of Beirut, and Yasser Arafat had to flee from there to Tunisia.
In military terms, it was a successful operation, but it was a highly unpopular war within Israel, and Ariel Sharon had to resign after it. Lakhs of Israelis came out in mass protests against the war in Lebanon, mainly because of the massacre of thousands of Palestinians in the Sabra neighbourhood and Shatila refugee camp in West Beirut, an outcome of the ongoing sectarian violence in Lebanon because of the civil war (1975-1990). The attack on the Palestinian refugees was carried out by the Lebanese army and Christian Phalange militias and not the Israeli army, but the area in and around Beirut at that time was under the military control of the Israeli army led by Ariel Sharon and he was found guilty by an Israeli Commission of Inquiry of playing a tacit role in letting this massacre happen.
The first Lebanon War was inconsequential when it came to Israeli security in the long term, and Israel had to negotiate with Yasser Arafat. He was recognised as the national representative, and not a ‘terrorist’, of the Palestinian people in the early years of the 1990s Oslo peace process. There is greater public support for Israel’s war in Lebanon today because of the brinksmanship of Hezbollah. The Arab states like Jordan, Egypt, and Gulf monarchies also offer silent support in weakening Hezbollah and its patron, Iran. Still, Israel will have to keep in mind the lessons of its misadventure in Beirut and its invasion of 1982.
First, Israel’s military strikes and targeted assassinations may have already crippled Hezbollah, yet it won’t be able to evict the group from Lebanon by force. By protecting the interests of the Shia community, Hezbollah has played the role of enabler for them in Lebanon’s deeply sectarian society as well as its polity.
It has a vast network of social services running schools and hospitals as well as a TV station, Al-Manar. In Lebanon’s 128-seat parliament, wherein representation was shared between Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shias, the Shia ‘March 8’ alliance led by Hezbollah effectively controls 72 seats, allowing the group to wield political power far out of proportion to its 44 seats – a power that is amplified by its entrenched militia force. Hezbollah’s influence over the crucial ministry of agriculture has, says a report by think tank Chatham House[1], allowed it “to secure ammonium nitrate imports required for the manufacture of explosives”.
It has built an ecosystem; it uses the port of Beirut to transport the contraband goods. “Hezbollah has risen to become the most influential political organization in Lebanon but operates largely without accountability. It probably could take over the Lebanese state by force, but it is far more effective to exercise power in Lebanon’s weak state without taking on responsibilities of office,” the report says.
Second, Israel will not be able to reoccupy southern Lebanon. Not only are the guerilla fighters of Hezbollah there in more significant numbers than in 1982, but this time, its allies like the U.S. and European powers oppose such an idea. According to the study by the Council on Foreign Relations, Hezbollah is a “dominant military force in Lebanon”. In 2021, Hasan Nasrallah said there are 100,000 fighters and 150,000 – 200,000 rockets and missiles of a variety of ranges.
Third therefore, Israeli leaders will be forced to seek a political and diplomatic solution with the caretaker government – or elites[2] – of Lebanon after the military strikes. Hezbollah is a deep-rooted socio-cultural organisation, but after the loss of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, its political bargaining powers and leverage within Lebanese politics have diminished.
This is a strategic opportunity to alienate Hezbollah from the political space of Lebanon in the long run. For example, the Biden administration is trying to influence the appointment of the next President of Lebanon now when Hezbollah is caught in the war with Israel.[3]
The President-elect, Donald Trump, is likely to continue with this strategy as it will contain Iranian influence in Lebanon’s domestic politics. Trump has also made it clear that he has all intention to ‘stop the wars’ and that will not give room for prolonged military operations by Israel in Lebanon. Before he won the election, he told Netanyahu to wrap up the war in Gaza by January 2025. Despite the advantage of a weakened Hezbollah leadership, without an end to the war in Gaza, Israel will not be able to garner international support or sympathy for its war in Lebanon. Overreliance on militarism and retaliation will not serve Israel’s security interests as its first Lebanon war has shown.
Dr Khinvraj Jangid is an Associate Professor and Director Centre for Israel Studies, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat. He is visiting faculty at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, for 2022-2024.
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References
[1] Lina Khatib, “Lebanon’s politics and politicians,” Chatham House, Dec 19, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lebanons-politics
[2] Renad Mansour, Tim Eaton and Lina Khatib, “Rethinking political settlements in the Middle East and North Africa,” Chatham House, Sept 20, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/rethinking-political-settlements-middle-east-and-north-africa
[3] Jared Malsin, Summer Said, Adam Chamseddine, “U.S. Sees Opening to Sideline Hezbollah Politically in Lebanon”, The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2024 https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-government-us-hezbollah-sideline-ab73290d