Governments across the globe are struggling to tackle the growing mountain of alternate facts and deliberate lies designed to deceive and create fragmentation. Yet, in some places on the map, the information war is fought more intensely than in others. Taiwan finds itself in a particularly vulnerable situation. According to data released by the V-Dem research project led by the University of Gothenburg, no other country is more exposed to false information disseminated by foreign governments.[1]
While attribution remains a challenge, the underlying cause of much of the disinformation found in Taiwan is rooted in the cross-strait issue and its historical legacy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), viewing Taiwan as a breakaway province, has long employed asymmetrical strategies to undermine Taiwan’s political stability, sway public opinion, and erode national unity. These efforts exploit the openness of Taiwan’s democratic society, targeting both physical and virtual spheres.
The challenge has intensified in recent years, driven by several factors:
- New Chinese leadership: Under the current CCP leadership, China has adopted a markedly more assertive foreign policy stance and increased its aggressive posturing both in Asia and on the global stage, with Taiwan emerging as a focal point of this shift
- Geopolitical tensions: The growing rivalry between the U.S. and China has amplified the strategic importance of Taiwan
- Technological advancements: Emerging technologies have created new vectors for disinformation dissemination and manipulation
- Changing media landscape: Evolving patterns of media consumption and communication have opened new avenues for influence operations
- Political shifts in Taiwan: Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2016, China has escalated its efforts to disrupt Taiwan’s political system and erode public trust in the government
The January 13 presidential and legislative elections, which saw the DPP secure an unprecedented third consecutive presidential term, prompted a substantial rise in the spread of false and misleading information.[2] Domestically, the disinformation aimed to exploit existing disputes and intensify societal tensions. On the international front, the efforts primarily centered on Taiwan’s relationship with China. A significant narrative emerged framing the election as a stark choice between ‘peace’ and ‘war’ emphasizing China’s military strength. In this context, ‘peace’ was equated with unification with China, while ‘war’ was associated with policies of continued independence preferred by the DPP.
These claims then aimed to raise doubts about the United States’ support for Taiwan, potentially affecting public perceptions of the strength of international alliances. In a worrying development, AI-generated content began to be circulated widely on social media platforms starting August 2023.[3] Deepfake technology was utilized to enhance the perceived authenticity of fabricated stories, potentially misleading voters. Videos featuring AI-manipulated voices and fake news anchors were created with remarkable speed and quickly replaced when removed by platform moderators.
One such deep fake video claimed that DPP’s presidential candidate Lai Ching-te had several mistresses and illegitimate children.[4] In another campaign, fake accounts were found sharing AI-generated content spreading rumors about outgoing Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen.[5]
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has designated the election the first time that nation-state actors have used AI to influence a foreign election.[6] While the immediate impact of these AI-enhanced influence operations appeared limited, Microsoft cautions that China’s ongoing experimentation with the technology could yield more potent results in future campaigns.[7] This development marks a significant escalation in the sophistication of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, potentially establishing a precedent for Chinese election interference efforts around the globe.
How has Taiwan reacted? The government in Taipei has recognized that overly restrictive regulations on media and individual expression can be politically counterproductive and potentially ineffective. Instead, Taiwan has shifted towards a more proactive strategy, adopting a multifaceted response. A primary emphasis has been placed on improving media literacy and critical thinking skills among the populace. Newly established government bodies, including the Ministry for Digital Affairs and the Cognitive Warfare Research Center under the Ministry of Justice, are leading efforts in digital advancement and cybersecurity, while the responsibility for combating false information is distributed across various executive branches.[8]
At an operational level, the government has implemented the ‘2–2–2′ principle, which requires that within two hours of identifying a false claim, two images must be shared along with a rebuttal of no more than 200 words. Overall, however, Taiwan’s resilience should largely be credited to the active involvement of civil society ranging from factcheckers and non-governmental organizations to educators, media, and the research community. These key stakeholders provide real-time monitoring, online verification and analysis, and have adapted valuable cross-sector cooperation. With this effort, Taiwan’s dynamic civil society and bottom-up approach were effective in fostering the adaptability and responsiveness necessary to tackle constantly evolving threats.[9]
Engaging with Taiwan’s civil society, media, and academic institutions helps to better understand the increasingly sophisticated disinformation tactics deployed by Chinese actors. A key aspect is raising awareness about China’s political system and how the CCP disseminates disinformation. Taiwan’s research institutions, particularly those involving social scientists at National Chengchi University, National Taiwan University, and Academia Sinica, have a robust history of analyzing these strategies.
Additionally, learning from Taiwan’s successful media literacy and fact-checking initiatives can improve public attention, and enable citizens to better identify false information. Fact-checking organizations can prioritize cohosting workshops and fostering partnerships with leading Taiwanese actors such as The Taiwan FactCheck Center, MyGoPen, Fake News Cleaner, and Cofacts.[10] Cooperating with civic groups specializing in countering Chinese disinformation, like DoubleThink Lab, Watchout, and the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center, can improve information-sharing and response strategies. Finally, exchanging knowledge on AI-driven disinformation detection tools, such as those developed by Taiwan AI Labs and MyGoPen, will improve countermeasures against emerging threats.[11]
Given the evolving geopolitical landscape, more nations will have to brace for a China seeking to influence public opinion abroad. Taiwan’s ecosystem of non-governmental organizations is already employing a range of high- and low-tech solutions to mitigate this threat. By drawing on their experiences, other countries can fortify their democratic institutions and enhance their readiness against an increasingly advanced arsenal of disinformation tools.
Lasse Karner is a Copenhagen-based journalist and analyst specializing in foreign affairs and security issues within the Indo-Pacific region. He has written several books on contemporary Chinese history and the expanding global influence of China.
This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.
For permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.
Support our work here.
©Copyright 2024 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.
References
[1] “Foreign governments dissemination of false information”, University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem Institute), 2023, https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/MapGraph/
[2] “2024 台灣選舉：境外資訊影響觀測報告初步分析” (2024 Taiwan Election: Preliminary Analysis of Overseas Information Influence Observation Report), Doublethink Lab, January 2024, https://medium.com/doublethinklab-tw/2024-%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E9%81%B8%E8%88%89-%E5%A2%83%E5%A4%96%E8%B3%87%E8%A8%8A%E5%BD%B1%E9%9F%BF%E8%A7%80%E6%B8%AC%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E5%88%9D%E6%AD%A5%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90-fe7f819aeabd
[3] Chen-ling Hung, Wen-Cheng Fu, Chang-Ce Liu and Hui-Ju Tsa. “AI Disinformation Attacks and Taiwan’s Responses during the 2024 Presidential Election”, Thomson Foundation, April 2024, https://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/268943/ai_disinformation_attacks_taiwan.pdf
[4] “網傳賴清德有三名情婦的影片？無事實依據！深偽剪輯片段”(video circulating on the Internet that Lai Ching-te has three mistresses. No factual basis! deepfake clip), MyGoPen, December 2023, https://www.mygopen.com/2023/12/deepfake.html
[5] “Seeing is not believing (part II) – AI videos spread during the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan”, Taiwan FactCheck Center, February 2024, https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/articles/10309
[6] “Same targets, new playbooks: East Asia threat actors employ unique methods”, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, April 2024, https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/final/en-us/microsoft-brand/documents/MTAC-East-Asia-Report.pdf
[7] “Same targets, new playbooks: East Asia threat actors employ unique methods”, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, April 2024, https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/final/en-us/microsoft-brand/documents/MTAC-East-Asia-Report.pdf
[8] Agust Börjesson and Yi-Chieh Chen “The Political Split at the Heart of Taiwan’s Struggle against Foreign Disinformation”, Institute for Security and Stability, February 2024, https://www.isdp.eu/publication/the-political-split-at-the-heart-of-taiwans-struggle-against-foreign-disinformation/
[9] “Taiwan POWER: A Model for Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference Resilience”, Doublethink Lab, August 2024, https://medium.com/doublethinklab/taiwan-power-a-model-for-resilience-to-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-70ea81f859b7
[10] “In Taiwan, Civic Group Combats False News with Patience,” April 7, 2024, https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/in-taiwan-civic-group-combats-false-news-with-patience/7552311.html
[11] Sunny Hsu, “2024 Taiwan Presidential Election Information Manipulation AI Observation Report”, Taiwan AI Labs, January 2024, https://ailabs.tw/uncategorized/2024-taiwan-presidential-election-information-manipulation-ai-observation-report/