The recent three-week long incursion by Chinese troops 19 kilometres into Eastern Ladakh, has yet again highlighted the systemic anomalies in the Indian defence establishment. While analysts try to break down what exactly happened in Depsang from April 15 to May 5, some clear lessons have emerged from this episode.
At the operational level, Depsang revealed the intelligence failure of the armed forces to detect the incursion, despite other similar attempts in the past by the Chinese on the Line of Actual Control.
The lack of a comprehensive strategy to deal with the Chinese threat, which India has faced since 1962, was especially evident in the manner in which decisions to handle the incursion were taken. The absence of proper channels of communication to enable a seamless exchange of information between different government agencies caused further confusion. The lack of well-practiced standard operating procedures – who should respond first in such instances, what are the initial steps, what is the role of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police – also exacerbated the situation.
The armed forces were absent from the initial decision-making process; it was only on May 1 – two weeks after the incursion – that General Bikram Singh got an opportunity to directly discuss the matter with the apex body on decisions about national security, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). While the army grappled with the incursion on the ground, it was the then Defence Secretary Shashikant Sharma who incongruously represented the army in the China Study Group. The group, which includes the National Security Advisor and secretaries of the home, defence and external affairs ministries, coordinated the resolution of the issue.
But the Depsang incursion may have moved the Ministry of Defence (MoD) out of its inertia in implementing long-pending proposals. Some of these go back to the report of the 1999 Kargil Review Committee (KRC), which had many path-breaking recommendations to correct the deficiencies in India’s security management and prevent another Kargil-like intelligence failure. [1]
Unfortunately, the government’s ad-hoc approach has meant that many KRC recommendations are still to be implemented. As a result, India has been caught napping on too many instances of territorial violations – the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2009 mass militant infiltration in north Kashmir, and now at Depsang.
Among the most important decisions that the MoD appears to have taken is its formal note to the CCS to create a mountain strike corps to empower the army to respond to China’s aggressive designs. The army proposed the corps in 2010, but no steps were taken to formulate such a force until now when, after Depsang, the army has re-stressed the need for such a force.
This feet-dragging is not an exception and on many other military-related issues, the MoD’s decisions have been stuck in bureaucratic apathy and a constant wrangling with the armed forces. Added to these hurdles are the scams in defence deals. Together, these factors have resulted in a sense of alienation amongst the armed forces and a demoralising effect on junior-level soldiers, sailors and airmen.
The MoD must proactively address the concerns of the armed forces, including the shortage of more than 13,000 officers and 53,700 other personnel. [2] And with the deteriorating regional security environment, the armed forces must immediately be integrated into a faster decision-making process at the MoD on various pending proposals.
On May 23, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh laid the foundation stone of the IndianNationalDefenceUniversity in Gurgaon. [3] The creation of such a university is a key recommendation of the KRC report. Pakistan and China have been operating such institutions for a long time. Starting the construction of the university may seem to be coincidental in the aftermath of Depsang, but the university will hopefully joins hands with the think tanks already established by the three wings of the armed forces to formulate a holistic grand strategy and assert the voice of the armed forces in decisions on national security. Instead of waiting for the completion of the university campus, the government can start recruiting faculty and begin the courses.
The MoD must also purposefully move forward on the indigenisation of defence production. Defence Minister A. K. Antony has been pushing this for some time, and on April 29 the MoD amended the Defence Procurement Procedure to give preference to indigenous production. [4]
Substantive measures are needed to enhance the private sector’s involvement in defence production, by giving them preferential treatment over the defence public sector undertakings (PSUs), whose performance has been dismal when compared to the resources at their disposal. Potential expansion areas for the private sector such as research and development (R&D) of weapons must also be explored. The entry of the Indian private sector has the potential to reinvigorate the defence sector.
A look at the progress made by the Chinese defence industry in enhancing the offensive capability of the People’s Liberation Army should help India draw lessons. Once characterised by inefficiency and corruption, the Chinese defence industry has now been reinvigorated with the end of the monopoly of state-owned firms, the entry of private players in the defence sector, and the integration of commercial and manufacturing aspects into R&D.
However, for all this, the willingness of the political leadership to move quickly is a critical factor.
Sameer Patil is Associate Fellow, National Security, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism, at Gateway House.
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References:
1. Government of India, Kargil Review Committee. (2000). The Kargil Committee Report: Executive Summary. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/news/india/2000/25indi1.htm
2. Government of India, Ministry of Defence. (2012). Shortage of Manpower in Armed Forces. Starred Question no. 238, answered on 10.12.12. Retrieved from http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/QResult15.aspx?qref=131233
3. Press Information Bureau. (2013). Prime Minister lays the foundation stone of Indian National Defence University. Retrieved from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=96158
4. Government of India, Ministry of Defence. (2013). Defence procurement procedure. Retrieved from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=95274