The classified Henderson Brooks report on the India-China War is still relevant for India, considering China’s renewed aggression at the Line of Actual Control. The findings highlight the need to re-think our muddled China policy and coordination among the political, bureaucratic and military establishments. Sameer Patil, Associate National Security Fellow, Gateway House, explains:
Fifty years after it was submitted, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report on the 1962 India-China war, has been partially released by Australian journalist Neville Maxwell, who was based in New Delhi when the war took place. The committee was mandated to look at the operational aspects of the war, and essentially blames the military leadership and intelligence apparatus for the debacle — one that has traumatised our national psyche since then.
However the report also indirectly points to a failure on the part of the political leadership at the time. The military and intelligence establishments which functioned under the instructions of the political establishment, shared the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s rather utopian outlook on China. While much has been written about Nehru’s naïve views, it would serve us well to examine how those views influenced the formulation and implementation of India’s policy towards China.
The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report points out that this complacency was especially evident in the Indian government’s response to China’s road-building activities along the entire Himalayan frontier, particularly the Aksai Chin area. The report says there was enough evidence to suggest that the government was aware of these activities, but did not pay sufficient attention and recognise it as a sign of China’s aggressive intentions.
The myopia persisted even while strong differences were emerging between India and China over the boundary issue. When the Indian Army asked for new arms and weapons platforms, the Ministry of Defence responded to the demand for tanks with urgency as the government was convinced that tanks would play a decisive role in the event of an India-Pakistan war. Clearly the bureaucracy at the time was focused on Pakistan to the exclusion of everything else.
Between 1956 and 1962, India stepped up its defence expenditure from $403.52 million(1956-57) to $608.03 million(1961-62). The focus of this spending was Pakistan as Nehru wanted to match up to the Western military aid received by Pakistan. Having achieved relative supremacy over Pakistan, Nehru should have paid attention to addressing the challenge posed by China.
The disregard proved fatal and at the receiving end was the Indian Army as this affected its operational preparedness. In order to balance the Chinese threat, the Army needed to raise additional mountain warfare-equipped battalions and regiments. A proposal for this had been mooted in 1947, but was set aside due to lack of political will. None of the nine Army divisions deployed along the India-China border in 1962 were up to full strength — they were short of artillery, equipment and even clothing. As a result they were unable to take on the full-scale attack from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops.