The year 2023 has special significance for India’s foreign policy as New Delhi presides over two major international forums – the G20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The agenda of these multilaterals is supposed to be different: G20 has traditionally been focused on issues of geoeconomics while the SCO has been more about security and geopolitics. This year, however, against the backdrop of the lingering Russia-Ukraine conflict, these institutions may swap places.
In the three months since the G20 summit in Bali coalesced around an agreed joint statement, the agreement came loose at the Finance Ministers and Central banks governors’ meeting and the Foreign Ministers meeting in India in February-March. There were no communiques, just Outcome Documents, which reiterated the two paragraphs of the Bali declaration referring to the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemning “the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” and demanding “its complete withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine.”[1] These were unexpected sticking points at the ministerial meetings of India’s G20 presidency.
The Outcome Document issued by the Indian Government names Russia and China as the only two countries standing against the proposed joint statement, indicating that India as President was unable to support the official explanation by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who threw little light on the renewed Russian approach and singled out the G7 countries for their “emotional attempts to highlight the situation around Ukraine as the Russian aggression”[2].
What can be the rationale behind Moscow’s turnaround from the Bali consensus? To trace the roots of this decision, it is necessary to recall the SCO meeting in Samarkand between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin in September 2022. Even as Modi’s “it is not the era of war” formula has been viewed as an acceptable one for all the sides of conflict including Russia, the Russian President was seemingly not happy with the implicit criticism of his actions. Putin’s irritation was visible when, speaking first, he underlined that he knew “[Modi’s] position on the conflict in Ukraine and the concerns that [he] constantly express[ed].”[3]
This matters against the backdrop of Putin’s expected participation in the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023[4]. No doubt it will materialize only on condition that Russia’s “special military operation” is not called out by the forum’s statement. Even before that, the SCO summit in June will be a litmus test for the Russian President on how (if at all) the Indian stance on the Ukraine conflict has evolved. Hence, Russia’s intransigent stance at the G20 ministerial meetings is probably about laying the base for these potential visits and setting out a new defensive position prior to the upcoming summits.
Surprisingly for Moscow, India’s chairmanship in G20 has not turned into ‘a home game’ in which Russia’s views can be accommodated, relying on the sentiments of Indo-Soviet friendship and citizen support. New Delhi has no reason to renege on the Bali consensus reached with its own diplomatic efforts just a few months ago.
Moscow’s diversion from the Bali declaration may also be explained by the domestic situation in Russia with the 2024 Presidential elections coming up and requiring a solid popular consensus on the war. In this context, an approval by Russian diplomacy of any criticism at the global level might not be perceived well domestically, particularly by those supporting the military campaign. As the Russia-Ukraine conflict enters its second year, Russian authorities will look for more “stability” inside the country by ironing out divergent views on the origins and requirements of the war. Moscow can hardly then allow itself to accept terms like “aggression” or the demand to withdraw troops, in international fora, even as these reiterate the UN proceedings.
The divergences on security issues should not cast a shadow on India’s chairmanship at the G20 forum or expect the G20 to become the venue for crisis settlement. It is not the G20’s agenda. But the forum should do its job by addressing the immediate after-effects of war like food and energy security along with other important global issues like the economic crisis, counter-terrorism, climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster risk reduction. No matter what the end game in Ukraine is, the resolution of these problems will define global development in the years to come. The right model for this year’s G20 should be the Covid-19 pandemic, where, despite an unprecedented situation, there was no condemnation of a country where the virus originated, but there was consensus under the Saudi presidency on addressing the impact of the crisis and cooperating on it.
The lack of consensus on the G20 declaration also points to the new dynamic inside the India-Russia-China triangle. The three are now more often seen as 2+1, with Beijing and Moscow acting in sync against the West at the UN and other multilaterals, while India does not take sides. The Russia-China joint statement following the Putin-Xi March 21 summit refers to the differences at the G20 when it condemned “…the politicisation of multilateral platforms and the attempts of certain countries to insert irrelevant issues on their agenda, damaging the implementation of the immediate priorities of these formats.”[5]
This joint position by Moscow and Beijing sets the trend for future multilateral engagements with their participation, including at BRICS and SCO, where New Delhi sticks to its own opinion and often declines to join anti-Western initiatives. Lack of consensus is an all-too-familiar state of affairs at the SCO. Iran’s official joining in April is set to expand the SCO to West Asia, but its member states are still mired in divergences over border issues and views of the origins of terrorism and extremism. This regularly leads to controversies such as at the latest meeting in New Delhi where Pakistan – yet again – found the pretext to demonstrate the map with Kashmir as its own territory and, following the protest from the Indian side, pulled out from the event.[6]
Despite all these differences, India’s 2023 chairmanship can infuse new life into the SCO. India’s efforts in recent years have allowed the SCO to step aside from an excessive focus on traditional security problems and include an economic agenda and cultural exchanges including conferences on civilizational connections and shared Buddhist heritage between the member states[7]. India launched the Startup Forum, a platform for bringing together investors and companies to support startup ecosystems in the participant countries. An SCO working group on innovation and startups was established and is expected to meet for the first time this year. IT and innovations have been discussed at the SCO since 2019, though several official meetings and conferences on these subjects have not had concrete outcomes so far.
The shift in organisational focus has played into Russia’s efforts to overcome isolation. At last year’s Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Moscow initiated the discussion on ‘SCO’s business agenda in today’s world’ with the ambitious idea to “put the enormous geopolitical potential of the SCO into practical cooperation at the business level.”[8] The proposal by President Putin last September to create a sports association for SCO countries was reiterated by Russian Minister of Sport at the recent (March 15) ministerial forum in New Delhi, proposing that Russia host the inaugural SCO Games to ensure that “…the athletes and major international tournaments do not become the object” of politization.[9]
As reaching convergence on security issues is nowhere in sight for the SCO members, the organisation’s activities will be focused on less contentious areas like digital solutions, logistics, humanitarian and cultural exchanges.
In an ideal world, the conversations at the SCO would be complementary to the G20 agenda. However, in the era of war, when economic and humanitarian issues become intertwined with geopolitics, it is difficult for both G20 and SCO to come up with significant deliverables. With diplomatic space decreasing, the two multilateral fora will see transformations in letter and spirit.
India sees its G20 presidency as a chance to promote the needs of developing countries and demonstrate that as a responsible power it deserves a place at the global high table. Faced with increased expectations from all the sides of the Ukraine conflict, New Delhi, by virtue of following multi-alignment strategy, has retained sufficient space for manoeuvre. Russia is fixated on countering the West and views the multilateral gatherings through the prism of great power contest. Moscow seeks closer ties with “the Global South” but has yet to elaborate on what it can offer to developing nations, beyond a vague concept of “struggle against neo-colonialism”.
India’s chairmanship of the G20 and SCO can be the right moment for Russia to reconnect with the world – provided Moscow releases itself from the shadows of the past and is receptive to new ideas. Russia must therefore start to align its interests with India, including at the multilaterals. This will provide it elbow room in an otherwise China-centric foreign policy in Asia, reach out to the developing countries, and potentially rebuild bridges with the developed ones.
Dr Aleksei Zakharov is a Visiting Fellow, Gateway House and Research Fellow, School of International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow.
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References
[1] “Chair’s Summary & Outcome Document,” https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/FMM_OUTCOME_DOC.pdf
[2] Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to questions following the G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting, New Delhi, March 2, 2023,” https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1856607/
[3] President of Russia, “Meeting with Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi,” Sept 16, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69362
[4] Alexander Kislov, “Peskov did not rule out that Putin will go to India for the G20 summit,” Kommersant, March 13, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5873933
[5] President of Russia, “Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation, Entering a New Era,” March 21, 2023, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5920
[6] Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Transcript of the Media Briefing by the Spokesperson on Friday 24 March 2023,” https://mofa.gov.pk/transcript-of-the-media-briefing-by-the-spokesperson-on-friday-24-march-2023/; Singh, Rahul and Rezaul H Laskar, “Pak team skips SCO event in Delhi after Indian objection to its inaccurate map,” March 21, 2023, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pakistani-team-skips-sco-event-in-delhi-after-indian-objection-to-its-inaccurate-map-101679393419718.html.
[7] Lentin, Sifra, “India and the SCO: Bound by Buddhism,” Gateway House, Nov 12, 2020, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/SCO_Sifra-Lentin.pdf.
[8] “The New SCO Business Agenda in Today’s World,” St Petersburg International Economic Forum, https://forumspb.com/en/news/news/novaja-delovaja-povestka-shos-v-sovremennyh-uslovijah/.
[9] “Russian sports chief Matytsin proposes Russia as venue for inaugural SCO Games,” TASS, March 15, 2023, https://tass.com/sport/1588977