A day after Mumbai was struck by multiple bomb blasts on July 13, Philip Oldenburg, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and South Asia Scholar spoke to Gateway House’s Samyukta Lakshman about his new book “India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths”. He explains how Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s blunder in imposing Urdu as the national language had far reaching consequences.
Q. What did the terrorists hope to achieve with the recent Mumbai blasts? Do you think the Jihadi elements from Pakistan were responsible for these attacks?
It is not clear why these attacks occurred and what exactly the terrorists hoped to achieve. No group came forward to claim responsibility. It seems to be a violent reaction to a domestic event. This attack was not sufficiently large to provoke an India-Pakistan war. The Indians cannot blame Pakistan for this incident even though they do not curb terrorism, continue to shelter Dawood Ibrahim, and complaints of the November 2008 attacks remain unaddressed. This attack seems to be the activity of groups in India expressing themselves.
Q. Your book emphasizes Jinnah’s decision to make Urdu Pakistan’s national language as a critical factor for the way democracy functioned in the country. Subsequent Pakistani leaders tried to enforce Urdu and Islam. Is there still a connection between Urdu, Islam and the constitutional order of Pakistan?
I don’t think there’s a connection between the constitutional orders after the breakup of Pakistan in 1971. The language policies prioritized Urdu as a medium of instruction in schools, and Urdu became a genuine language of communication. Urdu, as the national language, facilitated the preeminence of the Muhajir or refugee community in government in the post independence period. Urdu symbolized not just the mistake that an entire Urdu speaking Muslim nation represents, but more critically the fact that the Urdu speakers who arrived in Pakistan saw themselves as the creators of Pakistan and the occupiers of powerful positions within the bureaucracy and the military. Urdu no longer has that kind of role.
Islam is a different story. We don’t quite know what Jinnah’s choice was. Liberal and secular minded Pakistanis believe that Jinnah’s sentiments were expressed in the August 11th speech that Hindus and Muslims were “free to go to your mosques, your temples”. It had nothing to do with the business of the state; it was their business. It was a ringing endorsement, but six months later Jinnah said Pakistan was going to be an Islamic state.
There is an argument about what he felt and what he meant. Was Islam a superficial idea for him personally? Every effort to make Islam the binding factor ran into divisions within Islam. Islam has been a double-edged sword, and it is not clear whether Islam binds Pakistan in a way Jinnah thought.
Q. How do you view the current democratic experiment in Pakistan? Which direction do you think it is headed in?
The lack of institutionalisation of the political parties and the paucity of ideas on what to do on basic economic and security issues is worrying. There is not much strength in the political system. On the other side of the equation is the strength of the military. Pakistan is not a democracy yet, because the military continues to control security issues, foreign policy and has a significant role in the economy and society.
I haven’t seen signs that the military is letting go. They did stay out of the 2008 election; hopefully, they will stay out of the 2013 elections. They have now recognised that the Jihadi threat is significant and they need to get themselves out of politics to combat this threat effectively and, at some point, get civilians in the defence ministry.
Those with economic muscle have been able to maintain the status quo, and the indicator of this is the inability to have taxation systems. The paradox is that Pakistan has been able to survive economically without taxation and investment because it is well endowed with agricultural land, gas supplies and other things. Now may be Pakistan has reached a point with water issues and incredible imbalance with low economic growth-high population-increasing poverty. This is not going to happen with infusions from abroad, with drug money or black economy. If the economy changes, it will put the government on a better financial standing.
The middle class is a part of the elite which can get things done without a democracy; they only need connections and trading in favours. If an economic transformation occurs and broadens the size of the middle class, that is an incentive for establishing new democratic action teams.
I am optimistic that democracy (in Pakistan) will develop. There are certain things that can strengthen the political system vis-à-vis the military and bureaucracy. This includes having another good election after a full term of the current parliament with, perhaps, an alternation of government and an easy handing over of power as the first democratic step towards solidifying –not consolidating.
The Nawaz Sharif Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People’s Party recognize, I think, that they need each other desperately. Otherwise (Pakistan) will slip right back into explicit military rule. It seems to me that civil society organisations will expand. The lawyers’ movement that was wrong (to honour the killer of Salman Taseer) may revive, thus pressurising politicians to stick to their guns.
Q. U.S. military aid to Pakistan has created an imbalance in civilian-military power. Is the denial of the US $800 million military aid a move to correct the imbalance, or just enhance domestic U.S. consumption?
When the U.S. gives aid it strengthens the military. When it withdraws aid, it strengthens the military too as the military says the U.S. stabbed us in the back. As far as aid is concerned the U.S. can do no right with Pakistan. They can’t give military aid to the military; they can’t earmark it for civilians because the military won’t accept the provisions that aid cannot be given or siphoned off to other areas. We are damned if we do and damned if we don’t.
China doesn’t step in. They are very friendly [with Pakistan], but do not have the kind of resources that the U.S. has. The Chinese are true friends, but in critical moments the Pakistanis have gone to China seeking help and the Chinese have made nice noises and done nothing. They are not accused of stabbing [the Pakistanis] in the back.
The military doesn’t need those resources. This is peanuts; $800 million is a small part of the budget.
Q. You just returned from Srinagar. How do Kashmiris feel about their future?
We spent three days talking to students and teachers from classes 9 to 12 at the Delhi Public School in Srinagar. That’s the elite of the elite –English speaking, upper middle class. It is a very biased group. It is clear that none of them were looking towards a future with Pakistan; they were clearly talking about Azaadi (liberation).
I did an exercise with some student groups over two days, about lets think through Azaadi. What does it mean in concrete terms? The Pakistanis discovered that choosing a national language was not simple, and their wrong choice broke Pakistan apart.
So what should be the national language of an Azaad Kashmir? They said that we will adopt the Indian idea – of having a state language, but having equal legitimacy for regional languages. Religion? Pakistan also had a terrible time about what religion to follow and how Islam was go
ing to work. Will it be an Islamic state or a secular state? And the answer was secular. If it had been an Urdu medium school, that answer might have been different.
Whatever the outcome, it should happen by civil means not military means.
Q. Are there areas where Pakistan and India can realistically engage? Can they make SAARC an effective organisation?
I am not optimistic about SAARC being more than an organisation of convenience with limited benefits. India is too big and there is no other way that India is going to act.
If Pakistan is prepared now to turn its face back to the subcontinent, trade restrictions might loosen. Indians might say that instead of getting our garments from China, let’s get garments from Pakistan. There is still some scope for people to people medical interaction.
It clearly depends on the drying up of the jihadi enterprise on the Pakistani side, and easing of Indian automatic responses – of what Shekhar Gupta (editor Indian Express) called the Indian Fossil Service— to anything that Pakistan does.
A Hindu article had an interesting idea – a former Pakistani ISI officer and a former Indian Research & Analysis Wing operative suggested intelligence collaboration between India and Pakistan. If India and Pakistan can collaborate on intelligence, then why not everything else?
Philip Oldenburg is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and South Asia Scholar. He has authored the book “India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths”.
Samyukta Lakshman is a Researcher at Gateway House.
This interview was exclusively conducted for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.
For interview requests with the author, or for permission to republish, please contact outreach@gatewayhouse.in.
© Copyright 2011 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorized copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.