Petit, not grand geste on India-Pakistan

Pakistan’s President, Asif Zardari, will be in India on 8th April. It was to have been a private visit to the shrine at Ajmer Sharif. Naturally Prime Minister Manmohan Singh invited him to Delhi for a meeting followed by lunch. Equally naturally the Pakistanis accepted.

The Americans inserted themselves into this congenial India-Pakistan relative normalcy. On 3rd April, Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary of Political Affairs at the State Department, who was visiting New Delhi, announced a bounty of US$ 10 million on the head of Hafiz Saeed, chief of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) believed to be responsible for the horrific attack on Mumbai in 2008.

Press reports say India was given no advance intimation of this hugely significant decision. But our Home and External Affairs Ministers welcomed the move as additional pressure on Pakistan to act against terrorist groups in general and the LeT and Saeed in particular. There is some speculation that the timing of the Sherman announcement may have been a calculated quid for an Indian quo on Iran. More plausibly, it could be a way for the U.S. to corner Saeed, who is leading the opposition to the reopening of NATO supply lines into Afghanistan. Given the complex and extended processes involved in bounty-setting, the Americans may be given the benefit of doubt that it is related to the killing of six Americans in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the growing internationalization of the LeT threat.

The U.S. announcement was greeted with scorn by Saeed asking that the money be given to him directly since he is not in hiding. Equally farcical was the bureaucratic response of the Pakistani government, which sought information from the U.S. in order to act. It reveals simultaneously the power of the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-nurtured groups like the LeT, and the absolute dysfunctionality of the Pakistani government.

Whatever their motives may have been, the U.S. move has ensured that terrorism will top the list of issues when Zardari arrives in India, on which Indian and Pakistani principals will be obliged to take public positions. That is a pity because President Zardari has previously made some sound pronouncements on the terrorism issue including that the Taliban is a greater threat to Pakistan than India. So although we may get some positive sound bites, actual actions will be further delayed by the need to pander to both the army and intelligence network, let alone the inflamed Pakistani street.

Beating conventional wisdom, President Zardari, with the weakest hand imaginable, has managed to hold on to elected office longer than predicted. He has also been low-key and generally flown below the radar on recent testy exchanges with Americans on Afghanistan, allowing the hapless Prime Minister Gilani to take the flak from Parliament, the armed forces, the judiciary and the fundamentalists.

Zardari has also tried to reach out regionally. Through announcements and strategic visits, he has made it clear that China and Pakistan remain best friends, and he has worked on opening up relations with the Russians, possibly with the end game in Afghanistan in mind. For the same reason, he assured the Iranians that if the U.S. were to attack them, Pakistan would stand beside Iran. Lastly, the Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, remain strategic and to some extent, financial supporters.

In addition to the recognition that Pakistan’s greatest threats come from within, Zardari has shown flexibility on nuclear and trade issues. Although his announcement immediately after the Mumbai attacks that the ISI chief would come to India for discussions was torpedoed by the Pakistani army, it was an act of courage. Similarly his efforts to bring the Army under civilian control may have failed in the immediate, but have been part of the dynamic of the erosion of its image after the Osama killing. Again, Zardari’s statement that he hoped that Pakistan would not ever think of using nuclear weapons against India, is the nearest any Pakistani leader has come to a “no first use” policy. And it is his government that is implementing the significant step to grant Most Favoured Nation status to India, albeit step by single step, which could eventually yield a mutually profitable commercial relationship.

There is a pattern here. It may be time for India and Pakistan to eschew dramatic and decisive agreements on Kashmir etc. and work for incremental improvement, almost by stealth. Over time, this process may generate sufficient cumulative benefit to have a qualitative change, which can then be taken to the next stage. That would be more or less the route followed on nuclear issues, where the two countries have been exchanging lists of installations as an annual confidence-building measure.

Both India and Pakistan must work hard to avoid a Musharraf-type Agra debacle – where hopes were raised sky-high and the immediate results were non-existent.

It may also be a better strategy to work on one issue at a time, rather than on a whole raft of pending issues. It has been the political history of both countries to reject rational solutions on accounts of the perceived inability of public acceptance; similarly the smaller the target available to anti-Indian forces, the greater the possibility of its attainment. President Zardari, with his reputation and alleged interest in business affairs, may be willing to abjure glory for lucre. Small and innocuous deal-making may work – we should be modest and low-key. The grands gestes have never been achieved. Zardari is not Sarkozy, nor is Manmohan Singh. On Sunday, remember that here, small may well be better.

Neelam Deo is India’s former ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast, and served in Washington and New York. She is the director and co-founder of Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

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