In tracking the likely trajectory of geopolitics in the next 12 months, a blend of hope and realism may be the best yardstick. The past year witnessed a continuation of the polycrisis that began with the new decade, manifest in the COVID-19 pandemic, global economic slowdown, Russia-Ukraine war, sharpening climate challenges, escalating debt burden for developing countries, and the Israel-Hamas conflict. Will the world get some relief and traverse a shiny patch? Or will the situation be worse before it gets better? Predictions are often unreliable. But what can be offered is an informed reading of where we stand today to determine where we may arrive in December 2024.
This analysis presents an objective Indian perspective, infused with a sense of history. It is anchored in the conviction that India’s recent record of speedy economic growth drives its proactive diplomacy aimed at ending conflicts by utilising dialogue and negotiations as the preferred path to peace and prosperity.
At last year’s end, a critical issue was whether the two kinetic conflicts, Ukraine and Gaza, would end in 2024 or continue beyond it. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, asserted that the war would continue until Israel has achieved all its goals: the release of Israeli hostages, destruction of Hamas, and effective deterrence by ensuring that Gaza no longer poses a threat to Israel. Yet, the fact remains that Israel’s previous wars with its adversaries, including Hamas, ended at one time or another. Neither side has a limitless capacity to go on fighting. Whether the current military crisis is “at the tail-end” or will last for several more weeks is uncertain.
Also, no clarity exists about what follows the cessation of violence. The two-state solution, repeated by many as the ultimate mantra, has little chance of taking off due to an unbridgeable gap between the two sides and the enormous anger and anguish created by the recent hostilities. “Without a political horizon, Israelis and Palestinians will continue living from escalation to escalation, as they have over the past 75 years,” said the Russian Foreign Minister last week.
Growing regionalisation of the conflict through attacks on merchant ships by the Yemen-based Houthi militia, probably with Iranian support, has further complicated the situation. Nightmares of violence at sea and the rise in prices of goods traded between Europe and Asia could turn out to be real in 2024.
The future of the Russia-Ukraine war is more difficult to decipher because it is a conflict not only between two nations but also two conflicting systems — the western security system represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Russia. War fatigue has set in. The United States is finding it difficult to keep pouring billions of dollars into a war that Ukraine has little hope of winning. The decline in material and financial assistance will erode Ukraine’s ability to continue the war. “Indeed, it is no longer clear,” wrote Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group, “that Ukraine can prevent further Russian advances through 2024, much less recover lost ground.”
On the other side, Russia, having failed to prevail over a smaller neighbour, has shown remarkable tenacity to withstand the combined opposition of the West, biting economic sanctions, near-universal condemnation by the United Nations, and internal upheaval. Russian President Vladimir Putin now seems to be banking on a possible Trump victory. The former U.S. President gave enough signs of his proximity to the Russian leader. Scholars, therefore, suggest that if Mr. Trump enters the White House in January 2025, the war may end then, if not earlier. But if President Joe Biden gets a second term, this war may go on. Meanwhile, through 2024 the European pillar of NATO will have to carry a greater burden to ensure that Ukraine stays on the battlefield.
The world is no doubt anxious to avoid the outbreak of a new violent conflict in 2024. Possible flash points are all in the Indo-Pacific: Taiwan, North Korea, the South China Sea, especially the sharpening feud between China and the Philippines, and the India-China border. Their fate will continue to be moulded by the evolving U.S.-China strategic rivalry and the India-China contestation. Following the understandings reached at the recent Biden-Xi Jinping summit in California, the U.S. and China have enough motivations to avoid an armed conflict. Concerning the Ladakh issue, the protracted impasse is likely to continue in the absence of flexibility on China’s part and the imperatives for India’s resoluteness.
In several areas, India’s diplomacy scored handsomely and is on track to achieve more. The management of relations with the major powers has been marked with self-confidence and maturity. U.S.-India relations witnessed important strides. Political convergence, enhancing defence cooperation, and the expanding contours of the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) have been notable highlights. The Khalistani issue and repercussions of the Pannun/Nijjar saga no doubt cast a dark shadow that may linger on for a while, but it is unlikely to hurt the growing strategic partnership in the medium term.
Cooperation with the European Union (EU) and bilateral relations with its key member-states are certain to advance positively. French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations will further deepen collaboration with a vital strategic partner. Focus on special relations forged with Japan and Australia and further consolidation of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, the U.S.) are on the cards. There were worries about the direction of India’s relations with Russia, as Delhi and Moscow skipped the annual summit for two years. Nevertheless, Mr. Putin’s public praise of the Indian Prime Minister and the tangible outcomes of the External Affairs Minister’s recent visit to Moscow indicate that this ‘time-tested’ relationship remains stable and resilient, strong and steady. A Modi-Putin summit is a near certainty in 2024.
Another significant achievement was the adroit handling of the G-20 presidency, culminating in the adoption of the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration with “100% consensus”. However, success in implementing the summit decisions is now largely dependent on the next two presidencies, Brazil and South Africa. India will no doubt exert as much influence and determination as it can to secure optimal implementation.
China will continue to be the number one challenge in 2024 and beyond. South Asia, once India’s backyard, is now a space where the Chinese footprint continues to expand, as shown by recent developments in the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan. Beijing’s ‘intrusion’ is fuelled by its economic largesse and strategic vision that aims to keep India tied down to its neighbourhood. An effective counter-strategy needs to be devised.
In the new year, Indian diplomacy will grapple with both old and novel issues ranging from climate change and negotiations for various free trade agreements to promoting abroad India’s expertise in digital technology and readiness to accord a place of priority to Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the nation’s economic development. Multilateral groupings such as G-20, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, and the need to push United Nations Security Council reform will demand serious attention. Finally, the Ministry of External Affairs will have to project to the world the forthcoming parliamentary elections as a major milestone in the development of the world’s largest functioning democracy.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House.
This article first appeared in The Hindu.