Russia and China do not like the term Indo-Pacific. They prefer the older Asia-Pacific because they feel Indo-Pacific strategically excludes and therefore threatens them.[1]
For nearly a decade, while China showed aggressive intent in the East and South China Seas and in the Indian Ocean, Russia had a quieter role, doing nothing much of significance though it had presented its vision of the Indo-Pacific when the East Asia Summit Committee considered it in 2013. Under pressure after the Ukraine crisis, Russia and China have come closer and this proximity now, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said after a meeting with Wang Yi in Laos on 26 July 2024, needs to be asserted so that Southeast Asia does not become an area in which they are disadvantaged.[2]
Russia is usually a quiet participant during the clutch of meetings around the mid-year ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. This time, it vocalized its positioning. Russian FM Lavrov used the occasion of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit foreign ministers and several other bilateral to put forth a grander strategy for Russia in the Indo-Pacific.[3] This includes more interaction with regional players and not leaving them to the U.S. and China alone.
Lavrov cited Russian concerns about the increasing joint exercises among the Quad, regional powers and now NATO countries from Europe. In response, Russia and China intensified their joint patrolling and interoperability in the seas around Japan, heading to the Pacific.
But Russia has independently boosted its engagement with other countries like Vietnam, DPR Korea, Laos and groupings like BRICS and ASEAN. The most notable was India, visible in the engagement with Prime Minister Modi’s July visit to Moscow for the India-Russia summit with President Putin, at the same time when NATO’s 75th Anniversary Summit was taking place in Washington. Even if this was a convenience to both sides, its symbolism was not lost globally. Both were criticized for engaging at high levels while the Ukraine crisis continues.
In the India-Russia joint communique,[4] the term Indo-Pacific was not used but the ‘Indian Ocean’ and the ‘Indian and Pacific Oceans’ and ‘Asia-Pacific’ were. It indicates Russia’s interest in this region, even though it does not accept the terminology in common with India. India’s interest in the Russian Far East, on the Pacific coast, and the possibility of a Chennai-Vladivostok link in better times, remains a matter of interest. Russia’s diminishing but continuing defence engagement with India and some strategic congruence for keeping a multipolar world alive, are among the keystones of Russia’s emerging Indo-Pacific outlook.
Another point in Russia’s Indo-Pacific strategy is Vietnam, which Putin visited in June 2024 – his first official state visit since 2001. Vietnam is strategically autonomous between China and the U.S., and avails potential opportunities under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) besides being a member of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), both of which are outside America’s orbit. It took the risk of receiving Putin knowing that it will attract American opprobrium. Vietnamese trade is mainly with China and not so much with Russia. So, the visit was a strategic one. For Russia, it was important to be accepted in a country like Vietnam, which has consistently opposed U.S.-led criticism of Russia in the UN. For Vietnam, it was an assertion of greater strategic autonomy, this time playing the U.S., China and Russia all together. Engaging Vietnam is, therefore, an important prong of Russia’s return to the Indo-Pacific.[5]
Thirdly, Putin’s engagement with Kim Jong Un, president of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPR-K) in July is notable. North Korea, like China, has supported Russia in its war against Ukraine. Therefore, NATO now shares Japanese anxieties about North Korea, not because Japan has problems with DPR-K but because NATO sees DPR-K supporting Russia in Ukraine. The summit-level engagement with North Korea again reflects the cohesion within Russian policy towards the Pacific.[6]
The fourth prong is BRICS-ASEAN – a conundrum. Russia has traditionally underplayed its role in ASEAN because it lacks the economic heft that China has. Its arms sales to several ASEAN countries have diminished since the Ukraine crisis. Russia is now visible in the South China Sea returning with joint exercises with China this year.[7] Its partnership with ASEAN is more or less dormant. On its part, ASEAN has no unified view on the Ukraine crisis.
With Russia chairing BRICS in 2024, the further expansion of BRICS is under its influence and nudged carefully by China. The induction of some individual ASEAN countries is being pursued. While Indonesia remains undecided for now, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia have applied for membership, to expand their opportunities and to stay relevant in a multipolar world.[8] China has been their go-to country to seek support for admission, but Russian chairmanship is important. Hence Russia’s new relevance to ASEAN. Russia believes that ASEAN countries will be willing to discuss their Eurasian Security Initiative as part of quiet strategic autonomy. Russia thinks an inclusive security system open to all countries in Eurasia will bring ASEAN to its side, ignoring how hard Quad has worked to reduce its public strategic posturing to keep abreast of ASEAN. Quad summit statements have wooed ASEAN with functional cooperation.
Thus, without adopting the terminology of the Indo-Pacific, Russia is trying to play a role there. This has three main objectives. First, to support China which is now challenged by a U.S.-led cohort in the region. China is clearly the aggressor in most parts of the Indo-Pacific and will surely appreciate Russian support. A Russia-China axis will put Russia at cross-purposes with India, which does not countenance China’s violation of international rules in the region.
Second, Russia also seeks to reclaim some space in the Indo-Pacific to balance some of its loss of space in Europe. The efforts of NATO to come to the Indo-Pacific via the Indo-Pacific policies of EU countries now have a Russian response to its challenge, though it is a far cry from the robust manner in which other countries like Japan, Germany, France and the UK are coordinating their activity in the Indo-Pacific.
Third, despite its isolation, Russia is now trying to engage with those countries in the Indo-Pacific that have remained autonomous of Western pressure to criticize Russia and find some solace through them.
The problem is that Russia lacks both economic and strategic heft to play a useful role bilaterally for these countries. At best it offers a resurgent role in a multipolar world. Its proposed partners remain apprehensive of its closer embrace of China; Beijing will continue to mark its projection in the Indo-Pacific through the BRI, aggression in the South China Sea, and trade and tourism weaponization. This limits Moscow’s autonomy.
Russia seeks its place in the Indo-Pacific but needs to step out of China’s shadow as well. The Quad and China offer to provide public goods and technologies to the region. Russia has limitations in its offering. It needs to step up its trade, investment and related cooperation besides offering a multipolar alternative in a region increasingly becoming bipolar.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian Ambassador to Germany. He is currently promoting the impact investment movement for implementing SDGs in Africa.
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References
[1] Igor Denisov, Oleg Paramonov, Ekaterina Arapova1 and Ivan Safranchuk, Russia, China, and the concept of Indo-Pacific, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2021, Vol 12 (1) p 72-85 1879366521999899 (sagepub.com)
[2] Wang Yi, Lavrov highlight ASEAN-centred, open and inclusive regional cooperation architecture, Global Times, 26 July 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1316817.shtml
[3] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions following the Russia-ASEAN conference and the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Vientiane, July 27, 2024, Russian MFA,27 July 2024, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963819/
[4] Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit, PIB 9 July 2024, Press Release: Press Information Bureau (pib.gov.in)
[5] Vladimir Putin and President of Vietnam To Lam’s statements to the media, Kremlin, 20 June 2024 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74348
[6] Order on signing a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, Kremlin, 18 June 2024, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/74321
[7] Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, China, Russia navies wrap up joint patrol, start live-fire exercise in South China Sea, Global Times, 16 July 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1316136.shtml
[8] Gurjit Singh, Russia, China keen on rapid BRICS expansion to counter West, The Tribune, 12 July 2024,