Russia’s growing nationalism

The recent India-Russia annual summit which took place December 16-18 in Moscow could have been a victorious engagement of two old friends who grew apart but who recently recognized the importance of their relationship. Instead, the summit achieved only some modest gains and was overshadowed by two other events—

one, the large-scale civil protests in Russia’s cities following the allegedly rigged Russian parliamentary election on 4 December, and two, the threat by a Siberian court to ban the Bhagavad Gita, a case that broke out in the worldwide media shortly ahead of its verdict in December. Both these significant events—and the popular response to them—stand witness to the forces of nationalism that hold a potential threat for the India-Russia relationship, already suffering from neglect on both sides.

A mere five agreements were signed this time, instead of the thirty inked at the 2010 summit. The most important of these had to do with the first two Russian-made nuclear reactors that were finally installed at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, after the Indian government signalled its readiness to proceed despite protests from local residents (however, no agreement on reactors 3 and 4, long in the works, was concluded). In defense, India announced the purchase of 50 more Russian Su-30 aircraft, bringing the total number of Indian-owned Sukhois to over 250. This deal is neither new nor game-changing despite the many problems that remain to be addressed in the two countries’ military partnership. Overall, the diplomatic function was small-scale and quickly forgotten, sandwiched chronologically between two events that received much greater exposure in Russia and internationally.

The protests that shook the Russian public sphere and unnerved its rulers were a pent-up reaction to the state’s brazen determination to keep the current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the saddle until he can again run for president in the spring of 2012—helping him retain power for a total of twenty-four years. They also reflect the declining standard of living that followed the financial crisis of 2008, and the widespread disaffection with the corruption pervading Russian society at all levels. Clearly, Putin needs legitimacy around the world, since the continued support for his government by the majority of the Russian population may not be as reliable as once believed.

Just a few weeks later, a case simmering in the Tomsk law court since June came to a boil. The regional governor had put on trial the Russian edition of the Bhagavad Gita, As It Is. According to the prosecutor’s assessment, the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita inspired “religious hatred,” and were “extremist in nature.”[1] The move pushed the Russian Hindu community into energetic protest—which extended back to India. Swift diplomatic footwork by the Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander Kadakin, as well as Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna, were quick and decisive in dousing some of the fury. The response from Russia, with several major newspapers expressing embarassment with the court case and the Russian Foreign Ministry pointing out that only the Gita’s translated version was going on trial, testified to the importance still accorded to the India relationship in the country. Within India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress leader Sonia Gandhi cautiously abstained from commentary or intervention with the Russian authorities. But the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) shook the Indian Parliament with fiery speeches in defense of the text and even a proposal to ban Russian vodka in reprisal—hardly an equal measure, financially or symbolically.

The nationalist fervor stirred by the BJP constituted a response to what was actually a Russian legal move steeped in xenophobia. While absurd on the surface, the attack on the Bhagavad Gita was reportedly instigated by the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church—an arm of the state—and the Federal Security Service (FSB), successor to the KGB, to sideline and eventually repress the Hare Krishna movement. There is a robust group of devotees of the sect, also known as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), which has attempted to build ISKCON temples in Tomsk and Moscow—with opposition from the Russian government (both projects have been put on ice, permanently). The larger trend is that of religious minorities—especially foreign ones—increasingly coming under persecution in Russia. Finally, the ban was overturned just in time for the new year, yet its roots in Russian politics’ strong-arm tactics make it more than a quaint Siberian echo.

The Gita scandal was a shock to Indian society, which was patently unprepared to objections to any manifestation of the Hindu religion coming from Russia, of all countries. The historic warmth of the two countries’ ties manifested in Russia’s love of Raj Kapoor films and ongoing pilgrimages to the Sathya Sai Baba birthplace and India’s enchantment with the Russian circus, to cite some examples, is an anchoring point in a bilateral relationship that continues to be a trusting, if not a dynamic, one. Up to now, the two countries have never experienced any problems with one another at the cultural level.

Yet, while the recent unprecedented attack on the major Hindu text has no precedents in Indo-Russian ties, attacks on the 30,000- to 40,000-strong Indian population in Russia do. In 2006, a slew of violent crimes against students of Asian origin—including reported murders of three Indians—caused the Indian Embassy in Moscow to issue an advisory warning. Previously, in 2002, the Neo-Nazi Association of Russian Skinheads sent a message to the Embassy threatening to kill all Indians living in the country. These were isolated incidents, yet Indian citizens are still often wary of visiting Russia, informed of the violence that has been periodically directed against racial minorities—especially natives of North Caucasus and the Central Asian states, but others as well.[2]

The current trend of growth in Russian xenophobic nationalism is both state-driven, fomented by the increasingly jittery Putin government, and public, practiced by the broader society. The tenor of the December protests, for instance, has been as much liberal democratic as nationalistic. The opposition blogger Alexei Navalny, who was known for his exposés of corruption in the Russian government before emerging as one of the main instigators and leaders of the December events, has long participated in nationalist politics. In the parliamentary election, Russia’s Communist Party, whose platform is as nationalistic as that of their ideological predecessor, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, came in second (and may have led in some districts had it not been for the ballot-box stuffing). While this was largely a protest vote, some of the support the Communists got was emblematic of the “Russia for Russians” slogan that is being heard more and more in recent years, both in the streets and within the higher circles of power.

The Putin-led government that seems poised to assume the reins of power—given the lack of credible alternatives—in 2012 is likely to be an increasingly wary one, and the forces of nationalism will be evoked on both sides of the political barricades again. The Gita scandal which closed the last year is therefore a warning sign that Russia’s state-anointed xenophobia and nationalism could act as a dampener for the formerly solid Indo-Russian relationship. India needs to invest more in its increasingly threatened ties with its historic partner. Specifically, it should pay greater attention to building up a stronger relationship in such mutually beneficial areas of cooperation as new technologies—one of the Russian government’s current focuses—and pharmaceuticals. It is up to the Indian government to assure its embattled partner of its continued commitment to cooperation and, rather than responding with its own nationalistic outcry, continue to work on establishing a more productive and accountable relationship. These two Eurasian powers need each other for commercial as well as geopolitical reasons, such as a future important partnership in a post-war Afghanistan. It is crucial that the demons of national hatred do not pose an obstacle to their developing relationship in the future.

Dr. Katherine Foshko is the Russia Studies Fellow at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.