South Africa goes to the polls

Voting in the general elections in South Africa is set to take place on 29 May 2024. Given the history of a new, post-apartheid, democratic nation in 1994, its leadership role in Africa since then, and its economic strength as the largest economy on the continent, South Africa’s elections have drawn international attention. The country’s strident espousal of the Palestinian cause at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the latter’s order that Israel “must immediately halt its military offensive” in Rafah have accentuated foreign interest in the coming elections.

An important and unique feature of the elections this year is that thanks to the 2023 constitutional amendment act, a new three-ballot system will be followed, for the first time. The first ballot is the national ballot for a political party to represent a citizen in the National Assembly. The second ballot is a new ballot for political parties or independent candidates contesting in a region or province for elections to the National Assembly. The third ballot is a provincial ballot to vote for political parties or independent candidates contesting elections of the provincial legislature. (South Africa has nine regions or provinces: Limpopo, North West, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Free State and Gauteng.)

In the 400-seat National Assembly, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has won a clear majority (i.e. over 200 seats) in all previous elections. It also enjoys a majority in all provincial legislatures with a single exception: the Western Cape, which has been governed by an opposition party – the Democratic Alliance (DA) – since 2009. Now, with a new electoral system in place and the growing unpopularity of the ANC, the elections this week could push South Africa into the era of a coalition government.

The principal issue in this election is the economic woes of the people. Staggering unemployment, electricity crisis, inflation, fear of immigrants, inequality and poverty have all contributed to creating serious headwinds against the ANC. The other is corruption, which the party has engendered in political and social life, thus augmenting the wave of anti-incumbency, a point often highlighted by dissatisfied insiders.[1] Corruption and disunity among the ruling party leaders and the ranks have further aggravated the challenge. The divisive influence of former president Jacob Zuma and especially his perceived support to a new party – uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) – is a complicating factor. All this has put the ANC on the back foot. Its leadership has been busy affirming that the party has clearly heard what ordinary people are saying.

Yet, in a curious paradox, President Cyril Ramaphosa seems to retain his popularity and influence. His rallies have been attracting massive crowds. He remains both combative and resilient in his public speeches. On 25 May, for example, he stated that on voting day, “the people of South Africa will decide whether our country continues moving forward with the ANC towards a better, brighter future, or backwards to a terrible path.” He is fully conscious of the twin facts: one, there is no obvious rival challenging him for the presidency; and two, South Africans are fearful of a coalition government due to their experience of governance at the municipal level.

Foreign policy is not a significant issue in this election. But it matters to the elite, given South Africa’s global ambitions. In the recent publication Listening Beyond the Echo Chamber: Emerging Middle Powers Report 2024, South African respondents identified the following as “the most challenging foreign policy issues” for their country: balance between different powers (21%), international trade (18%), and the war in Ukraine (18%) for the food and fuel insecurity it caused. Unlike most countries where governments or specific leaders lead foreign policy, the survey showed that in South Africa, the ANC as a political entity directs foreign policy. The ANC-led South Africa took Israel to the International Court of Justice on crimes against Palestinians, but it has also had a backlash at home with opposition leaders pointing out that the ANC and the country would be better served by focusing on the serious conflicts in South Africa’s “backyard… which will have direct consequences for South Africa.”[3]

In the outgoing National Assembly of 400 seats, ANC currently has the majority with 230 seats, DA following with 84, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) with 44, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) with 14, and the Freedom Front Plus (FFP) with 10. Opinion polls indicate that the ANC may suffer losses, though there is disagreement on the degree. Ipsos, a marketing research company headquartered in Paris, assessed that the nation is “at a crossroads”, with rising voter discontent, the historic inclusion of independent candidates for the first time (10 are contesting), and the uncertainty and desire for change.[4] Ipsos polls project “political party support” (meaning total votes polled) for the ANC at 40%, DA at 21%, EFF at 11%, and MK at 8.4%. Gallup surveys too reveal disenchantment with the ANC which could lose its majority in the parliament for the first time in 30 years.

What happens on polling day remains mired in all kinds of uncertainty. In the days building up to the polling, Ramaphosa has made a passionate plea to give another opportunity to the ANC. He has repeatedly promised to do better in the future. This seems to be having a positive impact. However, if the ANC fails to win 50% of seats in the National Assembly, a coalition will become inevitable. South African sources indicate that, in that eventuality, the ANC may prefer to go with smaller parties rather than the DA (with its image of being the party of whites) or MK (which is working under the influence of former President Zuma).

A major perception two days before the nation goes to the polls is that it faces only two choices: either ANC hangs on to 50% vote share to form a government on its own, or it goes somewhat below 50% in which case it can easily obtain the support of smaller parties. But in the provinces, ANC has a genuine problem. It is likely to lose heavily to MK in KwaZulu Natal where local experts are talking of the possibility of a non-coalition government. As regards the Western Cape, it is expected to stay on with the DA.

Assuming the ANC does not get a serious setback at the national level, it will not only form the government but is likely to succeed in getting Ramaphosa re-elected as the president. He is the best-known South African face in the world today, and it is widely appreciated that he was mentored by Nelson Mandela. If Ramaphosa is president again, South Africa will largely follow the foreign policy adopted so far – an activist stance on African affairs, close relations with China and Russia, perhaps strained ties with the West and ambitious conduct of the G20 presidency which moves from Brazil to South Africa at the end of 2024. As for relations with India, both countries are conscious of their importance and complexity, and will need to work harder to strengthen and diversify the bilateral.

Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Gateway House and former High Commissioner to South Africa. He is the author of India–Africa Relations: Changing Horizons.

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References

[1] Commissions, Corruption and State Capture: Charting the Way Forward for South Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs, 15 May 2024, https://saiia.org.za/research/commissions-corruption-and-state-capture-charting-the-way-forward-for-south-africa/

[2] The report was published by Gateway House, Körber-Stiftung, BRICS Policy Center and the South African Institute of International Affairs. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/listening-beyond-echo-chamber-emerging-middle-powers-report-2024/

[3] Listening Beyond the Echo Chamber 2024, Gateway House, Körber-Stiftung, BRICS Policy Center and the South African Institute of International Affairs, https://koerber-stiftung.de/site/assets/files/37521/koerber-emerging-middle-powers_report-2024.pdf, pg. 11

[4] 30 Years of Democracy: South Africa’s 2024 elections marked by uncertainty and a desire for change, IPSOS South Africa, 26 April 2024, https://www.ipsos.com/en-za/30-years-democracy-south-africas-2024-elections-marked-uncertainty-and-desire-change