There has been an upsurge in armed attacks in Pakistan’s restive provinces over the past few weeks, with three high profile attacks in the second half of March. On 20 March, armed men attacked the Gwadar Port Authority Colony in Gwadar, Balochistan.[1] The Gwadar port is being developed as a part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On 25 March, the Pakistani military claimed to have foiled an attack on Turbat Airport and Naval Airbase, also in Balochistan, which reportedly houses Chinese-made drones.[2] On 26 March, a suicide bomber killed five Chinese engineers working on a hydropower project in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
The three attacks on Chinese interests have taken place amidst a number of other large-scale incidents such as the attack on Mach town in January this year, when dozens of armed men attacked multiple government installations in that town.[3] The responsibility for the two attacks, in Gwadar and Turbat, has been claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), an organization fighting for free Balochistan.
Balochistan is the largest, least populated, most mineral-rich, and yet least developed province of Pakistan. At $1,106, the per capita income in Balochistan is 38% below the national average of $1,798 and the lowest in the country.[4] It has long been treated as a colony by the country’s Punjabi elite. For instance, Pakistan’s largest gas field, Sui, is located in Balochistan, but most of the gas is used by cities in Punjab. Three-quarters of the natural gas reserves of Balochistan have been consumed so far, with little to show for it locally.[5] The state hasn’t received a fair share of its mineral wealth. There are similar fears about Reko Diq, a large copper mine also in Balochistan. Pakistan’s central government recently lost a multibillion-dollar arbitration award to a foreign consortium,[6] and has awarded 50% equity in this project as compensation to the Canadian investor.[7] Balochistan province is a minority shareholder in the venture.
Clearly, these are reflective of the rising concerns that the CPEC projects based in Balochistan bring little benefit to the locals who are largely pastoral or coastal. The fishing community, which comprises 90% of the population in Gwadar, complains about overfishing by Chinese trawlers, and loss of access to the port. Many of the locals were forcibly relocated to villages away from the port area and their livelihoods and without proper compensation for their ancestral land used to construct the port.
China has invested nearly $1 billion dollars in the Gwadar Port but done nothing for the Gwadar town and surrounding areas which remain underdeveloped. Shortages of basics such as fresh water and electricity are common. The promised industry and jobs projected to come to Gwadar have not materialized. The port is a high security zone and movement of locals is restricted for the safety of the Chinese working in the area – a security zone which agitated locals have clearly managed to breach. Pakistan’s agencies like the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) routinely kidnap, and in many cases torture and kill people deemed dangerous to the state[8] and to the Chinese projects. This has included critics of the regime and rights activists.
There are concerns that this financially unviable port may be handed over to China eventually. Gwadar has low traffic with little scope for growth and, according to the agreement, 91% of the revenues generated from it go to China.[9]
The one sector that has boomed in Gwadar is real estate. Several Lahore-based realtors offer residential plots in fancy townships for sale to investors in Pakistan and elsewhere, pricing out the locals.
Peaceful approaches to deal with these issues haven’t helped. The latest movement, Gwadar ko Haq do Tehreek (Give Rights to Gwadar Movement) started in November 2021 with peaceful sit-ins demanding basic services for the population of Gwadar.[10] It has had no significant impact on the ground realities, forcing Baloch nationalist organizations to again resort to violent means of resistance.
The surge in Baloch violence comes at a time when Pakistan is dealing with a major financial crisis, limiting its options. During 2023-24, Pakistan will spend 50% of its federal budget on loan interest, with just 7.9% earmarked for development. The development spend, as a share of the budget, has declined for the past two years. Islamabad is currently under the IMF’s financial oversight and is seeking another bailout from the institution, meaning it will have to behave in a fiscally responsible manner. Since the Pakistani state is incapable of delivering on development, the only tool the ruling army has left to deal with citizen dissatisfaction is greater repression. Balochistan is likely to suffer more violence from the Pakistani state – and vice versa.
Amit Bhandari is Senior Fellow for Energy, Investment and Connectivity, Gateway House.
Aditya Shinde is Research Assistant, Gateway House.
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References
[1] Ismail Sasoli, Tahir Khan and Iftikhar Shirazi. “2 Soldiers Martyred, 8 Terrorists Killed in Attack on Gwadar Port Authority Complex: ISPR,” Dawn, 20 March 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1822759.
[2] Behram Baloch and Saleem Shahid. “Attack on navy base in Turbat ‘foiled,’” Dawn, 26 March 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1823848.
[3] Saleem Shahid. “‘Coordinated’ terror attacks launched on Balochistan’s Mach town,” Dawn, 30 January 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1809679.
[4] Naulong Integrated Water Resources Development Project: Project Readiness Financing Report, Pakistan: The Asian Development Bank, October 2022, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/51131-003-ld-03.pdf.
[5] Zafar Bhutta. “Most of Pakistan’s oil, gas reserves consumed,” The Express Tribume, 13 December 2022, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2390854/most-of-pakistans-oil-gas-reserves-consumed.
[6] “Barrick Announces Reko Diq Arbitration Award,” Barrick, 15 July 2019, https://www.barrick.com/English/news/news-details/2019/Barrick-Announces-Reko-Diq-Arbitration-Award/default.aspx.
[7] “Reko Diq, Pakistan,” Barrick, https://www.barrick.com/English/operations/reko-diq/default.aspx.
[8] Anja Haga, “Enforced disappearances in Balochistan,” Parliamentary question, 12 January 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2024-000098_EN.html#:~:text=The%20immediate%20cause%20is%20the,been%20found%20dead%20years%20later.
[9] Iftikhar A. Khan. “China to get 91pc Gwadar income, minister tells Senate,” Dawn, 25 November 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1372695.
[10] Javed Baloch, “Protesters In Gwadar Continue Their Protest For Economic Rights And Civil Liberties,” The Friday Times, 18 November 2021, https://thefridaytimes.com/18-Nov-2021/protesters-in-gwadar-continue-their-protest-for-economic-rights-and-civil-liberties.