On June 9, a new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi was sworn in to run India for the next five years. For the first time in the decade since the Bharatiya Janata Party has been the ruling political party, it missed reaching the majority mark and will run a coalition government. While this has implications for India’s domestic politics and policies, on the foreign policy front there will be continuity and consistency. S. Jaishankar, at the helm of India’s foreign ministry, has a set goal to make India a ‘leading’ power in the world, which aligns with the BJP’s projection of India as “Vishvabandhu, or the brother of the world, but a brother for whom the nation comes first.”[1]
Since 2019, Jaishankar has played a critical role in projecting India abroad and at home. He changed the political narrative of India, when he reminded the world at the Bratislava Forum in June 2022, that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” It resonated everywhere, especially at home and in the Global South – and even in Europe when a year later at the Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz referred to it[2] saying that Jaishankar “had a point.” India’s natural goodwill, built over decades of being a neutral and non-aggressive power, has served the country well for the last five years, despite a dramatically transforming geopolitical environment.
For the next five years, however, India will need a differentiated narrative – one that is based on the country’s 8.2% GDP growth, its entry into global trade regimes, and its digital model. How will Jaishankar straddle the political and the economic?
There will be Three Continuities and Three Shifts.
Continuities:
South Asia- Neighbourhood First
Visible at the inauguration of the new government on 9th June, were India’s neighbours – Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka – along with Indian Ocean partners – Mauritius and Seychelles – seated in the front row. All of South Asia except Pakistan was invited and present, indicating a greater economic integration within the Sub-continent and growing geopolitical cohesion is on the agenda.
Global South leadership
There was much talk of the Global South during India’s G20 Presidency in 2023, crowned by the inclusion of the African Union into the G20. Last November, Prime Minister Modi inaugurated the (Dakshin) Development and Knowledge Sharing Initiative Global South Centre for Excellence, conceived for knowledge-sharing for locally relevant solutions and capacity-building[3]. Expect more events than actual achievements, but it is a start.
Great Power relationships
India has assiduously built relationships with the Great Powers, especially the U.S. Great Powers have economic, military, diplomatic and political strength and influence and today, these are the U.S., China and Russia. The attraction for India is mostly economic and strategic, particularly for partnerships in technology and defence. With the U.S. and Russia, it has a continuing 2+2 ministerial (foreign and defence ministries) dialogue[4]. India is in ever more multilateral groupings with the Great Powers than ever before – the G20, Quad, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) [5], BRICS, I2U2, and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). New Delhi has managed its long friendship with Moscow well, keeping the political engagement, oil imports and defence equipment going. Despite China’s stubborn refusal to have its military step back from India’s northern border, and 21 rounds of talks yielding nothing, India is still not at war with China – an example that all the Great Powers should emulate.
India is also close to the other five G7 countries: Japan, France, UK, Italy, and Germany, and since 2019, has been a permanent invitee to the G7 Summits, along with Australia and Singapore.
Stepping into trade regimes with the Great Powers is still not a reality; these initiatives with India have in the last two years been successfully taken by Middle powers like Australia, the UAE and the four non-EU EFTA countries.
Shifts:
Political to economic
India’s global conversation has to shift from the political to the economic. Over the last five years, New Delhi has made many commitments to investors, and the biggest is that India can be a trusted +1 alternative to China. Expect a greater effort on actualizing and stepping up the Make in India initiative, and expanding and professionalizing supply chains and attendant infrastructure. Efforts will be made to encourage established and emerging corporates in India to increase investments in manufacturing.
India will need a serious formulation and positioning as a services exporter, beyond the IT services offered by India’s tech services giants. Like India, much of the Global South is rich in human capital and will be following India’s example in being a provider of services. A new coalition partner in the government, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), is completing the building of Amravati, a new city in the south, for an estimated $6 billion. Its goal is to have a modern capital for India, to compete domestically with Bangalore and Hyderabad, and internationally on very high tech.
Creating an environment and funding for product innovation for wealth creation is on India’s agenda; already its successful, affordable and neutral digital public infrastructure model is actively accepted and promoted in developed and developing countries, creating a common communication, especially for fintech.
With Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal retaining his old job, India will carefully and with some confidence, enter more trade agreements – bilateral and regional. A South Asian trade agreement can be a triumph.
How is this being actualized? Like Mr. Modi, Indian ambassadors are now becoming salesmen. Their primary agenda is now to bring home investments. A few embassies used to have a junior commercial attaché; now this position carries seniority and weight.
Coming together with the Middle Powers, plus and minus
The last five years have seen instability caused by the Great Powers – Covid, Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza, sanctions – pushing the global system to the brink. The Middle Powers have begun to be heard, largely to create an alternative and provide some stability. These are countries with some economic, regional and military heft, and many punch above their weight – Australia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Singapore, and Germany.
There are also the Emerging Middle Powers, those with significant talent and populations, and this is where India fits in along with Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, and Indonesia.
India will increase its engagement and partnerships with the Middle Powers and with its peer group.
The Anchor that is 1.4 billion
India has never used its weight to make the world lean in any direction. The country has continued its non-aligned, visible particularly during the recent wars, or past ones like Iraq. Successive governments have diligently focused on poverty alleviation and development, avoiding taking global sides.
Of late, India has been assiduously wooed by all inclinations – and has in turn sought engagement with all. Prime Minister Modi’s first overseas trip in his third term will be to Italy, as a guest for the G7 meeting on June 13. His next engagement will be the SCO Summit in July, and more importantly, the BRICS Summit in October in Russia. BRICS is regarded as the most significant competitor to the G7, and the Western order.
This reiterates that India is an important participant in several groupings old and new, reflecting the country’s positioning: not anti-west, but non-west, seeking a more equitable accommodation for all. Its goal is economic and financial progress and just global governance that is driven by pragmatism rather than principles. It’s a reflection of the emerging multipolar world order, with neither the “exorbitant privilege” of dollar domination nor the reserve-currency obsession of the Yuan.
India is central to the ongoing global shifts. By keeping itself anchored in its current location, it helps to keep the world steady.
Manjeet Kripalani is the Executive Director and co-founder, Gateway House.
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References
[1] Rajiv Bhatia, ‘Foreign policy in India’s electoral fray,’ Gateway House, May 2, 2024, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/foreign-policy-and-party-manifestos-for-elections-in-india/
[2] ‘German Chancellor Olaf Scholz refers to EAM S Jaishankar’s ‘European mindset’ remark | Oneindia News,’ YouTube, Feb 20, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9gbz8JwNGMc
[3] ‘Development and Knowledge Sharing Initiative, Global South Centre of Excellence,’ http://134.209.222.136:90/uploads/assets/171517101979Global%20South%20Centre%20Brochure.pdf
[4] India has 2+2 ministerial dialogues with the U.S., Russia, Japan, Australia, Brazil, U.K.
[5] SCO is a conglomeration of countries from in and around Eurasia that seek greater economic cooperation