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30 September 2014, Gateway House

Time to refocus on the LBA

Although the Land Boundary Agreement between India and Bangladesh was discussed when Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina met on the sidelines of the UNGA, a timeline for ratification was not clarified. But both leaders have the numbers in their governments to move forward this critical agreement and must do so with urgency

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When Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on September 27 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, she raised the issue of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) between Bangladesh and India. Modi said he hopes the process will be taken forward, but did not clarify when India will ratify the agreement.

Similarly, a week earlier, on September 20, at the third Joint Consultative Commission meeting in New Delhi chaired by Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Bangladeshi counterpart Abul Hassan Mahmood, no real progress was made on the contentious LBA.

But it is important to urgently bring to the table and resolve the process of the LBA, which was started as far back as 1974. Dhaka ratified the Land Boundary Protocol (of the LBA) in 2011; India is yet to do so.

By ratifying the LBA—land in 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves on the Indian side can be exchanged.[1] This will reduce the difficulties in administering border areas, help delineate India’s troubled border, and improve the living conditions of local inhabitants; the LBA affects five Indian states—Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura.

Meanwhile, due to the failure to delineate the border, illegal activities such as smuggling continue—for example, the estimated annual turnover from cattle smuggling across the India-Bangladesh border is Rs. 200 crores.[2]

Earlier this month, the Indian daily Anandabazar Patrika alleged that after 2011, funds have been channelled from West Bengal across the border to the Bangladeshi opposition party the Jamaat-e-Islami. If this allegation is true, it indicates how the region has become a corridor for illegal activities.

Delineating the border will also help to fix responsibility for illegal crossings by people. Odhikar, a Bangladesh-based human rights organisation, has documented cases of nearly 1,000 Bangladeshi nationals killed by the Border Security Force over the last decade for transgressing the border.[3] An important reason for the illegal crossings is the inability of people living in the border enclaves to get valid documents because of a lack of visa offices or infrastructure in the area.

India’s acceptance of the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision of 8 July 2014 on the Bay of Bengal maritime boundary dispute—1,06,613 square kilometres of a total of 1,72,220 square kilometres was awarded to Bangladesh—indicates that India recognises the importance of a settled boundary.[4] After the resolution of the maritime boundary, it has become possible for Indians and Bangladeshis to fish in their respective zones, as well as explore oil and gas reserves in this region.

However, the ratification of the LBA has remained on hold also because of opposition to the agreement by the Trinamool Congress, the Asom Gana Parishad and by the Bharatiya Janata Party in the past. They have argued that India will lose a total of 10,000 acres of land in the exchange of enclaves.[5] The other worry is that if India willingly secedes land, it will encourage secessionist groups that are active in this region.

In the past, though former Congress-led governments had a good rapport with the Awami League, they lacked the numbers to ratify the agreement. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which ruled the country on and off for 14 years along with its principal ally the Jamaat-e-Islami, allegedly supported leaders of the United Liberation Front of Asom and other secessionist organisations active in northeast India. In both instances, the LBA could not be passed.

However, unlike the composition of past governments, both Narendra Modi and the Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina have the numbers required in their governments to push the LBA and thereby deepen the bilateral.  Modi certainly appears to be interested in improving neighbourhood relationships—not only did he invite SAARC leaders for his swearing-in ceremony, but India and Bangladesh have also stepped up their diplomatic engagement, and Dhaka was Swaraj’s first official solo destination.

The Bangladesh government too has taken concrete steps to improve the relationship: it granted a request by the Indian government in June to allow transit of heavy project equipment and turbines through the Chittagong-Ashuganj route, which has helped Tripura’s gas-fired Palatana power plant to be commissioned. Tripura could become India’s first power surplus state by the end of the year and will supply 100 megawatts of free power to Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has also allowed Indian transporters to carry rice to Tripura using the Ashuganj river port. The Indian government is constructing a road from Akhaura in Bangladesh to Agartala for goods transportation. Transportation of goods between mainland India and the northeast through Bangladesh will reduce costs and provide connectivity; India’s land-locked northeastern states will benefit greatly.

Modi must now get the chief ministers of eastern states on board to ratify the LBA, especially Mamata Banerjee and Assam’s Tarun Gogoi. One way to ensure Banerjee’s support can be by offering cash-strapped West Bengal a fiscal package. The state’s debt burden is projected to reach Rs 2.75 lakh crores by March 2015.[6] Since 2011, Banerjee has been pushing for a three-year moratorium on the interest payment, which can save the state more than Rs 60,000 crores. With a robust fiscal package, she might reconsider her opposition to the LBA.[7]

During Swaraj’s visit to Dhaka, the Bangladesh government brought up the possibility of giving special permits to workers from Bangladesh. This mechanism has worked, for example, in the UK’s approach to migrants from Poland after a Worker Registration Scheme was successfully introduced in 2004.  In India, special permits are a central government prerogative, and Modi can push for such documentation as a long-term solution to illegal migration. It will also allow remittances through legal channels.

The LBA has now been referred to India’s Parliament Standing Committee before it can be presented in the Lok Sabha. The next session of Parliament is due in December. Meanwhile, the Modi government must focus on this issue and move it forward.

Saumya Pant is Senior Content Manager, Gateway House.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive content here.

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References

[1] Ministry of External Affairs, Fact Sheet on Agreements and other MOUs signed between India and Bangladesh, 06 September 2011 <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5229/Fact+Sheet+on+Agreements+and+other+MOUs+signed+between+India+and+Bangladesh>

[2] Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries, Report of the National Commission on Cattle, July 2002 < http://www.dahd.nic.in/dahd/reports/report-of-the-national-commission-on-cattle/chapter-iii.aspx>

[3] Human Rights Watch, Trigger Happy, 9 December2010 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/12/09/trigger-happy>

[4] Permanent Court of Arbitration, Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration

between Bangladesh and India, Press Release, 8 July 2014,, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376>

[5] Schendel, Willem Van, ‘The Making of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves’, Stateless in South Asia <http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Statelessness/Further_Readings/Stateless%20in%20South%20Asia.pdf>

[6] Ghosh, Soumya Kanti, Suparna Karmakar, and Arnab Nath, ‘Refinancing West Bengal: Something Other Than Debt Relief’, Economic and Political Weekly, 10 May 2014 <http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2014_49/19/Refinancing_West_Bengal.pdf>