The Gulf countries have increased their weight in the international landscape, not only in the frame of multilateral organizations but as central actors in global governance. Paradoxically, this boosts the diplomacy rehearsals but intensifies the regional rivalries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has understood its role in the vacuum at the end of a chapter in the world order. It has adopted measures to leverage the advantages to expand its economy and influence and to face the risks that the Arab desert neighbourhood offers. Its cross-cutting strategy touches several sectors of a well-planned blueprint that aims to place the UAE as a stable actor with the potential to become a reliable leader in connectivity, the energetics sector, financial services, and a political facilitator. Therefore, this frame marks the rising of a new geopolitical identity of the UAE and the whole region.
A cabinet of precedents illustrates this evolution.
Several political and regional shifts highlight the shape of an emerging identity. First, the announcement of the end of the blockade on Qatar in 2020 and a new beginning for the Gulf Council Cooperation (GCC) and the Arab League appeared to fix political fissures within the Middle East, the north, and east Africa. Saudi Arabia has resumed its engagement with Qatar, displaying pragmatism; after three years, the UAE and Bahrain have not yet repaired their trust deficit. The deep coordination in intelligence and logistics before, during, and after the FIFA World Cup 2022 is an example of coordinated efforts introducing more such actions this year. Indeed, the recent story of the Gulf is of competitive economies rather than complementary ones. This limits regional cooperation and boosts the hunt for extra-regional strategic partners. Nevertheless, regional coordination is crucial to succeeding in the current multipolar world.
Second, in 2020, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco established official relations with Israel as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords, a diplomatic milestone that ended Israel’s isolation from the Gulf. The UAE specifically, has reaped benefits in the economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. Last year, the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Israel increased economic cooperation. The new bilateral framework has enabled both to advance their political presence with strategic actors. For example, Israel can facilitate the UAE’s approaches with the U.S. in sensitive sectors such as intelligence-sharing or acquiring cutting-edge technology and weapons system contracts. Geopolitically, in the long term, the Abraham Accords’ evolution will provide the UAE greater access to the Mediterranean provide Israel an expanded presence in the Gulf. If the cooperation deepens, it can be the beginning of encouraging regional integration and the draft of a new strategic deterrence mechanism. [1] [2]
The new diplomatic profile of the UAE has had some adverse consequences. Normalizing ties with Israel has severely impacted the UAE’s position on the Palestinian issue and caused divisions within the Gulf and Arab nations. It deepens the UAE’s rivalry with Iran, Israel’s main regional rival. Conversely, UAE has enabled back-room intercessions between Damascus and the Gulf countries and even between Damascus and the West. The understanding with Bashar al-Assad is especially relevant, at a time when the presence of Russia and Iran seems to be waning in Syria, and the Syrian regional government is regaining strength. After the February 6 earthquake in Syria, the UAE sent rescue teams and an immediate $13 million in aid to Syria.
The third is the UAE’s meaningful participation in international organizations. It is a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and during its month-long presidency in March 2022, it convened three signature events on women’s economic inclusion, climate finance, and cooperation between the UN and the League of Arab States. It renewed the mandates of peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and South Sudan and the panel of experts assisting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions committee. The reconfiguration proposal of the AU Mission in Somalia was adopted.[3]
Notwithstanding these successes, the UAE’s decision to abstain from the first Resolution deploring the Russian invasion of Ukraine had been more eventful in the media[4] and presumably a surprise in the West. The vote was 11 in favour, three abstentions (China, India, and the UAE), and a veto from Russia. After one year of the war, the UAE has kept its diplomatic prospects in the conflict alive. It mirrored a Gulf choreography to protect the trade, energy, and defence equilibrium that still involves Russia and the West. Holding a neutral position earns credibility and blocks an escalation and geographical expansion of the conflict, though no warranties are provided.
Cooperation in non-traditional security sectors backs up these initiatives. Last November, under an Agreement on Strategic Cooperation between the UAE and Europol to fight serious crime, police-coordinated operations were undertaken, which led to a crackdown on one of the most prominent criminal organizations linked to drug trafficking in Europe. Weeks later, a notorious human trafficker was arrested in Sudan thanks to the intelligence-sharing with INTERPOL. Both examples create a meaningful precedent in sensitive areas with the potential of continuing achievements. [5] [6]
Economically, energetics has been the main strength of the regional powers as suppliers and protagonists of price management in the international markets. The instability of 2022 impacted every corner of the world, reflecting continued global economic dependency on hydrocarbons. It has reinforced the geopolitical importance of Gulf countries’ resources. While Europe struggled to ensure oil and gas supplies and attempted diversification and price control, the UAE and Qatar did not use their strategic reserves as political pressure but as a public diplomacy tool to support European countries such as France or Germany. [7] [8] [9]
A priority for the Gulf countries is reducing dependence on hydrocarbons. This is done through connectivity, the development of critical infrastructure for logistics, and the evolution of supply chains. It has sparked a virtuous regional race between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE that has shaped regional affairs, even spreading, pragmatically, ties with Israel, China, or Türkiye, unthinkable diplomatic moves a few years ago. Sculpting a new geopolitical positioning through such diversification may update the regional identity necessary to navigate a multipolar world.
Mauricio D. Aceves is Author in Foreign Affairs Latin America on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
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References
[1] United Arab Emirates Ministry of Economy, “UAE and Israel sign Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement to advance bilateral trade beyond USD 10 billion in 5 years”, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Economy, Media Centre News, May 31, 2022. https://www.moec.gov.ae/en/-/uae-and-israel-sign-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement-to-advance-bilateral-trade-beyond-usd-10-billion-in-5-years
[2] Congressional Research Service (CRS), “The United Arab Emirates (UAE)”, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RS21852, January 30, 2023. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS21852.pdf
[3] Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, “During UAE’s March Presidency, Un Security Council Adopted Four Resolutions And Issued Six Statements,” Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, Press Release March 31, 2022. https://uaeun.org/press_release/during-uaes-march-presidency-un-security-council-adopted-four-resolutions-and-issued-six-statements/
[4] Gambrell, Jon, “UAE gets more than it bargained for with war in Ukraine”, The Times of Israel, Analysis, February 28, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/uae-gets-more-than-it-bargained-for-with-war-in-ukraine/
[5] European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), “Europol to host United Arab Emirates Liaison Bureau,” Europol, Media & Press, September 23, 2022. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-to-host-united-arab-emirates-liaison-bureau
[6] The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), “UAE action leads to arrest of people smuggling kingpin in Sudan,” INTERPOL, News 2023, January 5, 2023. https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2023/UAE-action-leads-to-arrest-of-people-smuggling-kingpin-in-Sudan
[7] Wintour, Patrick, “Germany agrees 15-year liquid gas supply deal with Qatar”, The Guardian (UK), World /Europe-Germany, November 28, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/29/germany-agrees-15-year-liquid-gas-supply-deal-with-qatar
[8] Moataz Mohamed, “UAE signs energy agreement with Germany’s Scholz”, Reuters, September 25, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/uae-signs-energy-agreement-with-germanys-scholz-state-news-agency-2022-09-25/
[9] Surk Barbara, and, Macpherson, Masha, “France, United Arab Emirates sign deal on energy cooperation amid potential Russian shutdown”, PBS News Hour & Associated Press, World, July 18, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/france-united-arab-emirates-sign-deal-on-energy-cooperation