The general election in the UK on 7 May promises to be the most divisive in the country’s modern history.
It is divisive on two counts. First, no party is set to win an overall majority. This poses the possibility of another coalition, carrying on the precedent set in the 2010 general election, or a minority government garnering the outside support of various smaller parties.
Second, the election will be divisive on the Scotland issue. The Scottish National Party (SNP), now with Nicola Sturgeon at its helm, has had a surge in popularity after the failed Scottish independence referendum of last September that the SNP championed. A Labour-SNP coalition/informal agreement appears likely, worrying unionists that Scottish independence could become a reality.
Table 1: Election Polling – Too Close to Call
Conservatives | Labour | Liberal Democrats | SNP | Plaid Cymru | Greens | UKIP | |
Election Results 2010 (seats)[1] | 306 | 258 | 57 | 6 | 3 | 1 | – |
Projected Election Results 2015 (seats) | 281 | 267 | 26 | 51 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
Projected percent of votes | 34.5% | 32.6% | 11.7% | 3.8% | 0.6% | 4.1% | 11% |
The winner will be that party/alliance that gets 326 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons. The projections (as of May 5) in the Table suggest no single party is likely to secure a majority. The probability of a Conservative or Labour majority is 0%, and that of a hung parliament is 100%.
Coalition or minority government?
A hung parliament could result in either a coalition or a minority government. Coalition governments are uncommon to the UK. The last non-wartime coalition pre-2010 in the country was the 1937 National Coalition under Neville Chamberlain 73 years ago. [3] But the emergence of smaller parties (like the UK Independence Party or UKIP and the SNP) is fragmenting votes, which could make coalitions the norm.
A national party (like the SNP) has not held a large number of seats in the UK Parliament since 1918 when Sinn Fein won 73 seats, eventually culminating in the formation of the Irish Republic.
With the SNP projected to win 51 seats, its popularity has surged 750% since 2010. Having ruled out any collaboration with the Conservatives, the SNP holds the key to Ed Miliband (Labour) becoming prime minister. A Labour-SNP coalition (318 seats) falls short of the requisite 326 seats. However, it provides them with the numerical strength to seek support from smaller parties like the Liberal Democrats, the Greens, and Plaid Cymru. Labour and SNP may not formalise their alliance, opting instead for a Labour-led minority government with outside SNP support.
A continued Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition would yield a larger 19-seat shortfall, making it harder to form the government without SNP backing.
If no party gets an absolute majority, the serving prime minister has the first option to form a minority government if he believes that his party can command the House’s confidence, even if his party did not receive the highest number of seats.[4] In 1974, for example, after a hung parliament, Edward Heath remained in power for four days to determine whether he could form a government that would not receive a vote of no- confidence.
The incumbent prime minister can either step down,[5] (as Gordon Brown did in 2010) making way for the opposition, or remain as prime minister until the Queen’s Speech to test whether his government can command the House’s support. The Queen’s Speech is the equivalent of India’s “no-confidence” motion, which, if passed, will force the prime minister to resign.
If Labour succeeds in establishing a minority government then it has cemented its place in power for the next half-decade, thanks to the Parliament Fixed Term Act, passed controversially by the current coalition. This will need SNP support. Unionists, fuelled by Conservative campaigning, fear this power shift. This has impacted Labour, leading to Miliband recently insisting that Labour would not do any deal whatsoever with the SNP.[6]
Clearly then, the post-election environment is precarious, especially as the Labour-SNP alliance commands 49% of the seats.
The Scottish question
There is also the issue of Scottish independence—a cause adopted by the SNP. Here, Labour is contradicting its own policies. In 2014 it vehemently campaigned against Scottish independence. An SNP alliance will present the nationalists with leverage to pressurise the government into calling another independence referendum. Nicola Sturgeon conceded that the SNP could seek a second referendum, if something “material” were to change. She cited a change in public attitude or Britain’s exit from the EU (Brexit)—the Conservative-promised referendum—as potentially material, adding to the ambiguity that characterises this election.
A second referendum will not definitely yield an independent Scotland. The political and economic upheaval will make it harder to entirely sever relations. Complete independence without any fiscal or political support is less palatable compared to devolving more power to the Scots. Issues like the ability to use the sterling, automatic membership to the WTO and EU,[7] and Scottish-domiciled companies threatening to shift jurisdictions because of market uncertainty, currency fluctuation and capital flight,[8] will again be contentious.
With Scotland’s reliance on North Sea oil revenue and oil prices currently depressed, this is not an opportune moment for another referendum. But it presents the new government with an opportunity to act on the promise of devolution, appease Scottish voters, and tackle the SNP. The government must, however, be careful to not create “asymmetrical devolution”[9] between Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
The last thing London will want is another independence struggle.
Kunal Nathwani was an intern at Gateway House. Kunal graduated from University College, London (UCL) with an LL.B. He then completed his Legal Practice Course (LPC) from BPP and is currently working at the London office of international law firm, Simmons & Simmons.
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References
[1] Electoral Commission, 2010 UK General Election Results, <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections/2010-uk-general-election-results>
[1] 2015 UK Parliamentary Elections, http://electionforecast.co.uk/
[1] Political Insights, The Least Worst Option: The Pros and Cons of Coalition Government, Boucek Francois , September 2010, http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1111%2Fj.2041-9066.2010.00022.x?r3_referer=wol&tracking_action=preview_click&show_checkout=1&purchase_referrer=onlinelibrary.wiley.com&purchase_site_license=LICENSE_DENIED, pp. 48-49.
[1] Parliament UK, House of Commons: Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Lessons from the Process of Government Formation After the 2010 General Election’ Fourth Report of Session 2010-11, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpolcon/528/528.pdf>
[1] BBC, Gordon Brown ‘stepping down as Labour leader’, May 2010, ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8672859.stm, pp. 9-10.
[1] Dominiczak, Peter, ‘Ed Miliband: No Deal of “Any Kind” with SNP,’ The Telegraph, 26 April 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/11564013/Ed-Miliband-No-deal-of-any-kind-with-SNP.html>
[1] House of Commons, The Quebec Referendums’, Research Paper 13/47, July 2013, < http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP13-47.pdf>, p. 30.
[1] Gantz, David A., The Scottish Referendum: Another Major Step Towards Independence?, University of Arizona October 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508341, pp. 3-4 .
[1] Weller, Marc, ‘Settling Self-Determination Conflicts: Recent Developments’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20- 2009, < http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/20/1/1788.pdf>, p. 117.