Is a UN Security Council seat worth the effort?

If 1998 was the year India announced its arrival on the global stage with a (literal) bang with the testing of a nuclear missile, then Indian foreign policy makers would like to believe that 2010 marked the climax of their efforts. This was the year of widespread global acceptance of India as a major player in global affairs. There’s good reason for that. The five self-appointed global superpowers, along with a bevy of other nations, expressed support for India’s top foreign policy priority: inclusion as a permanent member in an expanded United Nations Security Council.

Legitimacy for India’s bid for a UNSC seat came first from U.S. President Barrack Obama who announced it in his speech to the Indian Parliament during his first visit to India in November 2010. Nations that have traditionally given a cold shoulder to India’s foreign ambitions, such as the UAE and Syria, were quick to jump on to the bandwagon and extend support. Even arch-rival China said that it understood and supported India’s desire to play a greater role in the UN.

But nowhere more so is the importance of Game Theory, and the principle that for everything you gain at the negotiating table, you have to give something back, evident than in foreign policy – a fact that India seems to have overlooked. While on the surface it was a diplomatic coup, it came at the cost of some significant concessions.

With the United States economy significantly weakened, a solution to that particular problem was always going to be top of Obama’s priority list. The Obama visit generated $15 billion in business for the US economy and 53,000 jobs. In return, Obama played to the gallery and was quite liberal in his praise of India’s role in global affairs. However, little was said about issues that are closer to India’s national strategic concerns, like Pakistan’s role in spreading terror in India , the hike in H1-B visa fees, the increasing legislative restrictions on outsourcing.

Next came President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who arrived in India Dec 3, 2010, and had great success in selling the still-untested Areva nuclear reactors to India at a cost of $22 billion. The project has been plagued by financial over-runs and delays in the other locations where it is being built, and Areva has been criticized for grossly under-estimating the cost of producing a single unit of electricity. Given the severe energy crisis in India and the importance of reducing the country’s reliance on fossil fuels, nuclear energy is indeed the answer. But buying an untested nuclear reactor in return for a statement of support is too great a risk to take – and too great a concession to make.

India’s trade-offs for the UNSC seat didn’t stop there. Having set the mood very carefully on the first day of his Dec 15-17 visit to India by supporting India’s aspiration of a greater role in the UN, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who very skillfully skirted the issues of disputed borders with India, stapled visas for Kashmiris and Arunachalis, and control of Arunachal and Tibet. In the end, the Chinese premier’s statement didn’t amount to unequivocal support for India’s bid for a permanent seat – simply greater participation. Buoyed by this apparent diplomatic victory, Indian officials went about inking $16 billion in economic deals with China.

What if India does go on to become a permanent member of UNSC, serving as an independent entity rather than being guided by the Big Five existing members? What would India achieve?

The primary advantage would be the right to veto any resolution that is brought in front of UNSC.

Here, India already has a proxy in the form of a powerful ally in Russia, which has consistently vetoed any resolution that could potentially harm India’s interests. Would that be enough? Not really. Even the most optimistic Indian official knows that any resolution India might bring to the UNSC will need the approval of China.

So it’s worth asking: as a permanent member of the UNSC, would India gain any advantages other than the exercise of a veto? Some would argue that a permanent seat would give India leverage with other nations outside the Security Council, which might ask for India’s help in lobbying within it.

This is hardly a compelling argument, for two reasons. Firstly, the UN’s relevance in dealing with conflicts has been undermined by the US attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, nations are more likely to spend their efforts lobbying the most influential members of the council rather than its newest members.

There is certainly a chance that the position would be a mere status symbol. That would suggest that all India’s recent diplomatic efforts towards the goal of permanent Security Council membership have been rather misguided.

Currently, India’s interests are being served well by Russia in the Security Council. India need not make a permanent seat its top policy goal while that friendship remains solid and without cracks. The country might be better served by exploiting the rapid pace of economic growth to negotiate technology transfer and canvas support for bilateral issues. It’s an approach that is unlikely to achieve short-term glory, but will ultimately serve the country better in the medium and long term.

Once India achieves its ambition of becoming an economic powerhouse and solidifies that position, the rest of the world will be unable to deny the country a significant role on the global stage.