Courtesy:
The timeline records the daily instances and ongoing cross-border dynamics between India and Myanmar since the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar. It tracks the events taking place in the eight states along the Indo-Myanmar border—four states in India (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur) and four in Myanmar (Kachin, Sagaing, Chin, and Rakhine), revealing their social, political and economic interconnectedness.
Courtesy: Gateway House
A sweep of democracies across the world are scheduled to hold general elections in 2024, including seven of the 10 most populous countries. India has an interest in several of these: its own national election and those in its immediate neighbourhood; in the G20, of which India is still part of the troika; and in BRICS-plus, where a new global game is afoot.
Courtesy: Gateway House
Between 2023 and 2024, a sweep of democracies across the world are scheduled to hold general elections. India has an interest in several of these: its own national election and those in its immediate neighbourhood; in the G20, of which India is still part of the troika; and in BRICS-plus, where a new global game is afoot.
![EuropeProtests-01[85] copy](https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/EuropeProtests-0185-copy.png)
Courtesy: Gateway House
Discontent over high energy prices, spiralling living costs, and anti war sentiments have gripped Europe, resulting in protests and civil unrest across the continent. With no immediate solution in sight, public resentment is likely to intensify through the coming winter months
Courtesy: Symbior Solar
While several Bay of Bengal countries are rich in hydropower and thermal electricity generation, others are net energy importers with large markets. India can lead creative energy projects with its eastern neighbours, supported by regional and international institutions.
Courtesy: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
China is a clear winner in the physical connectivity stakes in the Bay of Bengal, and there's a reason a why: Its projects are connected to one another, from rail to road to port. While India also has some successful cross-border road and rail infrastructure projects, they are often an extension of an existing railway line or highway, not specific to the connectivity needs of the region. India can win by focussing instead on building infrastructure to maximise the vast maritime potential of the Bay of Bengal, especially the Andaman and Nicobar Islands that give India access to critical sea channels and trade routes.
Courtesy: Gateway House
The Bay of Bengal is a bridge between the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and with a population of 1.4 billion, an increasingly important economic zone in its own right. India has been slow to build regional connectivity. The space has been filled by China's Belt and Road Initiative projects, which have not always been beneficial for host countries. The region may be better off pursuing digital connectivity by enabling tech startups – areas of India’s strength. This research uses maps to explore the potential for energy, transport, and financial connectivity across the Bay of Bengal.
Courtesy: The Wall Street Journal
With the Taliban now ensconced in Kabul and being given legitimacy to represent Afghanistan, the worry for New Delhi is the Taliban-affiliated terrorist groups which are already looking eastward to India. This graphic shows the relationship between the terrorist groups in Afghanistan and their anti-India cousins.
Courtesy: The Maritime Executive
China is rapidly expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean Region, as its massive investment in ports starts to materialise. From smaller investments of $78 million in Djibouti to large ones like $1.6 billion in Gwadar, these are funded largely by Chinese state-owned enterprises. This infographic shows the 17 ports being built by China, which are now important strategic, economic and political outposts for the country.
Courtesy: Shutterstock
On 28 May 2021, the Biden administration submitted a much-delayed Defense Budget to Congress, asking for $715 billion for 2022, a 1.6% increase over the previous year’s $703.7 billion. This marginal increase highlights the U.S.’s shrinking capacities compared with China, which spends less than a third of the U.S. on defence. This Budget is focussed on challenges in the U.S.’s geographic vicinity, not the administration’s resolve to counter the threat of China from a position of strength.